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Contents

THE EAST ASIAN LIBRARY JOURNAL

VOLUME VII · NUMBER I · SPRING 1994

From the Editor	3
Visitors to the Library	3
The Contributors	3
Acknowledgments	4
Correction	5
To Bury the Unhappy Past: The Problem of Textbook Revision in Japan	
BY YUE-HIM TAM	7
The Use of Japanese Records in Sung Official Histories: A Textual Study	
BY ZHENPING WANG	43
The <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i> : The Record of an Auxiliary Capital Department in the Ming Dynasty	
BY JUN FANG	73
News and Notes: For the Friends of the Gest Library	99
Excerpt from "Annual Report 1992-1993: Gest Oriental Library and East Asian Collections"	99

Illustrations

Page 1, preface, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	75
Page 1, <i>juan</i> 1, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	86
Page 15b, <i>juan</i> 5, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	87
Page 1, <i>juan</i> 14, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	88
Page 31a, <i>juan</i> 18, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	89
Pages 19b–20a, <i>juan</i> 23, <i>Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue</i>	91

The *Gest Library Journal* Becomes the *East Asian Library Journal*

Our readers will note the new title and the new design of this issue of the journal. We hope they will see in this the beginnings of a new journal, albeit one with strong links to its predecessor, the *Gest Library Journal*. To emphasize this continuity, the *East Asian Library Journal* will continue the volume numbers of the *Gest Library Journal*, making this issue volume seven, number one.

We retain our original commitments to the Gest Library, and to its Friends Association, which continues to sponsor this publication. But over the years since we advertised our first issue in 1986, we have come to see a different role for the journal from the role we then anticipated. This broadened role encompasses service to and support for the field of East Asian bibliography and the history of printing, from its origins in China to its spread throughout the culturally contiguous regions of East and Inner Asia. This is a field of specialized investigation, one of growing interdependence among libraries and scholars everywhere, and one not served by English-language publications of similar focus.

Our readership has become more professional and more scholarly than we expected; it has become more international, and less drawn from persons with Princeton University affiliations than we had assumed would be the case. Seeing the logic of this development, we have decided to give the journal its new name, to symbolize our intention to make of it a publication that will better meet some of the more specialized

concerns of this larger audience. We hope that the content will soon reflect more clearly this reorientation of the journal, and especially that authors representing the widespread international audience will soon appear here in larger numbers.

Despite these new directions, we shall also continue to publish articles of broad cultural relevance, and will not abandon the ideal of reaching the informed general reader who has interests in East Asian civilizations. And we shall continue to respond to the special concerns of the members of the Friends of the Gest Library at Princeton who, we think, will be pleased to see that what has all along been their journal is now becoming a publication that strives to contribute ever more widely to all the concerns to which the Gest Library itself is dedicated.

We invite your comments and advice.

From the Editor

VISITORS TO THE LIBRARY

Close to one hundred nonlocal guests and scholars visited the Gest Library during the 1992–1993 fiscal year. Of these, the largest numbers came from other parts of the United States and from the People's Republic of China, Japan, and Taiwan. The library also welcomed visitors from Germany, India, Russia, and Australia. They included such noted persons as Mr. Li Zexing, Chinese ambassador to the United Nations; Liu Junwen, professor of Chinese history, Beijing University; and Peter Ch'ang, deputy director of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan.

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Yue-him Tam is a member of the *East Asian Library Journal's* advisory board and as such was first introduced to the readers of the journal in the spring issue of 1991. Dr. Tam received a Ph.D. from Princeton and was for many years a senior lecturer in the Department of History at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In 1991, he accepted a visiting professorship in the Department of History at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and was soon offered a tenured position. Professor Tam teaches Japanese history and directs a program in Japanese studies at Macalester College.

Zhenping Wang is editor of the *East Asian Library Journal*. He received a doctorate from Princeton in 1989, and went on to teach Chinese history in the Department of History at the University of Toronto. Recently he accepted a teaching position at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. In the past two years, he has published three English articles: "Chinese Manuscript Copies in Ancient Japan," *Gest Library Journal*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1991); "T'ang Maritime Trade Administration," *Asia Major*, vol. 4, pt. 1 (1991); "Chinese Titles as a Means of Diplomatic Communication between China and Japan during the Han-T'ang Period," *Studies in Chinese History*, no. 2 (1992). His most recent article, "Speaking with a Forked Tongue: Diplomatic Correspondence between China and Japan 238-608," will be published in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 114, no. 1 (1994). He is now revising for publication his doctoral dissertation on early Sino-Japanese relations.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The production of this issue was carried out when the editor had decided to accept a teaching position in Singapore. Moving to a new country and trying to settle down there was immensely time consuming, and caused

considerable disruption to the editor's normal working schedule. Without the generous help of Professor F. W. Mote and Barbara Westergaard, manuscript editor of the journal, the timely publication of this issue would have been impossible. The editor would like to acknowledge his indebtedness to them.

CORRECTION

In the last issue of the *Gest Library Journal* (volume 6, number 2), two of the illustrations in Ruowei Yang's "The Liao-Dynasty Stone Inscriptions and Their Importance to the Study of Liao History" were unfortunately incorrectly captioned. The epitaph for Pei-ta wang shown in illustration 2 was written in Chinese, not in Khitan "major characters"; illustration 3 shows the epitaph written in Khitan major characters. We regret any confusion this mixup may have caused.

To Bury the Unhappy Past

The Problem of Textbook Revision in Japan

Y U E - H I M T A M

Few would doubt the importance of textbooks in reflecting the change of values in Japan. Marius B. Jansen, for example, in 1957, witnessed a “striking contrast” between postwar textbooks and those used before the surrender of 1945.¹ Today one may wonder, however, to what extent Japanese history textbooks are still showing such a contrast, particularly when it comes to the treatment of war. More and more Japanese textbooks seem to be increasingly eager to reconstruct Japanese history, trying to bury Japan’s unhappy past. The case of Japanese history textbooks, examined in this paper, may add to Marc Ferro’s amazing findings in his worldwide survey of the “use and abuse of history,” and may also throw some light on the important question he has raised: “And then, tomorrow, which nation, which human group will still be able to control its own history?”²

During the Allied occupation (1945–1952) all Japanese textbooks were directed to purge all references to militarism and ultranationalism, which had been the politically correct stances that had characterized wartime and prewar textbooks. Indeed, many people admitted Japan’s

responsibility for the Pacific War without reservation. The Ministry of Education in its "Guide to the New Education," issued in 1946, expressed guilt-ridden sentiments: "From the Manchurian Incident [1931] on, Japan followed an undemocratic political and economic course at home and acted contrary to international legal and moral tenets abroad. . . . These policies were a cause of the Pacific War. We must never repeat those mistakes."³ The first postwar state textbook on Japanese history, *Kuni no ayumi* (Our nation's path, certified and published in 1946), was unequivocally pacifist: "The Japanese people suffered terribly from the long war. Military leaders suppressed the people, launched a stupid war, and caused this disaster."⁴ Textbooks for other subjects such as civics and modern society also adopted the same attitude. In a 1949 reading published by the Ministry of Education, *Minshushugi* (Democracy), we find the following accusation: "Japan and Germany must accept the greatest responsibility for World War II, which caused vast suffering, distress, and dislocation to the world. . . . [The military] propelled Japan into the fateful cataclysm of the Pacific War."⁵

The new emphasis on anticommunism in U.S. foreign policy, which started in late 1947, and the return of sovereignty to Japan in 1952 saw early attempts to revise the guilt-ridden views of the Pacific War and to reverse the democratic educational reforms.⁶ As early as February 1953, only one year after independence, the minister of education, Okano Seigo, created a public sensation with his controversial statement: "I do not wish to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of the Greater East Asian War, but the fact that Japan took on so many opponents and fought them for four years . . . proves our superiority."⁷ As a textbook writer observed, "the Ministry of Education did a volte-face on the official interpretation of the war."⁸ Many textbooks began to shift responsibility for the war away from Japan, blaming instead China, the United States, England, and other countries for the tragedy. Some even supported the so-called Affirmative View of the Greater East Asian War (*Dai Tōa Sensō kōtei ron*) advocated by the nationalistic revisionists in the 1960s, which sought to reinterpret the war as a positive action to resist Western imperialism led by Japan in the interests of all Asians.⁹

The revision of textbooks in Japan has been directed from above,

stemming from the long-term objective of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to boost patriotic education and nationalism. In February 1955 “nationalization of textbooks,” a euphemism for “tightening control of textbooks,” was in the platform of the Japanese Democratic Party (the predecessor of the LDP). Following its victory in 1956, the LDP started a campaign to correct the bias and indoctrination in the textbooks written by leftist authors for all subjects, including even basic Japanese language instruction in elementary and high schools. The LDP leaders openly accused textbook writers of being Marxist, antigovernment, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic.¹⁰

In spite of its desire for immediate revision of the textbooks, for the first two decades or so after independence, the LDP could only exert moderate and gradual pressure on the Ministry of Education, which was responsible for textbook screening and certification. The opposition parties were equally firmly against such revision. Many mass rallies were organized by the militant Japan Teachers’ Union (Nikkyōso) and other groups to protest the tightening of control on textbooks. Textbook writers also rebuked the government as reactionary and undemocratic, and criticized the screening system as unconstitutional.¹¹ Professor Ienaga Saburō, a renowned Japanese historian whose popular Japanese history textbook was rejected by the Ministry of Education in 1963, sued the government on grounds of censorship three times, starting in 1965. The first lawsuit was in the courts for fifteen years, the second for over twenty-five; the supreme court has yet to deliver its judgment on the third.¹² The legal battles have contributed substantially to the division in Japanese views on history education.

Beginning in 1980, when the LDP won a landslide victory in the election for both houses of the Diet, the LDP vigorously launched a new campaign to revise the textbooks. This campaign generated protest not only at home, but abroad. Elsewhere I have examined the blazing diplomatic dispute that flared in the summer months of 1982 in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries over the presentation in Japanese history textbooks of events prior to and during the Second World War.¹³ As evidenced by an official statement issued by the then secretary general of the cabinet, Miyazawa Kiichi, the Japanese government for the first

time was forced to commit itself to making the necessary corrections in textbooks for the sake of friendship with its neighbors.¹⁴ However, the Japanese government's commitment in 1982 failed to check the revisionist tendency in textbook writing. Another furor of protests exploded in the summer of 1986 when the Education Ministry approved a new textbook for Japanese history, which, as shown in a later section of this paper, was antidemocratic and ultranationalistic, and full of denials of Japanese war crimes. Not only were there protests in Japan, but China and South Korea led other Asian countries in lodging diplomatic complaints, warning that bilateral relations could be damaged unless the Japanese government rescinded its approval of this new textbook. The prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, is reported to have been personally involved in the approval. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to the help of the Ministry of Education in coping with the problems caused by the new textbook. Kaifu Toshiki, prime minister from 1989 until November 1991, who approved the controversial textbook in his capacity as education minister, resigned early enough in July 1986 to avoid getting into deeper trouble. His successor, however, was fired when he tried to defend the textbook's treatment of the "Greater East Asian War."¹⁵ Indeed, few issues would have placed the Japanese leadership in such a rare display of public agonizing.

In the early 1980s a few American scholars rightly spoke out about the problematic treatment of the Pacific War and Japan's relations with the United States in Japanese textbooks. A research project jointly sponsored by respectable Japanese and American institutions reported in 1981 that although the American reviewers of Japanese textbooks gave high marks to the general performance of the Japanese textbook writers, they could also readily identify "problematic areas" in the subjects under review, including history (Japanese and world), geography, civics, Japanese politics, and economics for junior and senior high school students.¹⁶ The problematic treatment of Pearl Harbor and other events in Japanese-U.S. relations in the twentieth century was found to be most disturbing.¹⁷

The reviewers mentioned above were primarily "concerned with improvements in the quality of the textbooks of both nations,"¹⁸ and their discussion of the Pacific War was necessarily sketchy. Few concrete

examples or analyses were given to illustrate the reviewers' points regarding the Pacific War and American-Japanese relations. Moreover, the reviewers focused on the textbooks published in 1978 and 1979 only.¹⁹ As textbooks in Japan are required to go through the certification process every three to four years, changes and revisions are bound to be made. To understand fully how the Pacific War is treated in Japanese textbooks, therefore, one has to review the textbooks published over a longer period.

Before examining the treatment of the Pacific War in Japanese textbooks, it is necessary to explain the name of the war. As most Japanese textbook writers see it, the Pacific War (*Taiheiyō Sensō*) did not start with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. It started with the Japanese involvement in the Manchurian Incident in 1931, making the conflict in China the first stage of the war and Pearl Harbor the beginning of the final stage. Viewed in such a light, the Pacific War lasted for fifteen years, from 1931 to 1945, and as such, it is sometimes referred to as the "Fifteen Year War" or World War II. Ienaga Saburō explains: "The term 'Pacific War' covers the period from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the unconditional surrender in 1945 and encompasses the whole series of Japan's military clashes with other countries. . . . These events are inseparable, full parts of the same war."²⁰ Most Japanese textbooks mark the beginning of the Pacific War in 1931, if not earlier.

The *Chūkyō* series of *Chūkyō Shuppan: Chūgakusei no shakai-ka* (Social science for high school students, published by the *Chūkyō Shuppan Company*) is used here for analysis of the treatment of the Pacific War for three reasons.²¹ First, the series remained the most popular among the textbooks for Japanese history and world history from the early 1950s to the 1970s. Until 1972 the series had more than 30 percent of the market for history textbooks.²² Second, although the textbooks in this series were required to go through certification every three to four years throughout the twenty-year period, changes proved to be minimal. Toyoda Takeshi remained the senior co-author of the series, keeping the ideas and arguments consistent.²³ Third, the texts concerning the Pacific War in this series were reprinted in a source book entitled *Taiheiyō Sensō to kyōkasho* (The Pacific War and textbooks), which is convenient to use.²⁴

In the Chūkyō series the Pacific War is treated in a chapter entitled "The Pacific War and Japan" or "The Second World War and Japan." The chapter is divided into illustrations; an introductory section of questions and answers called "What We Are Learning from This Chapter"; a box headed "Purposes of Learning," which highlights the contents of the chapter; the text, which makes up the bulk of the chapter; and a conclusion. The text is clearly written, being straightforwardly descriptive.

The chapter starts with two pictures, one showing an air raid in Tokyo and the other the aftermath of the atomic bomb, with provocative captions to arouse the students' interest. One caption reads:

On August 6, 1945, we Japanese opened our fearful eyes to witness what the human race had yet to experience. In the twinkling of an eye many innocent people were sent to the bottom of hell when an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There are many stories to be told, and the mere thought of any of them makes one tremble. . . . The war ended with the atomic bombs. . . . It was a bloody war.²⁵

It is a laudable effort to arouse the interest of the schoolchildren by using pictures and other visual materials such as maps and charts. But, since there are three or four pictures of bombings in this chapter, the reader is left with the impression that Japan was more a victim of the war than any other country. The impression becomes stronger in reading the editions certified in 1954 and later years, because a chart entitled "Victims of the Atomic Bombs" was inserted to give detailed figures of casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Following the sensational introductory remarks on the pictures, three major questions are posed to students under the subheading "What We Learn from This Chapter." As for the first question — "Was the course of our country correct until the Second World War?" — the students are told that war does not occur by accident, and therefore the course of development after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 should be reexamined. There is not the slightest trace of bitterness or of ideological overtones in the introductory remarks. Instead, one may sense a touch of scholarship. But one's feelings change when one reads the text, which emphatically tells the students about the development of capitalism amid

Westernization in Meiji times, the failure of the political parties, and the increasingly oppressive measures taken by the United States and other Western powers that infringed on Japan's course of development. As for the second question — "What did the different countries in the world want for themselves?" — the authors explain that whatever the wishes of individual countries, they will never be attained. Thus the students are encouraged to keep a watchful eye on the aggressive moves of Japan's competitors rather than on Japan's own moves. The third question — "What is the New Japan aiming at?" — is posed as the most significant question directly related to the Pacific War. The writers contend: "During the occupation by foreign military forces there were tentative answers to the big questions. But, were these answers correct? We simply cannot tell yet. Since our country has regained independence, let us have our own answers from our own minds."²⁶ Here, in the name of independent thinking, the democratic reforms during the occupation are introduced as "tentative answers" imposed by the Americans, which need to be reexamined.

It is clear from the introductory questions and remarks that the old-fashioned Confucian notion of history as the work of moral men, who are in complete control of events and in a position to right the wrong, still has a dominant hold over the authors. The moral issue, however, has disappeared amid the overtones of social Darwinism, which predominate in the books. The Pacific War was, after all, unavoided and unavoidable. Japan was certainly not the only one to be blamed. Obviously, the authors choose not to indulge in an orgy of guilt-ridden and emotional attacks on their imperial past, which was not uncommon in textbooks in the early postwar years, but to concentrate instead on the more passive and altruistic aspects of Japanese imperialism.

Following the introductory questions and remarks, the writers go on to describe changes under the following subheadings: the depression in the 1920s, political parties and their relations with the *zaibatsu* (financial cliques), the "advance to" (rather than "invasion of") Manchuria, the conflict in China and the aid from the United States and Britain, the Second World War and Japan, and finally the Pacific War and the atomic bombs.

A strong theme running through these topics is a desire to stress the disruptive effects of Western imperialism on Japan and the rest of Asia. On the question of the depression, the writers start with a statement about overproduction in the major industrialized countries following the First World War, which is cited as the major cause for the recession and economic chaos of the 1920s. The worldwide impact of the Great Depression, which started in the United States in 1929, is particularly emphasized as a major force throwing Japan into economic disaster. To salvage the situation, the Japanese government came up with well thought out policies to facilitate the "rationalization of industries and balanced budgetary planning." Nevertheless, there was no easy solution for Japan's domestic economic problems, because Japan was small and overpopulated. As a result, "our government sought to solve the domestic economic problems abroad, and naturally, the vision of the Japanese people was also extended abroad."²⁷ Here one can easily find traces of a residual anti-Western slant, which probably owes its origins to prewar propaganda.²⁸

On the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression, three reasons are given. First, the Chinese did not cooperate with the Japanese "economic advance" (*keizai no shinshutsu*) in China, which ultimately resulted from Japan's Westernization. Second, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party used the anti-Japanese movement (*hai-Nitchi undō o riyō*) to advance its unification movement. Third, American and British aid strengthened the anti-Japanese movement in China.²⁹ The writers leave students with the impression that the Japanese "advance" in China, although "flawed," was nevertheless imposed on Japan by Western powers. The Chinese government, particularly Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party, after all, benefited politically from the Japanese "advance." Japan is thus placed in a no-fault position.

Whereas many textbooks locate the indirect causes of the Second World War in the complex economic and political situation in the post-First World War decades, there is a perceptible difference in emphasis on the American role. The Chūkyō books are inclined to see the United States as a continuing source of worldwide troubles, which became worse in the late 1920s. Japanese students are told that the 1929

New York Stock Exchange disaster led to the Great Depression world-wide. "In particular, the price of agricultural produce plunged. To prevent a further plunge, wheat fields were burned in Canada and coffee was dumped into the sea in Brazil."³⁰ The Great Depression placed many countries in a difficult position. The United States tried in vain to help solve the problems. For instance, it agreed to extend the deadline of impoverished Germany's reparations payment, and later even agreed to accept drastically reduced reparations payments from Germany. But the United States refused to make loans to the United Kingdom and other European countries, offering no practical help for economic recovery in that part of the world. "As a result, the Western countries moved to consolidate their colonies and spheres of influence to establish a 'bloc economy' against other countries, and to facilitate 'economic control' at home."³¹ The students are also informed that President Roosevelt's New Deal was successful, but that Roosevelt's power was checked by the Congress, which favored liberalism, opposing the Nazism of Germany and the fascism of Italy. Badly hit by the Great Depression, England gave up its support for free trade, instead strengthening the policy of "bloc economy" under the National Government of Ramsay MacDonald. The rise of Mussolini and Hitler was thus related to the Great Depression, which had started in the United States.³²

Naturally, the grim socioeconomic situation in Japan on the eve of the Pacific War is attributed to the discriminatory policies of the Western powers. The text reads:

*As we could not sell our products in massive quantity at home, we had to look for markets overseas, thereby engaging ourselves in commercial competition with European countries and the United States. As a last resort, we had to lower our prices, adopting the strategy of "dumping." Other countries, however, took precautions against our dumping, such as raising tariffs.*³³

Consequently, the Japanese economy was on the brink of collapse. Industries had to lay off workers. It was difficult for the unemployed to return to their native places, as the rural areas were worse hit than the cities. The unemployed flooded the cities, helping socialist ideas to

spread. But the political parties were unable to solve these problems. The writers conclude: "Taking this opportunity, the military grabbed political power."³⁴ Hence, the students are left with the impression that the United States and other Western powers were the driving force behind Japan's move to militarism.

The writers have more immediate reasons to see the United States and the United Kingdom as malevolent upholders of world order. First, these two powers unilaterally placed an embargo on gasoline and other important materials, a move that necessitated the National Mobilization Law in Japan in 1938 and forced the Japanese government to resort to war with the United States and other powers.³⁵ Another reason was that the United States was greatly irritated by the Japanese "advance" into southern Indochina in July 1941, and took steps to reduce economic relations with Japan, including unilaterally renouncing its trade treaty with Japan.³⁶ Not satisfied with acting alone, the United States moved to ally itself with Britain, China, and the Netherlands (the Dutch), forming the "ABCD Encirclement" against Japan and making diplomatic negotiation impossible. When General Tōjō Hideki was asked to organize his cabinet in 1941, it was apparent that a war with the United States and other powers was unavoidable. Having no hope for peace, Japan decided to launch the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other American, British, and Dutch territories.³⁷

On the role of the League of Nations, the Chūkyō textbooks charge that following the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 "the prestige of the League of Nations was gone," repeating critical statements in war-time textbooks that accused the league of being "unfair" to and "biased" against Japan.³⁸

Although skillful summaries of events are the strong points of the textbooks in the Chūkyō series, questions are rarely raised. On the whole the text is straightforwardly assertive, with little reflection or analysis. Here and there some loaded accusatory phrases and lines peep through. For instance, the United States is referred to as "the center of the depression of the world" (*sekai no fukeiki no shingenchi*).³⁹ The story of the Pacific War was, in a nutshell, the story of "the flames of war that originally flared within the European world which by and by engulfed

the Orient” (*Yōroppa no tenchi-ni makiokotta dōran no hi no te wa yagate Tōyō-nimo oyonda*).⁴⁰

Another disturbing factor is the reappearance of certain colorful terms and value judgments that were common in wartime textbooks. For instance, the phrase “*hachiku no shingeki*” (irresistible advance) was used to describe the “heroic strikes” of the Japanese Imperial Army in British Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the American Philippines and Aleutian Islands in textbooks published in March 1942.⁴¹ In the Chūkyō series, a similar term, “*hachiku no ikioi*” (irresistible force), was used to describe the military victories immediately following Pearl Harbor.⁴² Indeed, the phrase “irresistible force” reminds one of wartime propaganda.

It is quite extraordinary that there is no mention whatsoever of the devastating damage in China, Southeast Asia, and other places that the Japanese caused throughout this “Fifteen Year War.” There is no reference to the Rape of Nanking, germ warfare and the 731 Unit, and other war crimes in China and elsewhere in Asia. The attack on Pearl Harbor is mentioned in one short sentence without any word of casualties.⁴³

In contrast, the effect of the war on Japanese society is covered in detail. The hardships the Japanese endured in the last months of the war are described in a provocative way:

*During the winter of 1944, at last, the American air force started to bomb Japan proper. Beginning in 1945 they raided our important facilities and cities almost every day. As a result, schoolchildren had to leave their parents and be evacuated to the countryside. Students were mobilized to manufacture weapons, or to pick up guns to fight in the front. The rural areas were troubled with lack of manpower, leaving agricultural fields a wasteland.*⁴⁴

In mentioning the suffering of the children and students in such a context, and illustrating the text with provocative pictures, the writers have succeeded in suggesting that the bombing represented savage abuse, which has in turn deeply confused the students’ understanding of the war.

The atomic bombs are condemned even more sweepingly. Before

the accusation, the bomb itself is described in some detail. One description reads: "This new bomb was made of uranium, a costly product of many first-class scientists working in secrecy."⁴⁵

The political result of the bombs is clearly spelled out:

*This device was used as a strong measure to crush the fighting spirit of the Japanese armed forces. . . . The destructive power of the bomb was beyond the capacity of any language to describe, and there was nothing to counter it. As our national strength was then already exhausted, the appearance of this surprising atomic bomb made us lose our will to resist.*⁴⁶

Despite the wealth of information on the atomic bomb, the Chūkyō's account does not really answer the kind of questions the students might have. How could all this really have happened? Why did it happen? The very wealth of information seems to make it more difficult for unsophisticated students to distinguish the woods from the trees. The writers never admit any moral wrongdoing on the part of Japan throughout the Pacific War. More than once the students are told that Japan was defeated merely because of its lack of resources and advanced technology.⁴⁷

As Japan is not found guilty, the postwar reforms during the occupation are placed in a different perspective. The writers leave the impression that the reforms were imposed on Japan by the Americans, and their effect remained doubtful. The 1954 version contains the following assessment: "Following strictly the directives from the occupying forces, we endeavored to practice democracy, gradually securing peace treaties, and finally becoming an independent country again. But most of the problems remained unresolved, and many problematic questions lie ahead."⁴⁸ At the end of the chapter, the writers remind the students that ten years after the war its impact could still be felt strongly: "In fact, we are still left in a bewildering situation. We cannot say we have completely settled the aftermath of the war. We are not completely free from the fear of another war."⁴⁹

On the one hand, the achievement of the democratic reforms is disparaged; on the other, the possible uneasiness about the performance

of the Japanese during the war is peculiarly obfuscated. At the end of the lesson, the following admonition is given to the students: "There is no need to be pessimistic. Our forefathers were preoccupied with a lot of problems. They had wrestled with these problems, and occasionally they might have taken extreme measures to try to solve them. There is nothing that we cannot do. Let us reexamine these problems once more."⁵⁰ In such a way of using and abusing history, the Chūkyō series has provided an interesting case for studying biases in school textbooks.

It is important to note that the Chūkyō textbooks cited above all went through the certification process. That is to say, they all met the standard set by the Japanese government, and as I show below, reflect the view that the Japanese Ministry of Education wanted to propagate. As early as 1949, Japan started a textbook-screening system (*kentei seido*), which has remained in effect to this day. The Ministry of Education is not only responsible for issuing the "course-of-study outlines" (*gakushū shidō yōryō*) for textbooks for all subjects at all levels in primary and secondary schools, but also for implementing the textbook-screening system. Under the influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Ministry of Education has worked to check the Marxist, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic tendencies in textbooks. It is possible to form the impression that the required "revisions" were imposed from above.

It is not easy to document the imposition of revisions, however, as the instructions from the textbook inspectors at the Ministry of Education are given to the writers and publishers orally in a meeting in a private room, which is sometimes referred to as "clandestine screening" (*misshitsu kentei*).⁵¹ Nevertheless, we can see the results of the imposed revisions by comparing the final version of the textbooks with the earlier versions, including originally submitted versions and conditionally approved versions, which are all required to be printed and properly bound for internal use.

In the ten textbooks for Japanese history and eleven for world history certified in 1982, I found several examples of imposed revisions concerning the Pacific War.⁵² Although some are obvious, many are highly subtle. To show the revisions I first quote the passage in question

in translation and then quote the final version, printing in bold type the disputed terms or lines in the original version and the revised terms or lines in the final version. Finally, I briefly highlight the differences between the two.

1. *To reduce the aggressive image of the Axis.*

ORIGINAL: Afterward, in November 1937, Italy also joined the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact, **forming the Axis of the so-called three have-not countries in opposition to the three have countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. This move was based on imperialism to justify aggression and recarving of the world.** (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 318)

FINAL: Afterward, in November 1937, Italy also joined the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact. **These three countries, which were referred to as "have not countries," formed the Tripartite Axis. This Axis was formed as a united front to resist the Soviet Union; its character as a means to oppose the "have" countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France was also being strengthened.** (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 318)

In the final version the sentence concerning imperialism and the aggressive motivation behind the forming of the Tripartite is deleted. The revision has also given the Soviet Union as the reason the Axis was formed, placing it and the Allied powers in direct opposition to Japan, and thereby making Japan's later war with the Allied powers appear more justifiable.

2. *To reduce the aggressiveness of Japanese military actions abroad.*

CASE A, ORIGINAL: In September 1940 Japan **dispatched troops** (*shuppei*) to the northern part of French Indochina. (Sanseidō's *Kōkō Sekaishi*, p. 234)

CASE A, FINAL: In September 1940 Japan **stationed troops** (*chūhei*) in the northern part of French Indochina. (Sanseidō's *Kōkō Sekaishi*, p. 234)

CASE B, ORIGINAL: This **aggression** (*shinryaku*) in Southeast Asia (Teikoku's *Shinshō Sekaishi*, p. 304)

CASE B, FINAL: This **advance** (*shinshutsu*) in Southeast Asia (Teikoku's *Shinshō Sekaishi*, p. 304)

CASE C, ORIGINAL: [Subhead] Japan's **Invasion** (*shinryaku*) of China (Tōsho's *Sekaishi*, p. 302)

CASE C, FINAL: [Subhead] Japan's **Occupation** (*senryō*) of Manchuria (Tōsho's *Sekaishi*, p. 302)

CASE D, ORIGINAL: In 1932 the League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission, whose report **concluded that Japan's action [in Manchuria] was an act of aggression** (*shinryaku*). (Sanseidō's *Nihonshi*, p. 300)

CASE D, FINAL: In 1932 the League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission, whose report **did not recognize the Japanese action [in Manchuria] as an exercise of legitimate rights of self-defense** (*seitōna jieiken no hatsudō*). (Sanseidō's *Nihonshi*, p. 300)

In all four cases, the change has the effect of toning down the sense of aggression that the original version suggests. The word "aggression" is replaced by "advance" or disappears altogether.

3. To reduce the severity of Japanese war crimes.

CASE A, ORIGINAL: In the occupied areas the local people were oppressed and exploited. **On the battle front in China the Japanese were accused of reinforcing the so-called Three All policy (sankō seisaku).² Chinese and Koreans were taken to Japan to become forced laborers in mining and other fields.³ To resist the relentless rule of the Japanese, anti-Japanese movements were spreading out in the occupied areas.**

FOOTNOTES:

² **Destroy all** (*ryakukō*), **kill all** (*satsukō*), and **burn all** (*shōkō*), as the policies were called on the Chinese side.

³ **From 1939 to 1945, a minimum of more than 600,000 Koreans and approximately 50,000 Chinese were taken to Japan.** (Jikkyō's *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

CASE A, FINAL: In the occupied areas the local people were oppressed and exploited.² **To resist the relentless rule of the Japanese, anti-Japanese movements were spreading out in the occupied areas, and the Japanese army took measures to maintain security.**³

FOOTNOTES:

² There were about 40,000 Chinese who were taken to Japan proper and became forced laborers.

³ During the Pacific War, the Japanese forces were troubled by the guerrilla warfare under the command of the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese forces launched a pacification campaign in the anti-Japanese base in the middle part of the Hopei Province in China in May-June 1942, which was referred to as the “Three All” campaign (burn all, kill all, and destroy all), and criticized. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

Here Japanese war crimes such as the “Three All” policy and forced labor are removed from the text and mentioned only in footnotes. Notice, also, that the scale of the devastating “Three All” policy is substantially reduced in that it now took place in one location (mid-Hopei) and for a short period (one to two months) only. In addition, the policy is instituted to maintain security in the occupied area, making it defensive rather than offensive. The Korean forced laborers now are left out in both the text and footnote, as they are considered “citizens” of the Japanese empire.

CASE B, ORIGINAL: On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a newly completed atomic bomb on Hiroshima, **killing** (*korosu*) **200,000 people** in one blow. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

CASE B, FINAL: On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a newly completed atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and **more than 100,000 people sacrificed** (*gisei*) **their lives** in one blow. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

Here, the death toll is reduced. Notice, also, that the victims in Hiroshima are no longer “killed,” but “sacrificed” their lives for their country.

CASE C, ORIGINAL: [In Okinawa] throughout the fighting, by June 1945, **approximately 100,000 military personnel and 200,000 civilians died**. The boys and girls in such units as “Iron-Blood Loyal Force” and “Red Starlily Force” also **sacrificed their lives**. And, about 800 Okinawans were killed by the Japanese army for interfering with the prosecution of the war. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

CASE C, FINAL: [In Okinawa] throughout the fighting, by June 1945, approximately 94,000 military personnel and their dependents (including about 28,000 native Okinawans), 55,000 residents who helped out with the war (including the boys and girls in such units as “Iron-Blood Loyal Force” and “Red Starlily Force”), and 39,000 ordinary residents involved in the war had sacrificed their lives. The total death toll of Okinawans reached approximately 20 percent of the prefecture’s population. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

Notice the death toll is carefully itemized. The grand total is now 190,000, military and civilians combined, which is substantially less than previously charged (300,000). The killing of the 800 or so Okinawans for interfering with the prosecution of the war is entirely eliminated.

4. To rationalize the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

CASE A, ORIGINAL: While propagandizing the plan of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to **justify aggression, Japan was plotting to advance to Southeast Asia.** (Jikkyō’s *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

CASE A, FINAL: While propagandizing the plan of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” **Japan was plotting to advance to Southeast Asia to secure such important resources as gasoline, tin, and crude rubber.** (Jikkyō’s *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

Here, the phrase “justifying aggression” is eliminated, and the “advance” to Southeast Asia is given a justification.

CASE B, ORIGINAL: Japan argued that this war was intended to liberate Asia from Western invasion and oppression, building “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

CASE B, FINAL: Japan argued that this war was intended to liberate Asia from Western invasion and oppression, **and to facilitate the independence of the Asian peoples,** by building “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

Here the phrase “to facilitate the independence of the Asian peoples” is added to give more weight to the justification for “the Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

5. To shift the responsibility for the war away from the Japanese government.

ORIGINAL: **As America, Britain, China, and Holland (the Dutch)**

formed the ABCD encirclement, they facilitated an economic blockade against Japan, which was used by the Japanese government to rationalize a war. (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

FINAL: The "ABCD Encirclement," an economic blockade against Japan formed by America, Britain, China, and Holland (the Dutch), kept deepening the sense of national crisis among our people. (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

Here, the "sense of national crisis among our people" is used to replace a straightforward admission of the government's mistake in rationalizing the war. Also, the "ABCD Encirclement" is now being emphasized as the very factor forcing Japan to go to war. It is the ABCD allies, therefore, rather than Japan, that should be held responsible for starting the Pacific War.

6. *To place the Tokyo Tribunal in a negative light.*

ORIGINAL: In November 1948, Tōjō Hideki and seven others were found guilty, and their death sentence was carried out in December. By this time, the suspects who were not prosecuted were released. **Those who received sentences other than death were all released by 1958.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

FINAL: In November 1948, Tōjō Hideki and seven others were found guilty, and their death sentence was carried out in December. By this time, the suspects who were not prosecuted were released. **There were criticisms of this tribunal for being one-sided, facilitating the victors' justice.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

Here the issue of "victors' justice" is brought up in the name of presenting a "balanced" view of historical events.

7. *To rehabilitate the image of the emperor.*

ORIGINAL: There were some people among the Allied powers **who voiced their demand that the emperor be put on trial** (*tennō o saiban-ni kakeyo-no koe*). **Because of a political design centering around the United States and the United Kingdom, the emperor was exempted from consideration as a war-crimes suspect.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

FINAL: There were some people among the Allied powers **who**

voiced questions regarding the emperor's responsibility for the war (*tennō no sensō sekinin o tou*). **Out of consideration for the Japanese people's sentiments, the emperor was not listed as a war-crimes suspect.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

Here, the accusatory tone is subtly lowered. Now instead of there being a demand that the emperor be put on trial, he is subject to inquiry about his war responsibilities. Also, the emperor is not even listed as a defendant, owing to "consideration for the Japanese people's sentiments," not because of political reasons within the United States and Britain.

It is clear that on many occasions the imposed revisions lead to a distortion of historical facts. Unfortunately, this disturbing consequence is heartily welcomed by some parts of Japanese society, particularly the conservative leadership. The former Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki is reported to have asked, "Why must we fling mud at the history of Japan with our own hands?"⁵³ Nationalism is often cited to justify the revision, and "noninterference in domestic affairs" is used to ward off protests from abroad.⁵⁴

In order not to "fling mud at the history of Japan," to use former Education Minister Fujio's words, a new textbook would be needed. Indeed, as mentioned above, the certification in 1986 of the new textbook *Shimpen Nihonshi* (New version of Japanese history), published by Hara Shobō in Tokyo in 1987 amid storms of protest at home and abroad, marked a new phase of textbook revision in Japan.

The new textbook was jointly written by nine people, including Muramatsu Takeshi, a respected professor at Tsukuba University. These writers, known for their Japanese-empire-centered view of history (*kōkoku shikan*), "would not hesitate to testify on behalf of the government against Ienaga in the textbook law suit."⁵⁵ As revealed in the press release, in addition to the nine writers, many other individuals and organizations were involved in the writing and publication. Specifically, the new textbook was "supervised" (*kanshū*) by Murao Jirō, a former deputy minister of education, and "edited" (*henshū*) by the National Association for the Protection of Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi). The "supervisor" and "editors" are politically colorful personalities in con-

temporary Japan, and the National Association for the Protection of Japan, founded in 1981, is noted as a right-wing organization. The president of the association, Kase Shinichi, former Japanese ambassador to the United Nations and an influential adviser to the Nakasone administration, is a staunch ultranationalist. The executive director, Mayuzumi Toshirō, a renowned composer by profession, has been a spokesman for ultranationalistic campaigns in recent years. The association is committed to campaign for a constitutional amendment to revive the power of the emperor and to legalize rearmament, favoring ultranationalism and militarism, which the Allied occupation sought to discourage. The leaders of this association reacted strongly to the protests from China and Korea against textbook revision in Japan in 1982, blaming the Japanese government for adopting a soft stand because it committed itself to correcting historical errors in Japanese textbooks. As they were not happy with the general performance of all existing history textbooks, they decided to produce their own.⁵⁶

This new textbook differs from its peers in several ways. First, like its prewar predecessors its text is written vertically from right to left according to the traditional style, which is in direct contrast to the horizontal writing from left to right found in all postwar history textbooks.⁵⁷ Also, it is widely rumored in education circles that the process of certification in 1986 was different from the normal course, and there are reports of favoritism from the Ministry of Education, including extensions of deadlines.⁵⁸ In spite of the fact that the textbook inspectors at the Ministry of Education demanded that eight hundred items, an unusually large number, be corrected and that many of these demands were ignored by the writers, the textbook was certified. The most striking abnormality was the personal involvement of Premier Nakasone Yasuhiro and his minister of education, Kaifu Toshiki. Moreover, despite the existence of traditional departmental lines within the bureaucracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is said to have been called on to polish the diplomatically sensitive texts.⁵⁹ The message is plain that the premier and his ruling party were favoring the new textbook as a model history for Japanese schools. The enthusiastic response to the new textbook from leading intellectuals is also revealing. Sakamoto Tarō, a highly respected Japanese historian, gave high marks to the new orientation embodied in

this book, arguing that it distinguished itself from the left-wing approach, from the emphasis on self-criticism, and from a defeatist historical viewpoint commonly found in postwar textbooks.⁶⁰ Many more paid tribute to the publication.⁶¹ The internationally acclaimed critic Etō Jun praised this work as a “very beautiful and brilliant textbook” which provided a breakthrough in the “pitiful situation” of foreign-dominated education throughout the forty-one years (1945–1986) since Japan’s defeat. He likened the new textbook to an “air hole” (*kazaana*) in the suffocating mind-set in contemporary Japan.⁶²

In the treatment of the Pacific War, indeed, this new textbook takes a more revisionist and Japan-centric view, and draws to a greater extent on materials that present Japan in a more favorable light than did the general run of earlier postwar textbooks. This is perhaps the only textbook certified in 1986 that refuses to refer to the war as the “Pacific War.” Following the wartime practice, it consistently refers to the war as “the Greater East Asian War,” which, according to wartime propaganda, was not an aggressive war but a “sacred war” (*seisen*). The term “the so-called Pacific War” is given in parentheses when the “Pacific War” appears for the first time in the text.⁶³ In dealing with the background of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which led to Pearl Harbor, the book introduces a series of events, including Chiang Kai-shek’s success in the northern expedition, the international support for Chiang, the Manchurian strong man Chang Hsüeh-liang’s anti-Japanese measures, and “organized anti-Japanese activities” throughout China, that give the impression that Japan’s military actions in Manchuria were necessary to resist intensified Chinese offensives against Japan.⁶⁴ Another example is a fuller account of the “Hull Note” to stress that Japan was forced to go to war by the United States. The book states that on November 25, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded that Japan withdraw all its armies from China (including Manchuria) and French Indochina, recognize the Chungking government as the only legitimate government of China, renounce the Tripartite Pact, and return to the situation before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The text ends with an emphatic conclusion: “This was in fact an ultimatum (*saigo tsūchō*), containing conditions unacceptable to Japan.”⁶⁵

Two other examples demonstrate the textbook’s desire to shift the

responsibility for the war. First, the textbook contends that the Tōjō cabinet, in spite of its efforts to prepare for war, continued its effort to avoid a war with the United States through intensive diplomatic negotiations. It was the United States that adopted the view that a war with Japan was unavoidable.⁶⁶ Second, in a box inserted in the upper column of the page, the writers quote and footnote two entries from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's diary to stress the impression that members of the American leadership were the real warmongers. The first entry, dated November 25, 1941, quotes President Roosevelt plotting with Stimson and other members of the War Cabinet: "How do we induce (*yūdō*) Japan into a situation where it will fire the first shot?" This quotation in Japanese translation leads one to believe that the president wants a war and plans to entrap Japan into such a war by making it the first to fire. The second entry from Stimson's diary, recorded two days later, quotes Hull telling Stimson and Navy Secretary Admiral Frank Knox that as he would discontinue negotiating with Japan for peace as early as November 27, 1941, from then on the whole question of war and peace would be in the hands of the army and navy.⁶⁷ That is to say, Hull and other American leaders had secretly decided to go to war with Japan at least ten days before Pearl Harbor.

It is clear that the entries are quoted and translated in such a way as to stress the United States' responsibility for the war. Let us take the first entry as an example. The original entry in Stimson's diary reads as follows:

November 25, 1941. At 12 o'clock we (viz., General Marshall and I) went to the White House. . . . There the President, . . . brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1, 1941], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.⁶⁸

The difference in nuance between the Japanese quotation and the original is subtle and significant. President Roosevelt's "maneuver," rather

than “induce,” was indeed extremely urgent and necessary, because he had reason to fear a surprise attack by Japan in a matter of five to six days. According to intelligence reports, Japanese forces continued their southward movements, aiming at the southern point of Indochina and landing in the Gulf of Siam, ignoring repeated warnings from the United States and England. A war with Japan was deemed inevitable. In view of the division in Congress on the issue of war, however, the president and his officials decided to refrain from militarily or diplomatically irritating the Japanese. As General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, who was present at the War Cabinet meeting in question, testified at a Congressional hearing in 1946, the presidential “maneuver” was really meant to be nonmilitary.⁶⁹ It was also not meant to be a diplomatic maneuver.⁷⁰ The “maneuver” was a political strategy to cope with a forthcoming war, not necessarily a military scheme to “plot” or to “induce” the Japanese into firing the first shot as the Japanese quotation, being out of context, tends to suggest.

This new textbook implies that a new economic and strategic consideration was a cause of the war. In its original version the book held that the Japanese government decided to fight with the United States because of a strategic assessment that with the embargo on gasoline and other important materials, the Japanese fighting ability was bound to be weakened. This assessment drove Japan to make up its mind in spite of the awareness that there was a convincing gap in favor of the United States in terms of productivity.⁷¹ As pointed out by a critic, this sort of statement is no more than repetition of wartime claims.⁷² In the final version, a chart entitled “Production of Major Materials in Japan and the United States: A Comparison” is inserted to show the huge gap between the two countries in the production of steel, coal, aluminum, and oil from 1929 to 1944. One has the impression that the embargo was genuinely effective in forcing Japan to go to war.⁷³

This new textbook is also inclined to distort historical facts in a subtle way. Concerning the start of the Pacific War, the following statement is given to confuse the time sequence and reduce the unethical behavior exhibited in the Japanese surprise attack: “On December 8 [1941], Japan declared war on the United States and England, and the air

force of the Japanese navy struck destructively the American Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and the British Far Eastern Fleet off the coast of the Malay Peninsula.”⁷⁴ Here, the Japanese attack came after the declaration of war, which is untrue. The ultimatum of war was delivered to Secretary of State Hull by Japanese ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō several hours after the raid in Hawaii and Singapore. Also, the usual terminology for the “surprise attack” (*kishū*) on Pearl Harbor and Singapore, which has appeared in almost all other textbooks, is avoided so as to give an impression the attack was merely a normal military action.

Japanese war crimes and atrocities are kept out of the text. The Nanking Massacre is mentioned ambiguously in a footnote: “The battle of Nanking was extremely fierce. Now China is demanding that Japan reflect deeply on the sacrifice of the Chinese military and civilians (the so-called Nanking Massacre) after the fall of Nanking.”⁷⁵ In the statement above it is not clear whether there was a massacre in Nanking. The students are given the impression that since fighting between China and Japan at the Chinese capital was “extremely fierce,” heavy casualties could be expected. And yet from hindsight China demanded that Japan reflect on the Chinese loss (the “so-called Nanking Massacre”). There is no mention of the rapes and senseless killings alleged in the Nanking Tribunal and other international sources.⁷⁶

Furthermore, Japan’s war responsibilities are ignored entirely. The only statement in the book about the hardships suffered by the Chinese people during the war is quite confusing. The students are told that after the fall of Nanking, the Chinese Nationalist government moved to Chungking and continued to receive military and material aid from England and the United States through Burma for its fight against the Japanese. The students are also reminded: “Consequently the front line was extended, effecting a long-term war. Meanwhile, the suffering of the people in various parts of China, which became battlefields, deepened.”⁷⁷ Rendered in this way, it is not clear whether the Chinese government, the British and American aid, or the Japanese aggression should be responsible for the deepening suffering of the Chinese people.

Although many textbooks certified in 1986 cite the belated response of the Japanese to the Potsdam declaration and the American

anxiety to save more lives by ending the war sooner as important reasons for the atomic bombs, the *New Version of Japanese History* does not give any reason at all. It gives only figures of casualties in the Japanese armed forces, particularly in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo. The caption to a picture of Tokyo on March 10, 1945, emphasizes that "the American air force not only destroyed our war plants, but also burned down our common folks' residences by dropping incendiary bombs."⁷⁸

Regarding the Tokyo Tribunal, the original version of the new textbook bluntly calls it "victors' justice."⁷⁹ This direct accusation disappears in the final version. But a long footnote is added to give details of the legal controversy over the trial. The note draws on the opinions of two justices, Radhabinod Pal of India and Bert V. A. Roling of the Netherlands, ignoring the opinions of the majority of the justices.⁸⁰

This is one of the very few textbooks to treat the problem of the repatriation of Japanese nationals after the war. But only a partial, gloomy account is given concerning the repatriation from China. The students are told that because of the civil war and the trial of war criminals in China, repatriation was delayed, which led to the loss of many Japanese lives.⁸¹ Here the positive side of the repatriation is ignored. None of the moving stories about Japanese indebtedness to the Chinese for the relatively smooth repatriation is told. In a work that has been widely adopted as a textbook for modern Japanese history in the United States, the highly respected Japanese-American historian Mikiso Hane has in effect disputed the negative claim above by substantiating that the repatriation in China revealed the "goodwill and magnanimity" of Chiang Kai-shek, who told his fellow countrymen to "cease regarding the Japanese as enemies and treat them as friends."⁸² It is only fair to say that under unusually difficult conditions in China immediately following the war the completion of such a massive repatriation of more than six million Japanese nationals in three short years can hardly be regarded as a "delay" at all.

In the final analysis, one can detect in this new textbook an echo of the "Positive View of the Greater East Asian War." Unlike other textbooks, this new book emphatically stresses the "purpose" of the "Greater East Asian War" as follows: "Japan decided to name this war the

'Greater East Asian War' (so-called Pacific War), whose purpose was to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japan's leadership and to expel the European-American powers from Asia."⁸³ At the end of the chapter, a concluding remark reiterates this "purpose" by echoing the "Positive View of the Greater East Asian War": "This war facilitated an opportunity for the speedy collapse of the European domination that had exploited Asia for a long time. Also, it made it possible for the Asian peoples, who, in spite of their suffering from the severe battles during the Japanese occupation, stood up and realized their independence through various changes."⁸⁴

The students may well learn from this new textbook that the whole story of the Pacific War is simple: under unusually difficult conditions Japan set out to start the "Greater East Asia War" to expel the Western powers from Asia with a clear consciousness that Japan might need to sacrifice itself because of its inferior productivity and technology. And the students may learn that history has proven Japan right in that many Asian peoples, indeed, gained their independence at the end of the war, leaving Japan a lone victim. Here, the struggle for independence in Southeast Asia is entirely ignored. In this new textbook, therefore, the immediate target of the struggle, namely, the Japanese empire, which remained unmistakably the common, demonic enemy to people throughout Southeast Asia, has been uncharacteristically converted into a savior. In the minds of the writers and editors, Japan's unhappy past would thus be calmly buried, and the younger generation would no longer be burdened by the guilt-ridden history.

In conclusion it must be stressed that all the Japanese textbooks under review are genuine and for the most part sincere attempts to acquaint students with complex and controversial problems. They are well written, straightforward, and highly informative. The overwhelming adoption of the notion of the Pacific War or the "Fifteen Year War," instead of the usual, West-centered notion of "World War II," can be understood as a painful effort to search for objectivity. It has been shown that under pressure from the conservative ruling party the Japanese government has been forceful in tightening control of the textbooks through the certification system. A comparison of the original and final

versions of textbooks clearly illustrates the revisions imposed by the Ministry of Education. The textbooks tend to stress more the positive aspects of the war without condemning the Japanese leaders for their mistaken assessments and deeds. What the ruling party calls the Marxist, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic elements in older textbooks are indeed fast diminishing.

In many Japanese textbooks the United States is seen as the malevolent upholder of world order. The students are told that the United States was the original source of the depression that threw the whole world into chaos. The American support for China, the embargo against Japan, the Hull Note, and President Roosevelt's "plot" have been seen as factors directly responsible for forcing Japan to go to war. Unsurprisingly, the unwarned attack on Pearl Harbor is viewed as a strategic measure without any special historical significance.

Japanese war crimes and the brutalities of Japanese rule in China and other areas are occasionally mentioned in some textbooks, but efforts are also made to hint at or stress the reason for such drastic measures. For instance, the Nanking Massacre, if mentioned at all, is often stated to have occurred as a result of fierce fighting in which casualties could hardly have been avoided. There is a tendency to reduce casualties caused by Japanese military actions in the Japanese textbooks. Many books simply do not give statistics. None reports the American casualties at Pearl Harbor.

However, the damage in Japan, particularly the devastating power of the atomic bombs, is described in great detail with pictures, charts, maps, and other visual aids. The Tokyo Tribunal is increasingly seen as a show of "victors' justice." The repatriation of Japanese, which the human race had never previously confronted on such a massive scale, is distorted. All textbooks mention the reforms in postwar years under General Douglas A. MacArthur, but none reports the American monetary and material aid. Nor does any textbook mention the goodwill shown by the Chinese in renouncing their rights to war reparations under Chiang Kai-shek and later Mao Tse-tung. Paying reparations to China, where many people were killed and substantial damage was caused by the Japanese invasion, would have delayed Japan's "economic miracle" to a great

extent. In sum, the Pacific War is reduced to a dog-eat-dog battle among powerful nations, and Japan is placed in a comfortable no-fault position.

The certification in 1986 of the controversial *New Version of Japanese History* further reveals the Japanese leadership's desire to "right the wrong" in a wrong direction. Given the weakening of the intellectual left and the growing of the right wing in recent years, the fear of domination by the controversial new textbook in the future is not entirely imaginary.⁸⁵ The immediate impact of this new textbook cannot be overestimated. The organized efforts that have rallied around the ultranationalistic *Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi*, the editors of the textbook, have introduced a new concern for the future of history textbooks in Japan. It used to be that following the guiding principles of the ruling LDP the Ministry of Education imposed "anti-leftist" revisions on the textbooks submitted for certification. Now it has also become necessary for the Ministry of Education to check the extreme "right-wing" bias and distortion in textbooks. But there is reason to doubt that under the conservative LDP, the Ministry of Education would really do anything to hurt its relations with the right-wing textbook writers and publishers.

The fundamental problem in Japanese history textbooks is more serious than one might expect. None of the textbooks under review asks the vital questions: Were the Japanese people guilty during the Pacific War? What actually went wrong in Japan? How can one facilitate, as urged recently by some Japanese leaders, a "deep self-reflection" over the military mission that caused "unbearable agony and sorrow?"⁸⁶ These books raise no questions about the weakness of the opposition and the lack of a strong defense of the parliamentary system. Some textbooks provide clues, stressing the fascist control of the military through the powerful special police. Many instead blame China, the United States, and other Western powers for the tragedy. One can therefore conclude that ghosts from throughout the Pacific, from Nanking to Pearl Harbor and Singapore, would find the treatment of the Pacific War in Japanese textbooks increasingly disappointing.

Given such a background, one should not have been surprised to see the passing of the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor in 1991 with the

ruling LDP rejecting the idea of making an official apology to the United States. One can also understand that the continuity of wartime ideas and values, which the LDP has been forcefully imposing on history textbooks, is genuine, persistent, and widespread. The anger and anxieties in the United States and in Japan's Asian neighbors⁸⁷ are therefore understandable. By the same token, the worries in the minds of some of the leaders in Japan are also understandable.⁸⁸ Politics has been increasingly dictating policy in a peculiar way in the domains of scholarship and education. Now it makes one wonder if it is too much to ask for objectivity in textbook writing in Japan. One cannot be optimistic, as one will be likely to exclude Japan and the Japanese textbook writers from the answer to Marc Ferro's question: "And then, tomorrow, which nation, which human group will still be able to control its own history?"⁸⁹

POSTSCRIPT: Based primarily on information available before 1989, this paper takes a rather pessimistic view of the future of history textbooks in Japan. Developments in Japan over the last few years, however, should have a positive impact on the writing of textbooks. Former Premier Kiichi Miyazawa's apology to Korea regarding the "comfort women," the apologetic remarks made by the reigning emperor during his visit to China, the Hosokawa administration's unreserved recognition of Japanese war crimes in Asia, and the Japanese supreme court's recent decision in favor of Ienaga in the 1965 lawsuit, will probably help to check the revisionist tendency in Japan in the years to come. It appears that it is possible, after all, that Japan will "be able to control its own history" in the right way.

NOTES

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1. Marius B. Jansen, "Education, Values, and Politics in Japan," *Foreign Affairs* 34.4 (July 1957), p. 666.
2. Marc Ferro, *The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. vii. I am grateful to Professor Paul Solon of Macalester College for his suggestion regarding this reference.
3. Saburō Ienaga, *The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 255.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Kubo Yoshizo, *Tai-Nichi senryō seisaku to sengo kyōiku kaikaku* (Tokyo: Sansaidō, 1984); Suzuki Eiichi, *Nihon senryō to kyōiku kaikaku* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1983); Harry Wray and Takahashi Shirō, *Senryōka no kyōiku kaikaku to ken'etsu* (Tokyo: Nihon kyōiku shinbunsha, 1987); Joseph C. Trainor, *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor's Memoir* (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1987).
7. Ienaga, *Pacific War*, p. 252.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
9. Hayashi Fusao, "Dai Tōa sensō kōtei ron," published in *Chūō kōron* serially in 1963, which was published in book form in two volumes in 1964 and 1965. Also, Ueyama Shumpei, *Dai Tōa Sensō no imi* (Tokyo, 1964).
10. In 1955 the Democratic Party issued three pamphlets under the general title *Ureubeki kyōkasho no mondai*. According to Jansen, "This was prepared by a party commission which drew on records of a House of Representatives committee as well as on many popular attacks on textbooks. It tried to link the Teachers' Union with the Japanese Communist Party and charged that union leaders were writing misleading and slanted texts which were poisoning the minds of the young. . . . The attack was badly overdone." Jansen, "Education, Values, and Politics in Japan," p. 670.
11. Ienaga Saburō, "The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2.4 (Fall 1970), pp. 5–8.
12. Ienaga filed lawsuits against the government in 1965, 1967, and 1984. For details see Ienaga Saburō, *Kyōkasho saiban* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1981) and Morikawa Kinjū, *Kyōkasho to saiban* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990). In 1982, the supreme court overturned the decision of the Tokyo high court on the 1967 lawsuit and decided in favor of the Japanese government. As for the lawsuit filed in 1965, it was not until 1993 that the supreme court reached its decision in Ienaga's favor.
13. Yue-him Tam (Tan Ruqian), ed., *Fan-Jih Kai-shi nu-hou-chi* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Company, 1991).

14. Ibid., pp. 329–331.
15. “‘Shimpen Nihonshi’ no gōin-na tōjō,” *Kyōkasho repōto* '87 (Tokyo: Shuppan Rōren, 1987), pp. 2–29.
16. The director general of the project was Masato Tokuyama, managing director of the Japan Textbook Research Center in Tokyo, and the staff director was James Becker of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. There were six American reviewers (Ronald Di Cenzo, Robert Ferrell, Carol Gluck, Grant Goodman, David L. Grossman, and Tetsuo Najita) and fifteen Japanese reviewers (chairperson: Atsuhiko Bekki). *Japan/United States Textbook Study Project: Joint Report* by the Japan Textbook Research Center and the International Society for Educational Information in Tokyo and the National Council for the Social Studies in Washington, D.C., 1981 (hereafter referred to as *Joint Report*).
17. For comments of the American reviewers on the textbooks for Japanese history for tenth to twelfth grades, see *ibid.*, pp. 39–40; for their comments on the textbooks for world history, see *ibid.*, p. 42.
18. Ibid., p. 1.
19. Ibid., Appendix A “Japanese Textbooks.”
20. Ienaga, *Pacific War*, p. xiii.
21. The series includes six books bearing different titles such as *Nihonshi* and *Kindai no sekai to Nihon*. The dates of certification of the six books are as follows: 1953, 1954, 1956, 1961, 1965, and 1968. These six books were popularly adopted for classroom use by Japanese schools from 1954 to 1970.
22. *Kyōkasho repōto*, 1957 to 1975.
23. Toyoda Takeshi, a former teacher at Jōkōshi (Tokyo Women’s Higher Normal School, currently Ochanomizu Women’s University), was a staff writer and later head of the section responsible for Japanese history textbooks for elementary and secondary schools in the Ministry of Education in the early years of the occupation. A protege of a leading ultranationalistic historian, Kuroita Katsumi, of Tokyo Imperial University, Toyoda adopted prewar views in his textbooks and often disagreed with his American supervisors, including Joseph C. Trainor who was director of the textbook project at the Civil Information and Education Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See Trainor Papers, Box 55, Conference Report, May 8, 1946.
24. This source book, hereafter referred to as *TSTK*, was edited and published by the Ienaga Soshō Shien Shimin no Kai in Tokyo in 1970.
25. Ibid., certified 1959, p. 120.
26. Ibid., pp. 108–109.
27. Ibid., certified 1953, p. 102.
28. John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), pp. 203–290.
29. *Joint Report*, pp. 103–104.
30. Ibid., p. 104.
31. Ibid., p. 110.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 111.
34. Ibid., p. 112.
35. Ibid., p. 104.
36. Ibid., p. 105.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., certified 1956, p. 125.
39. Ibid., p. 110.
40. Ibid., p. 115.
41. Ibid., p. 211.
42. Ibid., certified 1954, p. 116.
43. Ibid., p. 105.
44. Ibid., p. 116.
45. Ibid., p. 117.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 118.
48. Ibid., p. 118.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. For a close look at the screening system, see Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō o Shien-suru Zenkoku Renrakukai Kyōkasho Seido Kentō Iinkai (Representative: Nagai Kenichi), ed., *Minnade kangaeyō: Nihon no kyōkasho seido* (Tokyo: Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō o Shien-suru Zenkoku Renrakukai, 1982).
52. Shuppan Rōren Kyōkasho Taisaku Iinkai, ed., "*Nihonshi*" "*Sekaishi*" *kentei shiryō-shū: Fukatsu-suru Nihon gunkoku-shugi to rekishi kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Shuppan Rōren, 1982). This source book includes problematic passages in both the original and final versions of the Japanese history and world history textbooks certified in 1982 and adopted by schools after 1983. The Japanese history textbooks are: *Shin Nihonshi*, published by Sanseidō; *Nihonshi*, Jikkyō Shuppan; *Kōtō gakkō Nihonshi*, Gakkō Tōsho; *Nihonshi*, Sanseidō; *Kōkō Nihonshi*, Sanseidō; *Shōsetsu Nihonshi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa Shuppan; *Nihon no rekishi shimpan*, Yamakawa; *Yōsetsu Nihonshi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa; *Kōtō gakkō shin Nihonshi*, Jiyū Shobō; and *Kōtō gakkō shin Nihonshi*, Daiichi Gakushōsha. The world history textbooks were: *Sekaishi* published by Tokyo Shoseki; *Shin sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Sanseidō sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Sekaishi*, Jikkyō Shuppan; *Kōkō sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Kōtō gakkō sekaishi*, Shimizu Shoin; *Kōtō gakkō shin sekaishi saishimpan*, Teikoku Shoin; *Shinsho sekaishi saishimpan*, Teikoku Shoin; *Shōsetsu sekaishi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa; *Sekai no rekishi shimpan*, Yamakawa; and *Yōsetsu sekaishi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa.
53. Leslie Helm, "Japanese Decide Not to Apologize for Pearl Harbor Attack," originally in *Los Angeles Times*, reprinted in *Saint Paul Pioneer Press* (St. Paul, Minnesota), December 7, 1991.
54. Tam Yue-him, *Fan-Jih*, pp. 45-59.
55. *Kyōkasho repōto* '87, p. 16.
56. Satō Nobuo, *Rekishi kyōiku to sensō sekinin* (Tokyo: Azumino Shobō, 1988), pp.

- 90-91. As for Mayuzumi Toshirō's view of Japanese history, see his dialogue with Hoshino Yasusaburō, entitled "Tokubetsu taidan: hinomaru kimigayo to tennōsei," in *Kikan kyōikuhō rinji zōkangō* 58 (Tokyo, August 1985), pp. 42-60. Also see Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," *Asahi jōnanaru* (Tokyo: September 5, 1986), pp. 6-12.
57. See the accompanying pamphlet, *Shimpen Nihonshi: Atarashi rekishi kyōkasho ga tanjōshimashita*, ed. Hara Shobō (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1986).
58. Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," pp. 10-11.
59. Premier Nakasone allegedly told the editors of the textbook before its certification in 1986: "I myself have read the entire book from the first page to the end. I think this is a very good textbook. One way or another I will see to it that this book will be published as a textbook. But we have various hurdles, and also have to consider diplomatic problems. Especially, we have to honor the official opinion issued by the cabinet secretary general [Miyazawa Kiichi] in 1982. Along this line of thinking, I wish to beg the writers and the editors to tolerate the intolerable and to endure the unendurable. Trust me, one way or another we will settle the matter by publishing the work as a textbook." For Premier Nakasone's and the education minister's connection with the textbook, see the remark by Mayuzumi Toshirō, in Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," p. 11. For the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, pp. 12-17.
60. See Sakamoto's recommendation in the accompanying pamphlet (see n. 57 above).
61. About five hundred people of note paid tribute to the new textbook by participating in a celebration party to commemorate its certification, jointly organized by nationalistic organizations such as Shin-Nihon Kyōgi-kai in Tokyo on July 22, 1986. For details, see Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," pp. 6-13.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
63. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 228.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. Quoted in Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 517. I am grateful to Professor Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago for suggesting the idea of looking at the original entries in the diary.
69. General Marshall testified, "They [the president and those present at the meeting] were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also that in anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement." *Ibid.*, p. 523.

70. General Marshall also testified, "I mean the expression he [Stimson] is using relates to what would be the diplomatic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight." *Ibid.*, p. 521.
71. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, p. 10.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 227.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*, p. 225, n. 2.
76. For an English bibliographical review of major works in all languages on the Nanking Massacre, see Daqing Yang, "A Sino-Japanese Controversy: The Nanking Atrocity as History," *Journal of Sino-Japanese Studies* 3.1 (November 1990), pp. 14-35.
77. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 224.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
79. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, p. 26.
80. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 234.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
82. Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 345.
83. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 228.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
85. Despite the obvious support from the LDP leadership, the new textbook will have a long way to go before it dominates the market. Its share of the total market (1,372,800 copies) in 1987 when it first appeared was an insignificant 0.6 percent, representing 8,876 copies. Its sales went up to 9,357 copies in 1988, but decreased slightly, to 8,665 copies, in 1990. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '92, p. 66.
86. Helm, "Japanese Decide Not to Apologize."
87. For the anger and anxiety in China, see "Li-shi pu-neng wang," in *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), December 8, 1991.
88. For instance, in the early summer of 1986 on the eve of the certification of the *New Version of Japanese History*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported to have expressed worries that this new textbook would eventually nullify the diplomatic efforts toward reestablishing friendly relations with China and other Asian countries during the last forty years. Quoted in the article "'Shimpen Nihonshi' o osotta gaiatsu to naiatsu," by Kabajima Yuzo, *Bungei Shunju* (Tokyo, September 1986), p. 161.
89. Ferro, *Use and Abuse of History*, p. vii.

GLOSSARY

- Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良
 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石
 chūhei 駐兵
 Chūkyō 中教
 Chūkyō Shuppan: Chūgakusei no shakai-ka
 中教出版: 中学生の社会科
 Dai Tōa Sensō kōtei ron
 大東亞戦争肯定論
 Etō Jun 江藤淳
 Fujio Masayuki 藤尾正行
 gakushū shidō yōryō 学習指導要領
 gisei 犠牲
 hachiku no ikioi 破竹の勢
 hachiku no shingeki 破竹の進撃
 hai-Nitchi undō o riyō 排日運動を利用
 Hara Shobō 原書房
 henshū 編集
 Hopei 河北
 Ienaga Saburō 家永三郎
 Jikkō 実教
 Kaifu Toshiki 海部俊樹
 kanshū 監修
 Kase Shinichi 加勢伸一
 kazaana 風穴
 keizai no shinshutsu 経済の進出
 kentei seido 検定制度
 kishū 奇襲
 Kōkō Sekaishi 高校世界史
 kōkoku shikan 皇国史観
 korosu 殺す
 Kuni no ayumi 国のあゆみ
 Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
 Mayuzumi Toshirō 黛敏郎
 Minshushugi 民主主義
 misshitsu kentei 密室検定
 Miyazawa Kiichi 宮沢喜一
 Muramatsu Takeshi 村松剛
 Murao Jirō 村尾次郎
 Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曾根康弘
 Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi
 日本を守る国民会議
 Nihonshi 日本史
 Nikkyōso 日教組
 Nomura Kichisaburō 野村吉三郎
 Okano Seigo 岡野清豪
 ryakukō 掠光
 saigo tsūchō 最後通牒
 Sakamoto Tarō 坂本太郎
 sankō seisaku 三光政策
 Sanseidō 三省堂
 satsukō 殺光
 seisen 聖戦
 seitōna jieiken no hatsudō
 正当な自衛権の発動
 sekai no fukeiki no shingenchi
 世界の不景気の震源地
 Sekaishi 世界史
 senryō 佔領
 Shimpen Nihonshi 新編日本史
 shinryaku 侵略
 Shinshō Sekaishi 新詳世界史
 shinshutsu 進出

shōkō 燒光

Shōsetsu Nihonshi 詳説日本史

shuppei 出兵

Taiheiyō Sensō 太平洋戦争

Taiheiyō Sensō to kyōkasho

太平洋戦争と教科書

Teikoku 帝国

tennō o saiban-ni kakeyo-no koe

天皇を裁判にかけよの声

tennō no sensō sekinin o tou

天皇の戦争責任を問う

Tōjō Hideki 東條英機

Tōsho 東書

Toyoda Takeshi 豊田武

Yamakawa 山川

Yōroppa no tenchi-ni makiokotta dōran no

hi no te wa yagate Tōyō-nimo oyonda

ヨーロッパの天地にまきおこった動乱

の火のてはやがて東洋にもおよんだ

yūdō 誘導

zaibatsu 財閥

The Use of Japanese Records in Sung Official Histories

A Textual Study

ZHENPING WANG

The tenth century saw private Chinese merchants actively trading in Japan, facilitating more frequent and extended contacts between the two countries. This represents a major advance in Sino-Japanese relations and a sharp contrast with the situation during the T'ang dynasty (618–907), when travel abroad required government permission in China, and efforts to reach the Middle Kingdom had to be sponsored by the court in Japan. Over a period of more than 250 years from the seventh to the ninth century, the Japanese court organized only eighteen ambassadorial missions to China, fifteen of which actually reached their destination.

The increased bilateral contacts greatly advanced the understanding of Japan among tenth-century Chinese court officials as well as commoners, especially those in the coastal cities of southeast China. In Northern Sung (960–1127) works, contemporary writers express their appreciation and admiration of the fine quality and design of Japanese handicraft products: Japanese swords;¹ folding fans made with carved frames; and Japanese paper on which landscape, flowers, and occasionally pornography, were painted.² In the Southern Sung (1127–1279), the Chinese

preferred to use expensive Japanese pine, which is said to have been close-grained,³ in building palaces, temples, and coffins.⁴ They also favored Japanese bronze ware,⁵ and the five-colored paper decorated with golden flowers. Sulphur in lumps, screens decorated with Japanese painting, flower-shaped flat boxes inlaid with shell and metal, and cypress-wood fans had become the best-selling Japanese products in Sung China. Some Chinese authors demonstrate in their works an astounding knowledge of the Japanese language,⁶ social customs, and even the intimate details of Japanese private habits: the public bath where Japanese men and women bathed together; the malodorous body of the Japanese female, who tried desperately to deodorize it by fragrant cream; and the outlandish sexual behavior Japanese sailors displayed when calling on Chinese prostitutes in port cities in Fukien.⁷

The enriched knowledge of Japan is equally noticeable in Chinese official historiography if one examines in quantitative and qualitative terms the "Account of the Japanese" (Wo-jen chuan) in three Chinese dynastic histories: the *Old Dynastic History of the T'ang* (*Chiu T'ang shu*), the *New Dynastic History of the T'ang* (*Hsin T'ang shu*), and the *Dynastic History of the Sung* (*Sung shih*).

The "Account of the Japanese" in the *Old Dynastic History of the T'ang* amounts to only 450 Chinese characters. It contains no detailed information on Japanese history, geography, social customs, or relations with China. That this dynastic history of Japan is brief comes as no surprise since it was compiled during the Five Dynasties (907–960), after numerous T'ang archives and imperial collections, indispensable to the compilation of any dynastic history, had been reduced to ashes by warfare in the early tenth century.⁸ The loss was particularly devastating for historians wishing to write about foreign peoples since they themselves usually had no direct contact with foreigners and relied primarily on government records for their information. Such records were gathered through a well-established governmental practice that required local and court officials to interview visiting foreign envoys and visitors, and forward reports to the court.⁹ When the compilation of a dynastic history was officially commissioned, those reports, together with the *Veritable Records* (*shih-lu*) of Chinese emperors in which foreign envoys' visits to

the court were also briefly mentioned, would be made available to the compilers. Unfortunately for the compilers of the *Old Dynastic History of the T'ang*, only a tiny portion of these materials had survived destruction, forcing them to produce a brief and shallow account of Japan and its people.

In contrast, the contents of the "Account of the Japanese" in both the *New Dynastic History of the T'ang* and the *Sung shih* have been substantially expanded, the former amounting to 994 Chinese characters, the latter to 3,098. The expansion allows much more detailed coverage of Japan and its history. The account in the *Sung shih* in particular includes a lengthy and quite accurate genealogy of the Japanese imperial family, indicating that the compilers must have consulted some sort of written Japanese records to improve the accuracy of their descriptions of Japan. Among these written Japanese records, the *Imperial Genealogy* (*Ō nendai ki*), the *Statute on Government Officials* (*Shikiin ryō*),¹⁰ and *Chōnen's Memorial (to the Sung Court)* (*Chōnen hyōkei*) were personally presented to the Sung court by Chōnen (938–1016), a Japanese monk who was on a pilgrimage in China between 983 and 986.

Modern scholars have praised the *Ō nendai ki* as a valuable primary source and meticulously used it to advance our understanding of Japanese imperial genealogy, Japanese society, and Sino-Japanese Buddhist contacts.¹¹ Unfortunately, the *Ō nendai ki* no longer exists as a complete work, but appears only in the form of an excerpt in the *Sung shih*.¹² This immediately raises questions about the authenticity and reliability of the excerpt. Did the compilers of the *Sung shih* avail themselves of the original *Ō nendai ki*? Did they faithfully transcribe it? Where exactly does the excerpt start and end in the *Sung shih*? And who was its author? It is necessary to look into these questions before we accept the excerpt as authentic, reliable source material. And since it appears in the *Sung shih*, it is necessary to scrutinize the compilation process of this dynastic history, and the source materials for its "Account of the Japanese."

The *Sung shih* was completed during the reign of Emperor Shunt'i (Toghon Temür, r. 1333–1368) of the Yüan dynasty (1271–1368). An edict promulgated in 1343 had officially started the project, and T'o-t'o (1314–1355) had been appointed its supervisor.¹³ Within three years, in

the tenth month of 1345, a vast work of 496 *chüan*, at that point the most voluminous dynastic history, was presented to the throne.¹⁴ The speedy completion of the work does not, however, imply that its quality was compromised, for the *Sung shih* was not the first history of the Sung to be compiled. Well before the Mongols conquered the Sung, Sung historians had already produced “national histories” (*kuo-shih*) that covered the reigns of thirteen emperors.¹⁵ Amounting to some one thousand *chüan*, these national histories were based on such minute and generally accurate court documents as the *Records of Current Government* (*shih-cheng chi*), the *Court Diaries* (*ch’i-chü chu*), the *Calendar* (*jih-li*), and the *Veritable Records of Successive Reigns*.¹⁶

It is fortunate that during the chaotic Sung-Yüan transition these valuable historical works were spared the destruction that often accompanied dynastic change in China. In the spring of 1276, after Lin-an (modern Hangchow), the capital of the Southern Sung dynasty, fell into Mongol hands, Tung Wen-ping (1217–1278), a high-ranking Chinese official of the Mongol court, arrived to supervise the sealing up of the Sung imperial storage houses and the expropriation of Sung sacrificial vessels, musical instruments, and books. A man of political vision with a strong sense of history, Tung regarded the Sung cultural objects as political assets for the Mongols, useful to the Mongol court’s efforts to establish Chinese-style institutions to govern its Chinese subjects. He is reported to have said:

A nation can be eliminated, but its history should not be obliterated. The Sung dynasty had sixteen emperors and had ruled China for more than 300 years. It is therefore appropriate to preserve all the records written by Sung historians which are now housed in the Institute of Historiography (shih-kuan), and to collect ritual vessels and musical instruments to be used in ceremonies [at the Mongol court].

Thanks to Tung’s farsightedness, more than five thousand *chüan* of Sung historical works were preserved intact and later transported to the Yüan capital.¹⁷

These Sung works provided a solid basis for the Yüan historians’ compilation of a Sung dynastic history. The project was first commis-

sioned by Emperor Shih-tsu (r. 1271-1294). Imperial edicts appointed officials to preside over the project, and instructed provincial officials to encourage commoners to present Liao (916-1125), Chin (1115-1234), and Sung books in their possession to local governments, to reward them with cash, and to transport the collected books to the capital for use by official compilers.¹⁸ Although the compilation proceeded smoothly, the final completion and presentation of the work to the throne were delayed by disputes among high-ranking Yüan officials, who disagreed with each other over the appropriate contents and style for a Sung dynastic history.¹⁹ The preservation of Sung historical works, the preparation by earlier Yüan historians, and the draft of a Sung dynastic history compiled in the early years of the Yüan made it possible for T'o-t'o and his subordinates to produce a quality work in less than three years. In most cases, they simply reclassified or rearranged accounts in the Sung national histories, and copied them into their own work. In only a few cases, as when the fast crumbling Southern Sung empire had left no official history for its last three rulers, the Emperors Kung-tsung (r. 1275-1276), Tuan-tsung (r. 1276-1278), and Ti Ping (r. 1278-1279), did the Yüan compilers exert themselves to produce completely new accounts.²⁰ The *Sung shih* is a high-quality work of scholarship based on solid and reliable Sung national histories and other Sung official documents.

Of the thirteen Sung so-called national histories of separate reigns, the one compiled for Emperor T'ai-tsung's reign deserves special attention. When compiling this particular national history, Sung historians were granted access to the three Japanese works that Chōnen had presented to the court. They consulted and incorporated accounts from these works in the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*, which was to become one of the major source materials for the *Sung shih* in whose "Account of the Japanese" the excerpt from the *Ō nendai ki* appears. An examination of the compilation process of this national history therefore provides further information useful in evaluating the authenticity and reliability of the excerpt from the *Ō nendai ki*.

In a preparatory step, Ch'ien Jo-shui (960-1003) and Yang I (974-1020) were commissioned by Emperor Chen-tsung in 998 to produce a *Veritable Record* for Emperor T'ai-tsung's reign. They took only nine months to

complete this work, which amounted to eighty *chüan*, fifty of which were single-handedly written by Yang I himself.²¹ Systematic compilation of the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign* did not start until the second month of 1006, when Chu I and Chang Fu were instructed to arrange in chronological order events recorded in the *Court Calendar*, the *Records of Current Government*, the *Court Diaries*, and the *Veritable Records* for Emperors T'ai-tsu and T'ai-tsung. Wang Ch'in-jo (962-1025) was appointed editor-in-chief.²² An imperial edict also ordered the Bureau of Military Affairs (*shu-mi yüan*) and the Finance Commission (San-ssu) to select and transfer their documents to the court for use by the compilers.²³ Compilation officially started in the eighth month of 1007 under the supervision of Wang Tan (957-1017), with Wang Ch'in-jo, Ch'en Yao-sou (961-1017), Chao An-jen (958-1018), Ch'ao Chiung (951-1034), and Yang I being the major participants. Emperor Chen-tsung displayed great interest in the project. When the draft of the first *chüan* of the *Annals for Emperors* (*pen-chi*) was completed, he carefully reviewed it and pointed out errors to be corrected and places where revisions were needed. It soon became routine for the compilers to present the draft for each *chüan* to the throne for final approval. Almost nine years had passed when the work was completed in the second month of 1016. It consisted of 120 *chüan*, 9 of which were devoted to the "barbarian" peoples, including the Japanese.²⁴

Yang I is a noteworthy person among the major compilers of the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*. A "presented scholar" (*chin-shih*), Yang I is said to have composed his first piece of prose when he was only seven years old. At eleven, his unbelievable literary talent caught the attention of Emperor T'ai-tsung, who instructed Chang Ch'ü-hua, fiscal commissioner in Chiang-nan, to hold an examination specifically for Yang I. Soon after the examination, Yang I was on his way to the capital for service at court. He was only twenty-five years old when he finished his own fifty-six *chüan* of the eighty-*chüan* *Veritable Records of Emperor T'ai-tsung*.²⁵ It was "when serving in the Institute of Historiography that I [Yang I] read the books from the imperial collection. Among them there are the *Jih-pen nien-dai chi* (Japanese: *Nihon nendai ki*) and the *Tiao-*

jan piao-ch'i (Japanese: *Chōnen hyōkei*), each in one volume. [These works] enabled me to write the history of Japan in considerable detail."²⁶

Yang I's account confirms that the *Imperial Genealogy* and *Chōnen's Memorial (to the Sung Court)* formed the documentary basis for his account of Japan in the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*. To gather information about Japan, in 1006 Yang I also interviewed a Japanese monk Jakushō (?-1034) when he was working at the Memorial-Forwarding Office (Yin-t'ai t'ung-chin ssu), a government branch under the Chancellery. The two, neither able to speak the other's language, communicated in written Chinese.²⁷ This was perhaps the first time that any Chinese historian had used written Japanese records when compiling a national history. And this was indeed a milestone in Chinese official historiography. It symbolized a stride toward greater accuracy in the descriptions of Japan and its people in Chinese official history.²⁸ There should be little doubt about the credibility of the excerpt from the *Imperial Genealogy* in the *Sung shih* since this is essentially a transcription from the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*, whose reliability has survived the thorough scrutiny of modern scholars.

This argument, however, should not obscure the textual problems present in the excerpt, problems of the sort that usually arise when accounts in one work have been selected, edited, and incorporated in another work. Even a careful transcription is sometimes not totally free from unintended miscopying, not to mention the fact that the original text is often subjected to deliberate omissions and abridgments. All of these tend to distort accounts in the original work when they appear in the form of quotations in another work.

The first of such textual problems concerns the original Japanese title for the *Imperial Genealogy*, which differs in Chinese and Japanese primary sources. In both the *Huang-ch'ao lei-yüan* and the *San tendai godaisan ki* the work in question is referred to as *Nendai ki* and *Nihon nendai ki* (in one *chüan*),²⁹ but in the *Sung shih* it is referred to as *Nendai ki* and *Ō nendai ki*.³⁰ These different titles suggest that the *Nendai ki* is an abbreviated title for either *Nihon nendai ki* or *Ō nendai ki*.³¹ But the full title for this work might have been *Nihon ō nendai ki*. One need only

examine the titles for the “six Japanese national histories” (*Rikkoku shi*)³² to realize that using the term “Nihon” (Japan), or “Dai Nihon” (Great Japan) as part of a book title was a common practice for Japanese writers if their work concerned the Japanese monarchy.³³

The second question concerns the scope of the *Nihon ō nendai ki*'s coverage. The term *ki* seems to suggest that this work is a simple chronicle, similar to the Chinese “basic annals” (*pen-chi*), a genre employed in Chinese dynastic history to document the important activities of Chinese emperors. In Japan, this genre was adopted as early as Emperor Temmu's reign (673–686).³⁴ One example is the compilation of the *Chronicle of the Emperors* (*teiki*). The *teiki*, together with the *Ancient Words* (*kyūji*), laid the documentary foundation for the first comprehensive Japanese history, the *Records of Ancient Matters* (*Kojiki*). A well-received modern interpretation suggests that the Japanese *ki* in general, and the *Chronicle of Emperors* in particular, contain information on the names of successive Japanese rulers; the imperial genealogy; the names of the rulers' spouses, consorts, and children; the locations of the imperial palaces; important domestic events that occurred during a ruler's reign; their ages, number of years on the throne, and the locations of their tombs.³⁵

It is perhaps because they endorse this interpretation that some modern scholars have suggested that the excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki* in the *Sung shih* begins at “Accounts in his *Nendai ki* say (*ch'i Nien-tai chi so-chi yün*)” and ends with “All the preceding is said to have been taken from the written account of Chōnen (*chieh Tiao-jan so-chi yün*),”³⁶ a passage that contains 1,205 Chinese characters (see appendix one below). This excerpt describes the succession to the throne, the imperial genealogy, Buddhist contacts with China, the administrative establishment, and the jurisdiction of the court. Reading carefully the excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki*, however, one can't help but notice that accounts of Sino-Japanese relations, indexed by Arabic numerals [2] to [12] in appendix one, from time to time interrupt the otherwise smooth flow of the description of Japanese imperial genealogy. These peculiar components do not fit well with the style of the traditional Japanese chronicle, which usually focuses on the Japanese throne. It is well known that authors of those chronicles are arbitrary in handling Chinese records concerning

ancient Japan. They either turn a blind eye to events relating to bilateral relations or accord them only brief treatment.³⁷ It is therefore highly unlikely that in the original *Nihon ō nendai ki* accounts of Sino-Japanese relations and Buddhist contacts would appear eleven times. The frequent appearance of these accounts casts serious doubt on the assertion that all the 1,205 characters are directly and integrally quoted from the original *Nihon ō nendai ki*. Internal evidence suggests that the “excerpt” is probably a conflation of passages transcribed from the *Nihon ō nendai ki* and *Chōnen’s Memorial (to the Sung Court)*. It is the final product of an editorial procedure during which compilers of the *Sung shih* edited and rearranged some of the accounts in the two works, and then incorporated them into their own work to create a comprehensive history of Japan.

Indicative of such a possibility is the appearance of thirteen sentences, indexed by upper-case letters [A] to [M], which contain the name of a Chinese dynasty, the title of a Chinese reign, or an exact year in a Chinese reign period. The sentences were used to relate a specific year during a Japanese reign period to a corresponding year in Chinese history, thus further defining the time an event happened. In the excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki*, an account of an event in Sino-Japanese relations usually follows the title of a Japanese emperor, serving as an indication of when the event occurred. Occasionally, this time indicator includes such specific elements as a Japanese reign title or an exact year of a reign period, or both. But this Japanese-style time indicator is sometimes supplemented by one of the thirteen sentences in question, which either immediately follows the title of a Japanese emperor or appears after the account of an event. One example reads: “This year corresponds to the first year of the Ch’eng-sheng era (552) in the Liang dynasty of this land.” The use of the phrase “this land” (*tz’u-t’u*) is particularly worth noting. The phrase undoubtedly refers to China, because the Liang (502–557) was a Chinese dynasty. The phrase, indexed by lower-case letters [a] to [e], appears five times in the excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki*, and should have put modern scholars on guard. The use of “this land” and of the explanatory sentences in question implies that the author was writing from a Chinese point of view, trying to explain in Chinese terms a period in Japanese history. This immediately suggests

that the thirteen sentences are unlikely to have been part of the original *Nihon ō nendai ki*. Not only are they discordant with the style of Japanese chronicles, they are unnecessary, and indeed it would have been odd for a Japanese author to explain Japanese reign periods in Chinese terms if his work was intended for his own people. Since anybody, Chinese or Japanese, could have used the phrase "this land" to refer to China as long as he was in China at the time, it is either Chōnen who coined and used the phrase in his memorial to the Sung court, or the compilers of the *Sung shih* who employed the phrase and the explanatory sentences to make their account of Japan more comprehensible to Chinese readers. In either case, it seems likely that the eleven specific accounts of Sino-Japanese contacts are also not from the original *Nihon ō nendai ki*, but were derived from *Chōnen's Memorial (to the Sung Court)*.

Yang I is perhaps the person who created this conflation in the first place. To prepare an account of Japan for the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*, he seems to have attached events in Japan reported in Chōnen's memorial to the corresponding Japanese reign periods in the *Nihon ō nendai ki*. An assortment of information about Japan was thus created, which is similar in style to the Chinese "basic annals." This preliminary account of Japan was further edited when it was incorporated into the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign* and when the history itself underwent revision and recompilation throughout the Sung.³⁸ It assumed its present form as an excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki* when the *Sung shih* was completed in early Yüan times.

Yang I is not the only Northern Sung historian to have employed this method when assembling an account of ancient Japan. Some fifty years after the compilation of the *National History of Emperor T'ai-tsung's Reign*, Ou-yang Hsiu (1007-1072) and Sung Ch'i (998-1061), two of Yang's younger contemporaries, used the same method to prepare the "Account of the Japanese" in the *New History of the T'ang*, which was completed in 1060. In this substantial 994-character coverage of Japan, the Japanese imperial lineage down to the fifty-eighth Tennō, Emperor Kōkō (r. 884-887), also appears. Moreover, individual events in Sino-Japanese relations are attached, in the same manner as they are in the *Sung shih*, to the Japanese reign period during which they occurred. This could

hardly be a coincidence. Ou-yang Hsiu and Sung Ch'i must also have had access to Japanese materials in the government archives. And the striking similarities between these two works further suggest that they were probably based on the same sources: the *Nihon ō nendai ki* and *Chōnen's Memorial (to the Sung Court)*. There are, however, two major discrepancies between them. Whereas records of Japanese monks' visits to China appear eleven times in the "Account of the Japanese" in the *Sung shih*, its counterpart in the *New History of the T'ang* contains only one brief statement about these events.³⁹ More important, a different phrase "*chih . . . nien*" (this corresponds to the year of) has replaced "*tz'u-t'u*" (this land) as the time indicator.⁴⁰ The absence of the eleven records concerning Sino-Japanese Buddhist contacts,⁴¹ and the use of a different phrase as the time indicator in the "Account of the Japanese" of the *New History of the T'ang* provide additional evidence for the argument that the records in question and the phrase "this land" may have been quotations from the *Chōnen hyōkei*.

The *Chōnen hyōkei* is a collection of Chōnen's written answers to questions posed him by the Sung court during his audiences with Emperor T'ai-tsung. In the Chinese sources it is referred to as his "memorial."⁴² The sentence "When asked about his country, he [Chōnen] would only reply in writing" introduces this memorial to readers. The excerpt starts at "In my country there are five canons and Buddhist sutras" (*kuo-chung yu wu-ching chi fo-ching*) and ends with "Officials and officers, both civil and military, all hold hereditary positions" (*wen-wu liao-li chieh shih-kuan*), a passage totaling 128 characters (see appendix one below).⁴³ The first impression one gets from reading the excerpt is that the questions asked of Chōnen had nothing to do with Sino-Japanese Buddhist contacts, and that they are narrowly focused on Japanese "social customs" (*feng-t'u*). But the *Honchō kōsō den*, an eighteenth-century Japanese work, suggests that Emperor T'ai-tsung did ask Chōnen about the Japanese imperial genealogy as well as the spread of Buddhism from China to Japan.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the *San tendai godaisan ki*, the diary of Jōjin (1011-1081),⁴⁵ a Japanese monk who traveled to China in 1072 and was received by Emperor Shen-tsung (r. 1068-1085), shows that the Sung emperor raised as many as seventeen questions with his Japanese visitor, which touch on

a wide range of social, economic, and political issues in Japan. The questions dealt with:

1. social customs in Japan (*Jih-pen feng-su*);
2. the scale of the metropolitan areas (*ching-nei li-shu to-shao*);
3. the number of residential buildings in the metropolitan areas (*ching-nei jen-wu shu to-shao*);
4. the population of the country (*jen-hu to-shao*);
5. the territorial boundaries of the country (*pen-kuo ssu-chih pei-chieh*);
6. the number of prefectures and counties (*kuo tu-i to-shao*);
7. the rulers' titles (*pen-kuo wang shen-hu*);
8. the family names of subjects and commoners (*yu pai-hsing hao*);
9. the reasons Japan, which was adjacent to Ming-chou, had not initiated any official contact with China (*pen-kuo hsiang-ch'ü Ming-chou chih-chin yin-ho pu-t'ung Chung-kuo*);
10. the titles for high-ranking officials (*pen-kuo kuei-kuan yu shih-ho ming-mu*);
11. the imperial genealogy (*pen-kuo shih-hsi*);
12. whether the weather in Japan was similar to that in China (*pen-kuo ssu-shih han-shu yü Chung-kuo t'ung pu t'ung*);
13. which Japanese prefecture one would arrive in first if one traveled from Ming-chou to Japan, and how far this prefecture was from the capital (*tzu Ming-chou chih Jih-pen-kuo hsien-tao ho chou-chün? Ch'ü kuo-wang so-tu chin-yüan*);
14. the kinds of Chinese goods needed in Japan (*pen-kuo yao-yung Han-ti shih-ho wu-huo*);
15. the kinds of animals found in Japan (*pen-kuo yu shih-ho ch'in-shou*);
16. the family name of the Japanese ruler (*pen-kuo wang hsing-shih*);
17. the distance between Japan and the country of hairy men (the Ainu) (*pen-kuo ch'ü Mao-kuo chin-yüan*).⁴⁶

Similar questions might have also been asked of Chōnen since it was routine for the court to collect as much information as possible through interviews with foreign envoys and guests. And the questions might have been customary ones. With the help of those seventeen questions, plus

the two recorded in the *Honchō kōsō den*, we can determine more precisely which account in the alleged excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki* is in fact Chōnen's written answer to a question asked him by the Sung court.⁴⁷ Circumstantial evidence in support of the argument that some passages in the *Nihon ō nendai ki* are probably in Chōnen's own words is also found in the *General History of Buddha and His Patriarchs (Fo-tsu t'ung-chi)*, a work compiled in 1269 by Chih-p'an (1220-1275). He attributed twenty-seven sentences to Chōnen, all of which follow the phrase "Chōnen said" (*Jan yen*), and these sentences are almost word for word the same as some of the sentences in the alleged excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki*.⁴⁸ Another piece of circumstantial evidence is the last sentence in the quotation "All the preceding is said to have been taken from the written account of Chōnen." This sentence seems to have escaped the attention of modern scholars who take it for granted that "the written account of Chōnen" refers to the *Nihon ō nendai ki* and that Chōnen is the author. What they have failed to notice is that the paragraph that immediately precedes the sentence in question describes the administrative scope of the Japanese court and the number of taxable inhabitants in Japan. These are not the essential elements of a traditional Japanese genealogy. The "written account of Chōnen" therefore may not refer to the *Nihon ō nendai ki*, and the information in this last paragraph may have been taken from Chōnen's memorial.

The reason modern scholars have so far made no attempt to differentiate the *Nihon ō nendai ki* from *Chōnen's Memorial (to the Sung Court)* is because they assume that Chōnen is the author of both works.⁴⁹ This is an unwarranted assumption, which has hindered further textual study of these two important Japanese works. Except for the diary that he kept while in China and a few poems,⁵⁰ Chōnen did not bring out any major works during his lifetime. No primary Japanese sources have ever hinted that he was involved, or even interested, in compiling a genealogy of the Japanese imperial house. The lack of documentary evidence makes it impossible to determine the authorship of the *Nihon ō nendai ki*. But it seems safe to suggest that the *Nihon ō nendai ki*, just like the *Statute on Government Officials*, was an official work by Japanese court historians. The Japanese court probably granted these two works to Chōnen at his

request, so that Chōnen could use them to explain to Emperor T'ai-tsung the Japanese imperial lineage and the administrative system in Japan.

As the unrehearsed and straightforward answers to questions posed to him by Sung officials during solemn court audiences, Chōnen's memorial has preserved some interesting and valuable details about Sino-Japanese relations that do not appear in any other Japanese or Chinese primary sources. These details enable us to evaluate the credibility of certain related Chinese records and to depict more vividly particular events. Here are three examples:

It is well known that Prince Shōtoku (574–622) dispatched Ono no Imoko to Sui China in 607.⁵¹ The aim of Imoko's mission, however, is not specified in the *Nihon shoki*. Modern scholars have argued that the revitalization of Buddhism in China was the major impetus for the Yamato rulers to send this mission: they hoped that Buddhism would help bolster their political status and strengthen their control in Japan. Quite convincing when examined in the general historical context, this argument is nevertheless based on a single record in the *Dynastic History of the Sui* (*Sui shu*).⁵² Chōnen's memorial offers supporting Japanese evidence. It clearly spells out that Imoko was sent to obtain, among other things, the *Lotus Sutra* (*Hokke kyō*) from Sui China.⁵³

Another example is the dispatch of Awada no Mahito (?–719), the seventh Japanese envoy to China, in 702.⁵⁴ In the *Chronicle of Japan Continued* (*Shoku Nihongi*), there is again no further explanation of the task assigned to Mahito, except for a brief mention of his departure to the Middle Kingdom. Thanks to Chōnen's memorial, it is now clear that Mahito was sent on a "shopping spree" to obtain books in China (*ju-T'ang ch'iu shu-chi*).⁵⁵ This Japanese account also independently confirms the credibility of two relevant T'ang records that Mahito "used all the rewards granted to him [by the Chinese court] to purchase books" (*so-te tz'u-lai, chin-shih wen-chi, fan-hai erh-kuei. Hsi shang-wu mao-shu i-kuei*).⁵⁶

Chōnen's memorial also sheds light on the introduction into Japan of the *Golden Light Sutra of the Most Victorious Kings* (*Konkōmyō saishō kyō*), which the eighth-century Japanese emperors enthusiastically promoted for its magic power of protecting the state and the people. In 741 when Emperor Shōmu ordered the establishment of provincial monaster-

ies and nunneries all over Japan, many of them were named the "Temple of Golden Light Four Deva Kings" (Konkōmyō Shitennō no ji).⁵⁷ No doubt an important event in Japanese political and religious history, the introduction of this Buddhist sutra to Japan is mentioned only in Chōnen's memorial, which points out that the sutra was brought back to Japan by Dōji (?-744), a Japanese monk who accompanied Mahito to China.⁵⁸

Valuable as they are, accounts in Chōnen's memorial should nevertheless be treated with caution. These accounts are based primarily on Chōnen's memory, and not all of them are accurate. Chih-p'an was the first to detect such inaccuracies. In an annotation to the *Fo-tsu t'ung-chi*, he pointed to a mistaken statement that Kūkai (774-835), the famed Japanese Buddhist master, came to China during the Yüan-ho period (806-820) and studied the T'ien-t'ai (Japanese: Tendai) Buddhist teachings, and that Kūkai and Saichō "took back to Japan the *Chih-kuan i* of Chih Che [i.e., Chih I]."⁵⁹ It is common knowledge that Kūkai studied the esoteric teachings while in China and later became the founder of the "True Word" Buddhist school (Shingon shū) in Japan. And he played no part in introducing the *Chih-kuan i*, a major work of T'ien-t'ai teachings, to Japan.

Traditional Japanese scholars were also aware of the inaccuracies in Chōnen's memorial. In his remark on Chōnen's pilgrimage to China, Sesson Yūbai (1290-1346) implied that Chōnen had exaggerated: "In ancient times when Chōnen visited China, he bragged about the history of Japan to Emperor T'ai-tsung" (*tsai-hsi Tiao-jan ju-Hua hsi tui T'ai-tsung k'ua-ku hsi*).⁶⁰ Modern scholars have singled out one such exaggeration: "In Japan domestic animals are buffalo, mules, and sheep. Rhinoceroses and elephants are numerous."⁶¹ Chōnen's statement is in fact based on Indian folktales, which were introduced to Japan along with Buddhism. Strange animals, such as rhinoceroses and Indian birds, are important subjects in this folklore, which was widely circulated among the Japanese during the late Heian period.⁶² Meticulous modern Japanese scholarship has also demonstrated that a discrepancy exists between the number of provinces in the Tosandō and Saikaidō prefectures recorded in Chōnen's memorial and in the *Ordinances of the Engi Period* (*Engi shiki*), the former work listing over twenty provinces more than the latter.⁶³ Moreover,

Chōnen's memorial totally ignores the Southern Islands in modern Okinawa: Tanejima, Yakushima, Amami, Tokushima,⁶⁴ Shiga, and Kumi,⁶⁵ whose rulers had pledged their loyalty to the Japanese court during the late seventh and early eighth centuries, and which the Japanese court had since then considered territories under Japanese jurisdiction.⁶⁶

Although the original, unabridged *Nihon ō nendai ki* has long been lost, it is possible to reconstruct part of this important Japanese work after elements from Chōnen's memorial have been removed from the 1,205-character excerpt from the *Nihon ō nendai ki* preserved in the *Sung shih*. The *Nihon ō nendai ki* should start at "The first ruler was called Amenominakanushi" and end with "and then Morihira Tennō, who is the present sovereign, now reigning as the sixty-fourth in line." A reconstructed text is shown in appendix two below.

The reconstructed text reveals some major characteristics of the *Nihon ō nendai ki* as a genre of historical writing. It deals almost exclusively with Japanese imperial genealogy: the successive emperors and empresses, their titles, their children who succeeded to the throne, the year of their enthronement, and the location of the palace. Its contents suggest that the *Nihon ō nendai ki* is analogous to a Japanese imperial genealogy, and therefore an appropriate English title for this work would be *The Japanese Imperial Genealogy*, not *The Japanese Imperial Chronology*. On the other hand, ancient Japanese historians also saw such "genealogy" as a historical expression in its own right. They believed that the source and the legitimacy of the power held by any reigning Tennō ultimately came from being a member of the imperial house,⁶⁷ and therefore had always been preoccupied with the imperial lineage, making the affirmation of the uniqueness of Japan's line of priestly rulers the primary purpose of their writings. Historical writings in this particular genre are commonly referred to as the *kōdai ki*. They must have existed long before Chōnen presented the *Nihon ō nendai ki* to the Sung court. But the primitive form and the brief contents of the *kōdai ki* writings as revealed in the reconstructed text did not remain unchanged. Over time the coverage of these writings seems to have been gradually broadened. The thirteenth-century *kōdai ki* writings give more detail on the imperial house, listing not only

the names of a Tennō's parents, the number of years of his or her reign, and the location of the tomb where a deceased Tennō was buried, but also the names of the regents.⁶⁸ Important political events have been incorporated in these works as well, indicating that the *kōdai ki* genre had evolved from being primarily an imperial genealogical record to a chronicle that focused on the Tennō, the central court, and events that happened in the capital.⁶⁹ In particular, the thirteenth-century Japanese monks made major contributions to enriching the contents of the *kōdai ki* writings. They "arranged the imperial chronicles of successive emperors in order, and attached to them the old records of [Japanese] Buddhism [in the past] one thousand years."⁷⁰ Some of the imperial genealogical records were still available to contemporary historians. When Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293–1354) was writing his *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns* (*Jinnō shōtōki*), he "looked for a most concise *kōdai ki*" and used it as the framework for his own book.⁷¹ This "most concise *kōdai ki*" must refer to an early form of Japanese imperial genealogy, and the *Nihon ō nendai ki* Chōnen brought to China is similar to such a work.

The *kōdai ki* genre probably experienced a three-stage evolution: in its formative stage, the *kōdai ki* writings (i.e., the "most concise" ones) were basically imperial genealogical records; they then evolved into the more elaborate imperial chronologies; in the fourteenth century they developed into "full-fledged" chronicles, which contain not only detailed information on the imperial genealogy and important political events in the capital, but also accounts of Sino-Japanese Buddhist contacts. Modern scholars who suggest that the accounts of Sino-Japanese Buddhist contacts are part of the original *Nihon ō nendai ki* have apparently read back the features of the more sophisticated thirteenth-century *kōdai ki* writings into the primitive tenth-century *Nihon ō nendai ki*. This is not only premature, but, indeed, groundless.⁷²

NOTES

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1. Ou-yang Hsiu, *Ou-yang wen-chung kung chi* (SPTK edn.), 54, pp. 7a-b; Su Ch'e, *Luan-ch'eng chi* (Shanghai: Ku-chi ch'u-pan-she, 1987), 13, p. 321; Mei Yao-ch'en, *Wan-ling chi* (SPTK edn.), 55, pp. 11b-12a; Ssu-ma Kuang, *Wen-kuo wen-cheng Ssu-ma kung wen-chi* (SPTK edn.), 3, p. 16a.
2. Chiang Shao-yü, *Huang-ch'ao [shih-shih] lei-yüan* (Sung-fen-shih ts'ung-k'an edn. of twelfth-century work; rpt. Kyoto: Chübun shuppansha, 1981), 60, pp. 11a-b; Chou Mi, *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih (hsü-chi)* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1988), b, pp. 176-177; Teng Ch'un, *Hua-chi* (preface dated 1176; Shanghai: Po-ku chai, 1922), 10, pp. 5b-6a.
3. Lo Chün, "Pao-ch'ing Ssu-ming chih," in *Sung-Yüan ti-fang-chih ts'ung-shu* (Taipei: Chung-kuo ti-chih yen-chiu-hui, 1978), 6, p. 8.
4. One of the palaces, the Ts'ui-han Hall, in the Southern Sung capital was built of Japanese pine. See Chou Mi, *Wu-lin chiu-shih (Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu edn., 1793)*, 4, p. 2; *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih (hsü-chi)*, b, p. 176; Li Hsin-ch'uan, *Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi* (Shih-yüan ts'ung-shu edn., 1913), 1, p. 5a; T'ao Tsung-i, *Nan-ts'un ch'o-keng lu* (SPTK edn.), 18, p. 13b. For information on temples, see Lou Yüeh, "Ch'ien-fo ko chi," in *T'ien-t'ung ssu chih* (Pi-chi wu-pien edn. Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1976), 2, pp. 6b-8b; 3, p. 22a. Also found in Lou's *Kung-k'uei chi* (SPTK edn.), 57, pp. 51 ff. For coffins, see Lu Yu, *Fang-weng chia-hsün (Chih-pu-tsu chai ts'ung-shu edn.)*, p. 5.
5. Lo Chün, *Pao-ch'ing Ssu-ming chih* (ca. 1227), 6, p. 7.
6. Lo Ta-ching, *Ho-lin yü-lu (ping-pien)* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1983), 4, pp. 304-305. The author carefully recorded the pronunciations and meanings of certain Japanese words.
7. Chou Mi, *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih (hsü-chi)*, b, p. 176. For an interesting discussion, see Mori Katsumi, "Nissō kōshō to sōnin no Nihon fūsō e no kanshin," in his *Nissō bunka kōryū no shomondai* (Tokyo: Kokusho kankō kai, 1975), pp. 149-158. For a general discussion of the advancement in mutual understanding between China and Japan during the Sung, see Mori Katsumi, "Nissō kōtsū to Nissō sōgō ninshiki no hadden," in his *Nissō bunka kōryū no shomondai*, pp. 27-74. See also Miura Keiichi, "Nissō kōshō no rekishiteki igi," in Kobata Atsushi kyōjū taikan kinen gigyōkai, eds., *Kobata Atsushi kyōjū taikan kinen kokushi ronshū* (Kyoto: Naigai insatsu kabushiki kaisha, 1970), p. 327.
8. Liu Hsü, *Chiu T'ang-shu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1975; hereafter referred to as *CTS*) 46, p. 1962; 149, p. 4008; Wang P'u, *Wu-tai hui-yao* (Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu edn. Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1937), 18, p. 228. For a detailed discussion of the compilation of the *Old Dynastic History of the T'ang*, see D. C. Twitchett, "The *Chiu T'ang shu*," in his *The Writing of Official History under the T'ang* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 191-236. See also Ch'en Kao-hua, *Chung-kuo ku-tai-shih shih-liao hsüeh* (Peking: Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1983), pp. 187-192.
9. For example, when Ennin, a Japanese monk, was visiting T'ang China, he recorded in his diary that the magistrate and an administrative officer asked him and his party

- about customs in Japan. See his *Nittō guhō junrei kōki* (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan-she, 1971), 2, p. 48. A detailed description of this information-gathering procedure can be found in my "Sino-Japanese Relations before the Eleventh Century" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1989), pp. 48-88. These reports might have formed the documentary basis for three lost T'ang works, Kao Shao-i, *Ssu-i ch'ao-kung lu*, in ten *chüan*; Lü Shu, *T'ang Hsia-chia-ssu ch'ao-kung t'u-chuan*; and Li Te-yü, *T'ang i-yü kuei-chung chuan*, in two *chüan*. A work compiled during the Hui-ch'ang period (841-886), the *Ssu-i ch'ao-kung lu* contained information on more than two hundred countries. It was originally in twenty *chüan* and was later reduced to ten. See Ma Tuan-lin, *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* (Shih-t'ung edn. rpt. Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1986), 196, p. 1653; Ch'en Chen-sun, *Chih-chai shu-lu chieh-t'i* (Shanghai: Shang-hai ku-chi ch'u-pan-she, 1987), 5, p. 147; Wang Ying-lin, *Yü-hai* (Taipei: Hua-wen shu-chü, 1967), 58, p. 26b. The *T'ang Hsia-chia-ssu ch'ao-kung t'u-chuan* seems also to have been completed during the Hui-ch'ang period. It is said that Lü Shu, the author, personally brought the draft of the work to the foreign guesthouse where the Kirghiz envoy stayed. The two reviewed the draft together to make sure that transliterations for Kirghiz words were correct and the descriptions of mountains and rivers in the country were accurate. See Li Te-yü, *Li Wei-kung wen-chi* (SPTK edn.), 2, pp. 9a-b; Wang Ying-lin, *Yü-hai*, 58, p. 15a. The third work, *T'ang i-yü kuei-chung chuan*, contains biographies of thirty foreigners, ranging from those in the Ch'in down to the T'ang, who had pledged allegiance to the Chinese court, remained loyal to Chinese emperors, and personally contributed to the Chinese cause. See Wang Ying-lin, *Yü-hai*, 58, p. 15b; Ch'en Chen-sun, *Chih-chai shu-lu chieh-t'i*, 7, p. 198. Information about foreign peoples was collected by Chinese envoys sent abroad and military commanders on expeditions. Their reports provided materials for such works as P'ei Su, *T'ang p'ing-jung chi* in five *chüan* and Lu Chih, *T'ang ch'ien-shih lu* in one *chüan*. For bibliographical information about these two works, see Wang Ying-lin, *Yü-hai*, 57, p. 39b and 58, p. 25a, respectively. Wei Hung-chi, a T'ang envoy to the Western Turks, was determined to bring information on the host country back to the T'ang court. When his return to China was postponed for three years because of a rebellion in the Western Region that made the journey back to Ch'ang-an unsafe, he is said to have torn apart his own clothes and used them as paper to draft a book entitled *Hsi-cheng chi*, in which he described the customs and products of the Western Turks. When he eventually came back to Ch'ang-an, Wei Hung-chi presented this work to Emperor T'ai-tsung. See Wang Ying-lin, *Yü-hai*, 57, p. 36a; CTS, 185a, p. 4795; Ou-yang Hsiu, *Hsin T'ang-shu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1975; hereafter referred to as HTS), 100, p. 3944.
10. Kimiya Yukihiko suggests that *Shikiin ryō* is one of the statutes in the *Taiho ryō*. See his "Nyūsō sō Chōnen no jiseki (jō)," *Nihon rekishi* 133 (1959), p. 94.
 11. Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka bunka kōryū shi* (Tokyo: Fūsanbo, 1955), pp. 272-277; Kimiya Yukihiko, "Nyūsō sō (ge)," pp. 84-90.
 12. To-t'ō, *Sung-shih* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1977; hereafter referred to as SS) 491, pp. 14131-14134. An English translation can be found in L. C. Goodrich and

- R. Tsunoda, *Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories* (South Pasadena: P.D. and Ione Perkins, 1951), pp. 56–61. A quotation from this genealogy also appears in a Yüan-dynasty work, the *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao* 324, pp. 2552–2553, and has been translated by E. H. Parker in his “Ma Tuan-lin’s Account of Japan up to A.D. 1200,” *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* 22.1 (1894), pp. 54–64. There is, however, a considerable discrepancy between these two quotations, which awaits further study.
13. T’o-t’o, *Yüan shih* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1976), 41, p. 868; 138, p. 3344.
 14. T’ao Tsung-i, *Nan-ts’un ch’o-keng lu*, 3, p. 1a; T’o-t’o, *Yüan shih*, appendix, p. 14253; Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi* (Shanghai: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1939; rpt. Peking: Chung-kuo shu-tien, 1987), 23, p. 304.
 15. These thirteen national histories cover the reigns of Emperors T’ai-tsu, T’ai-tsung, Chen-tsung, Jen-tsung, Ying-tsung, Shen-tsung, Che-tsung, Hui-tsung, and Ch’in-tsung of the Northern Sung, and Kao-tsung, Hsiao-tsung, Kuang-tsung, and Ning-tsung of the Southern Sung. For accounts concerning the compilation of these national histories, see Li T’ao, *Hsü Tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien* (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1983), 62, p. 4a; 66, p. 15a; 86, p. 7b; 314, pp. 9b–10a; 318, p. 14b; 325, p. 14b; Wang Ying-lin, *Yü hai*, 46, pp. 46a–b, pp. 47a, 49a; Ma Tuan-lin, *Wen-hsien t’ung-k’ao*, 192, p. 1628; Ch’ao Kung-wu, *Chün-chai tu-shu chih* (SPTK edn.), 2a, pp. 8b–9a; Li Hsin-ch’uan, *Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1956), 125, p. 2041. See also a discussion by Ko Chao-kuang, “Sung kuan-hsiu kuo-shih k’ao,” *Shih-hsüeh shih yen-chiu* 1 (1982), pp. 47–54.
 16. SS, 445, p. 13131; Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi* 23, p. 306; Chin Yü-fu, *Chung-kuo shih-hsüeh shih* (Hong Kong: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1964), pp. 106–107.
 17. T’o-t’o, *Yüan shih*, 156, p. 3672; Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi*, 23, p. 304. See also Su T’ien-chüeh (a Yüan-dynasty scholar), *Tz’u-hsi wen-kao* (Yüan-tai chen-pen wen-chi hui-k’an edn. Taipei: Kuo-li chung-yang t’u-shu-kuan, 1970), 25, p. 982.
 18. T’o-t’o, *Liao shih* (Peking: Chung-hua, 1974), appendix, p. 1554; Wei Su, *Kuei-chai chi* (Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chü, 1957), 16, p. 11a. See also a discussion by Ch’en Fang-ming, “Sung Liao Chin shih te tsuan-hsiu yü cheng-t’ung chih cheng,” first published in *Shih-huo yüeh-k’an* 2.8 (1972), reprinted in Sung-shih tso-t’an-hui, ed., *Sung-shih yen-chiu chi* (Taipei: T’ai-wan shu-chü, 1974), vol. 7, pp. 205–232.
 19. Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi*, 23, p. 305. For a detailed and accessible account of the compilation of the Sung official history, see Hok-lam Chan, “Chinese Official Historiography at the Yüan Court,” in *China under Mongol Rule*, ed. John D. Langlois, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 55–106.
 20. *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi*, 23, pp. 304, 305, and 308.
 21. Ch’en Chen-sun, *Chih-chai shu-lu chieh-t’i*, 4, p. 123; SS, 305, p. 10079; Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi*, 23, p. 306. For the *Veritable Record of T’ai-tsung’s reign*, see also Yu Mao, *Sui-ch’u t’ang shu-mu* (Shuo-fu edn. Shanghai: Shang-hai ku-chi ch’u-pan-she, 1988), p. 28; SS, 203, p. 5090.
 22. Li T’ao, *Hsü tzu-chih t’ung-chien ch’ang-pien*, 62, p. 4a.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. Wang Ying-lin, *Yü hai* 46, pp. 46a–b.

25. SS, 305, p. 10079.
26. Yang I, "T'an-yüan," cited in Chiang Shao-yü and Tung K'ang, *Huang-ch'ao lei-yüan*, 78, p. 6a.
27. *Ibid.*, 43, pp. 9b-10a.
28. Wang Hsiang-jung, "Chung-kuo cheng-shih chung te Jih-pen chuan," in his *Chung-Jih kuan-hsi shih wen-hsien lun-k'ao* (Changsha: Yüeh-lu shu-she, 1985), pp. 42-48.
29. Chiang Shao-yü and Tung K'ang, *Huang-ch'ao lei-yüan*, 78, p. 6a; Jōjin, *San tendai godaisan ki* (Shiseiki shūran edn. Tokyo: Kondō shuppanbu, 1924-1938), 5, pp. 181-182.
30. SS, 491, p. 14131.
31. Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka bunka kōryū shi*, p. 88, n. 3.
32. The *Nihon shoki* (compiled in 720), the *Shoku Nihongi* (797), the *Nihon kōki* (840), the *Shoku Nihon kōki* (869), the *Nihon Montoku tennō jitsuroku* (879), and the *Nihon sandai jitsuroku* (901). For a recent study of these works, see John S. Brownlee, *Political Thought in Japanese Historical Writing* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1991).
33. For example, the *Kokusho sō mokuroku* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1963-1972), pp. 320, 379, 398, and 462, lists such works as the *Zoku Nihon ōdai ichiran*, the *Zoku Nihon ōdai ichiran kōki*, the *Nihon ōdai ichiran*, the *Nihon ōdai ichiran kō*, the *Nihon ōdai ki*, the *Nihon ōdai ki kakinuki*, the *Nihon ōdai kiryaku*, the *Nihon nendai ki*, the *Nihon nendai ki taisei*, the *Nihon nendai kiryaku*, and the *Dai Nihon ōdai ki*.
34. See, for example, Toneri Shinō, *Nihon shoki* (Kokushi taikai edn. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1974), 29, p. 357, the third month of 682: "The emperor . . . gave orders to the Imperial Princes Kahashima and Osakabe . . . to commit to writing a chronicle of the emperors, and also of matters of high antiquity." See also the *Nihon shoki*, 30, p. 398, the eleventh month of 688: "Chitoko, . . . in a eulogy recited the succession to the throne of the imperial ancestors." According to Sakamoto Tarō, these words about "the succession to the throne of the imperial ancestors" constitute a form of "chronicle of the emperors." See his *Rikkoku shi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1970), p. 68. The English translations are from W. G. Aston, trans., *Nihongi* (rpt. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1972), vol. 2, pp. 350, 389. After the compilation of the *Kojiki* in 720, Japanese historians continued to write along the lines of "chronicles." They completed the *Nippon teiki* in one volume and the *Teiki* in two volumes in 746 and 748 respectively. For further discussion, see Donald L. Philippi, *Kojiki* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968), p. 10.
35. Tsuda Sōkichi, *Nihon koden no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1948), vol. 1, pp. 37-38; Sakamoto Tarō, *Rikkoku shi*, pp. 68-70.
36. Kimiya Yukihiko, "Nyūsō sō (jō)," p. 87; Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka*, p. 273.
37. G. W. Robinson, "Early Japanese Chronicles: The Six National Histories," in *Historians of China and Japan*, ed. W. G. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 224-225.
38. For the revision and recompilation of various Sung national histories, see Wang

- Ying-lin, *Yü hai*, 46, pp. 47a, 49a; Ma Tuan-lin, *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 192, p. 1628; Li T'ao, *Hsü Tzu-chih t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien*, 86, p. 7b; 314, pp. 9b-10a; 318, p. 14b; 325, p. 14b; Li Hsin-ch'uan, *Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu*, 125, p. 2041; Tseng Kung, *Yüan-feng lei-kao* (Kuo-hsüeh chi-pen ts'ung-shu edn.), 31, pp. 216-217.
39. "With him [the Japanese envoy] went Tachibana Hayanari, a student, and Kūkai, a Buddhist monk. They asked permission to remain and pursue their studies." *HTS*, 220, p. 6209; Goodrich and Tsunoda, *Japan*, p. 47.
 40. In Ma Tuan-lin, *Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao*, 324, p. 2553, where the *Nihon ō nendai ki* is also cited, the time indicator takes on yet two other forms: "tang . . . wang shih" and "tang-tz'u."
 41. In this conjunction, it is worth remembering that both Ou-yang Hsiu and Sung Ch'i are known for their hostility toward Buddhism. See Ch'en Kuang-ch'ung, "Ou Sung hsiu-shu i-t'ung lun," *Shih-hsüeh shih yen-chiu*, 4 (1982), pp. 5-8. This attitude must have affected the way they treated Buddhist monks and their activities in the *Hsin T'ang shu*.
 42. For a discussion of the Chinese literary genre "piao," see James R. Hightower, "The *Wen hsüan* and Genre Theory," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 20 (1957), pp. 524-528.
 43. *SS*, 491, p. 14131.
 44. Shibana, *Honchō kōsō den* (Dai Nihon bukkyō zensho edn.), 67, p. 373.
 45. For a brief study of this work, see Robert Borgen, "*San tendai godaisan ki* as a Source for the Study of Sung History," *Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies*, 19 (1987), pp. 1-6.
 46. *San tendai godaisan ki*, pp. 119-121. For a recent study of Jōjin, see Charlotte von Verschuer, "Le Voyage de Jōjin au Mont Tiantai," *T'oung Pao* 77.1-3 (1991), pp. 1-48.
 47. The preliminary result is shown in the following, where each Arabic numeral refers to one of the seventeen questions listed in the text that was presumably raised with Chōnen, and each Roman numeral represents an indexed passage in appendix one that is supposed to be Chōnen's answer: 1-i, 4-ix, 6-viii, 7-vi, 11-vi, 12-iii, 15-ii, 16-v. And the twelve accounts indexed by Arabic numerals [1] to [11] in appendix one were probably Chōnen's answer to the question concerning the spread of Buddhism from China to Japan.
 48. Chih-p'an, *Fo-tsu t'ung-chi* (*Taishō shinshu Daizōkyō* edn.), 43, p. 399b. Compare some of the sentences on this page with the following indexed passages in appendix one: [v], [vii], [1], [2], [3], [4], [6], [7], and [9].
 49. Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka*, pp. 293-294. He suggested that the *Nihon ō nendai ki* was compiled by Chōnen after he had collected the available Japanese official historical works and consulted government officials. See also Kimiya Yukihiko, "Nyūsō sō (jō)," p. 94.
 50. The *San tendai godaisan ki*, 4, p. 117; 5, p. 181, reports that Chōnen's diary is in four *chüan*. In his *Jōjin shōki nyūsō shoshiden kō* (*DNBZ* edn.), p. 2, Takakusu Junjirō cites

- an old bibliography that specifies the diary as consisting of six *chūan*. The diary is also mentioned in his *Nyūtō shokkaden kō* (DNBZ edn.), 6, p. 178. For a study of Chōnen's diary, see Mori Katsumi, "Chōnen zaitōgi ni tsuite," *Shūkyō shakaishi kenkyū* 10 (1971), pp. 95-108. Three of Chōnen's poems have been preserved. Two of them can be found in "Chōnen Genkō showa shishū," collected in Takakusu Junjirō, *Nyūtō shokkaden kō* (DNBZ edn.), 6, p. 177; the other is in Fujiwara Sadaie, ed., *Shin kokin waka shū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1966), 10, p. 204.
51. *Nihon Shoki*, 22, p. 148; Aston, *Nihongi*, p. 238.
 52. Wei Cheng, *Sui shu* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1973), 81, p. 1827; Goodrich and Tsunoda, *Japan*, p. 32.
 53. SS, 1491, p. 14132.
 54. Sugano Mamichi, *Shoku Nihongi* (Kokushi taikai edn.), 2, p. 15, the twenty-ninth day of the sixth month, 702; the English translation is from J. B. Snellen, trans., "Shoku Nihongi: Chronicles of Japan, continued, 697-791 A.D.," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (2d series) 11 (1934), p. 210.
 55. SS, 491, p. 14132.
 56. HTS, 220, p. 6209; CTS, 199, p. 5341.
 57. Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka*, pp. 172-174.
 58. SS, 491, p. 14132.
 59. Chih-p'an, *Fo-tsu t'ung-chi*, 43, p. 399b; SS, 491, p. 14133; Goodrich and Tsunoda, *Japan*, pp. 52-53.
 60. *Mingaki shū*, cited by Nishioka Toranosuke in his "Chōnen no nyūsō ni tsuite (2)," *Rekishi Chiri* 45.3 (1925), p. 552.
 61. SS, 491, p. 14131; Goodrich and Tsunoda, *Japan*, p. 50.
 62. Nishioka Toranosuke, "Chōnen," p. 552; Goodrich and Tsunoda, *Japan*, p. 75, n. 7.
 63. Kimiya Yukihiro, "Nyūsō sō (ge)," pp. 89-91.
 64. As early as 689, the Japanese envoy Fumi no Imiki Hakase and seven others were dispatched to the Southern Islands to claim them. See *Shoku Nihongi*, 1, p. 5, the thirteen day of the fourth month of the second year of Mommu Tennō. See also Snellen, "Shoku Nihongi," pp. 174-175. In 699, envoys from Tanejima, Yakushima, Amami, and Tokushima went to the Japanese court accompanied by the Japanese envoy. They presented local products and were granted titles by the Japanese court. See *Shoku Nihongi*, 1, p. 8, the nineteen day of the seventh month of the third year of Mommu Tennō; Snellen, "Shoku Nihongi," p. 179.
 65. In 714, Futono Ason Enkenji and fifty-two other people from Amami, Shiga, and Kumi also paid tribute to the Japanese court. Kimiya Yasuhiko, *Nikka*, pp. 79-85.
 66. Kimiya Yasuhiko has offered an explanation for the discrepancy and omission. He suggests that the development of remote border areas in the Tōsandō and Saikaidō prefectures would have increased the number of provinces there. Also from the 770s onward, Japanese envoys stopped sailing to China by way of the Southern Islands, and began using a new sea route that started at Hakata in Kyūshū, stretched across

- the East China Sea, and stopped at the Chinese coast. The Southern Islands thus gradually faded from the minds of the Japanese. See Kimiya Yasuhiko, "Nyūsō sō (ge)," pp. 89-91.
67. Brownlee, *Political Thought in Japanese Historical Writing*, pp. 8-20; Delmer M. Brown, "Pre-Gukanshō Historical Writing," in Ishida Ichirō and Delmer Myers Brown, *The Future and the Past: A Translation and Study of the Gukanshō* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 353-401.
 68. Kuroida Toshio, "Gukanshō to Jinnō shōtō ki," in *Nihon rekishi kōza*, ed. Rekishigaku kenkyūkai and Nihonshi kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1958), vol. 8, pp. 33-35. This work has been translated into English by John A. Harrison in his *New Light on Early and Medieval Japanese Historiography: Two Translations and an Introduction* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960).
 69. Hirata Toshiharu, *Yoshino jidai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yamachi shobō, 1943), pp. 603-610. He studied sixteen works in the *Ō nendai ki* genre which were compiled during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. These works bear such diverse titles as *Kōdai nendai ki*, *Kōdai ki*, *Rekidai kōki*, *Teiō hennen ki*, *Kō nendai ryakki*, *Kōdai ryakki*, and *Tōji ōdai ki*.
 70. Eiyū, *Teiō hennen ki* (Kokushi taikei edn.), p. 1. Typical of such a work is the *Gukanshō* (Nihon koten bungaku taikei edn. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1967), which was compiled by the monk Jien during 1219-1220. This book consists of seven *chūan*. The first is devoted to a chronicle of the successive Chinese rulers, the second to the Japanese imperial house. The *Gukanshō* has been translated into English by Ishida Ichirō and Delmer Myers Brown, in *Future and the Past*.
 71. *Jinnō shōtōki okugaki*, cited in Hirata Toshiharu, *Yoshino jidai no kenkyū*, p. 596. This passage has been translated into English by H. Paul Varley in his *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns: Jinnō shōtōki of Kitabatake Chikafusa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 5, n. 9. It is worth noting that he also translates the term *Kōdai ki* as "imperial genealogy." But I disagree with him that the imperial genealogy used by Kitabatake Chikafusa is an "abridged" one. "A most concise imperial genealogy" may be a translation that better conveys the meaning of the original Japanese term.
 72. In his study of *teiki*, a similar genre of Japanese historical writing, G. W. Robinson also touches on this issue. He asks: "Does *teiki* mean 'chronicles of the emperor,' as Chamberlain, following traditional opinion, translates? Or does it merely mean imperial genealogies? There are strong but inconclusive arguments for both views." See his "Early Japanese Chronicles," p. 217, n. 7. This preliminary study of the *Nihon ō nendai ki* has added one more piece of evidence in support of the latter view.

GLOSSARY

- Amami 奄美
 Awada no Mahito 粟田真人
 Chang Ch'ü-hua 張去華
 Chang Fu 張復
 Chao An-jen 趙安仁
 Ch'ao Chiung 晁迥
 Ch'en Yao-sou 陳堯叟
 Chen-tsung 眞宗
 ch'i Nien-tai chi so-chi yün
 其年代紀所記云
 Chiang-nan 江南
 ch'i-chü chu 起居注
 chieh Tiao-jan so-chi yün 皆奮然所記云
 Ch'ien Jo-shui 錢若水
 Chih Che (Chih I) 智者 (智顓)
 chih . . . nien 直 . . . 年
 Chih-kuan i 止觀義
 Chih-p'an 志磐
 ching-nei jen-wu shu to-shao
 京內人屋數多少
 ching-nei li-shu to-shao 京內里數多少
 chin-shih 進士
 Chiu T'ang shu 舊唐書
 Chōnen 奮然
 Chōnen hyōkei (Tiao-jan piao-ch'i)
 奮然表啓
 Chu I 朱巽
 Dai Nihon 大日本
 Dōji 道慈
 Engi shiki 延喜式
 feng-t'u 風土
 Fo-tsu t'ung-chi 佛祖統記
 Heian 平安
 Hokke kyō 法華經
 Honchō kōsō den 本朝高僧傳
 Hsi shang-wu mao-shu i-kuei
 悉賞物質書以歸
 Hsin T'ang shu 新唐書
 Jakushō 寂照
 Jan yen 然言
 jen-hu to-shao 人戶多少
 jih-li 日曆
 Jih-pen feng-su 日本風俗
 Jinnō shōtōki 神皇正統記
 Jōjin 成尋
 ju-T'ang ch'iu shu-chi 入唐求書籍
 ki 紀
 Kitabatake Chikafusa 北畠親房
 kōdai ki 皇代記
 Kojiki 古事記
 Kōkō 光孝
 Konkōmyō saishō kyō 金光明最勝王經
 Konkōmyō Shitennō no ji
 金光明四天王之寺
 Kūkai 空海
 Kumi 久美
 Kung-tsung 恭宗
 kuo tu-i to-shao 國都邑多少
 kuo-chung yu wu-ching chi fo-ching
 國中有五經及佛經

- kuo-shih 國史
 kyūji 舊辭
 Lin-an 臨安
 Nihon 日本
Nihon nendai ki (Jih-pen nientai chi)
 日本年代紀
Nihon ō nendai ki (Jih-pen wang nientai chi)
 日本王年代紀
Ō nendai ki (Wang nientai chi) 王年代紀
 Ono no Imoko 小野妹子
 Ou-yang Hsiu 歐陽修
 pen-chi 本紀
 pen-kuo ch'ü Mao-kuo chin-yüan
 本國去毛國近遠
 pen-kuo hsiang-ch'ü Ming-chou chih-chin
 yin-ho pu-t'ung Chung-kuo
 本國相去明州至近, 因何不通中國
 pen-kuo kuei-kuan yu shih-ho ming-mu
 本國貴官有是何名目
 pen-kuo shih-hsi 本國世系
 pen-kuo ssu-shih han-shu yü Chung-kuo
 t'ung pu t'ung
 本國四時寒暑與中國同不同
 pen-kuo ssu-chih pei-chieh
 本國四至北界
 pen-kuo wang hsing-shih 本國王姓氏
 pen-kuo wang shen-hu 本國王甚呼
 pen-kuo yao-yung Han-ti shih-ho wu-
 huo 本國要用漢地是何物貨
 pen-kuo yu shih-ho ch'in-shou
 本國有是何禽獸
Rikkoku shi 六國史
 Saichō 最澄
 Saikaidō 西海道
San tendai godaisan ki 參天臺五臺山記
 San-ssu 三司
 Sesson Yūbai 雪村友梅
 Shen-tsung 神宗
 Shiga 鹿島
 shih-cheng chi 時政記
 shih-kuan 史館
 shih-lu 實錄
 Shih-tsu 世祖
Shikiin ryō 職員令
 Shingon shū 真言宗
Shoku Nihongi 續日本紀
 Shōmu 聖武
 Shōtoku 聖德
 shu-mi yüan 樞密院
 Shun-ti 順帝
 so-te tz'u-lai chin-shih wen-chi fan-hai erh-
 kuei 所得賜賚盡市文籍泛海而歸
Sui shu 隋書
 Sung Ch'i 宋祁
Sung shih 宋史
 T'ai-tsu 太祖
 T'ai-tsung 太宗
 Tanejima 種子島
 teiki 帝紀
 Temmu 天武
 Tennō 天皇
 Ti Ping 帝昺
 T'ien-t'ai (Tendai) 天臺
 Tokushima 德島
 Tosandō 東山道
 T'o-t'o 脫脫

tsai-hsi Tiao-jan ju-Hua hsi tui T'ai-tsung k'ua-ku hsi 在昔奮然入華兮, 對太宗誇古兮	Wang Tan 王旦 wen-wu liao-li chieh shih-kuan 文武僚吏皆世官
Tuan-tsung 端宗	Wo-jen chuan 倭人傳
Tung Wen-ping 董文炳	Yakushima 屋久島
tzu Ming-chou chih Jih-pen-kuo hsien-tao ho chou-chün? Ch'ü kuo-wang sso-tu chin-yüan? 自明州至日本國先到何州 郡? 去國王所都近遠?	Yamato 倭 Yang I 楊億 Yin-t'ai t'ung-chin ssu 銀臺通進司 yu pai-hsing hao 有百姓號
tz'u-t'u 此土	Yüan-ho 元和
Wang Ch'in-jo 王欽若	

APPENDIX ONE

「【I】國中有《五經》書及佛經、《白居易集》七十卷，並得自中國。土宜五穀而少麥。交易用銅錢，文曰『乾文大寶』【II】畜有水牛、驢、羊，多犀、象。【I】產絲蠶，多織絹，薄緻可愛。樂有中國、高麗二部【III】。四時寒暑，大類中國。【IV】國之東境接海島，夷人所居，身面皆有毛。【I】東奧州產黃金，西別島出銀，以爲貢賦。【V】國王以王爲姓，傳襲至今王六十四世，文武僚吏皆世官。」

其《年代紀》所記云，初主號天御中主。次曰天村雲尊，其後【VI】皆以「尊」爲號。次天八重雲尊，次天彌聞尊，次天忍勝尊，次膽波尊，次萬魂尊，次利利魂尊，次國狹槌尊，次角龔魂尊，次汲津丹尊，次面垂見尊，次國常立尊，次天鑑尊，次天萬尊，次沫名杵尊，次伊奘諾尊，次素戔烏尊，次天照大神尊，次正哉吾勝速日天押穗耳尊，次天彥尊，次炎尊，次彥瀲尊，凡二十三世，並都於築紫日向宮。

彥瀲第四子號神武天皇，自築紫宮入居大和州橿原宮，即位元年甲寅，當周僖王時也。次綏靖天皇，次安寧天皇，次懿德天皇，次孝昭天皇，次孝天皇，次孝靈天皇，次孝元天皇，次開化天皇，次崇神天皇，次垂仁天皇，次景行天皇，次成務天皇。次仲哀天皇，國人言今爲鎮國香椎大神。次神功天皇，開化天皇之曾孫女，又謂之息長足姬天皇，國人言今爲太奈良姬大神。次應神天皇，【VII】甲辰歲，始於百濟得中國文字，今號八蕃菩薩，有大臣號紀武內，年三百七歲。次仁德天皇，次履中天皇，次反正天皇，次允恭天皇，次安康天皇，次雄略天皇，次清寧天皇，次顯宗天皇，次仁賢天皇，次武烈天皇，次繼體天皇，次安開天皇，次宣化天皇。

次天國排開廣庭天皇，亦名欽明天皇，即位十三年，【1】壬申歲始傳佛法於百濟國，當【a】此土【A】梁承聖元年。

次敏達天皇。次用明天皇，有子曰聖德太子，年三歲，聞十人語，同時解之，七歲悟佛法于菩提寺，講《聖鬘經》，天雨曼陀羅華。當【b】此土【B】隋開皇中，【2】遣使泛海至中國，求《法華經》。

次崇峻天皇。次推古天皇，欽明天皇之女也。次舒明天皇，次皇極天皇。次孝德天皇，白雉四年，【3】律師道照求法至中國，從三藏僧玄奘受經、律、論，當【c】此土【C】唐永徽四年也。次天豐財重日足姬天皇，【4】令僧智通等入唐求大乘法相教，【D】當顯慶三年。次天智天皇，次天武天皇，次持總天皇。次文武天皇，大寶三年，【E】當長安元年，【5】遣粟田真人入唐求書籍，律師道慈求經。次阿閉天皇，次皈依天皇。次聖武天皇，寶龜二年，【6】遣僧正玄昉入朝，【F】當開元四年。次孝明天皇，聖武天皇之女也，天平勝寶四年，【G】當天寶中，【7】遣使及僧入唐求內外經教及傳戒。次天炊天皇。次高野姬天皇，聖武天皇之女也。次白壁天皇，二十四年，【8】遣二僧靈仙、行賀入唐，禮五臺山學佛法。次桓武天皇，【9】遣騰元葛野與空海大師及延曆寺僧澄入唐，詣天台山傳智者止觀義，【H】當元和元年也。次諾樂天皇，次嵯峨天皇，次淳和天皇。次仁明天皇。【I】當開成、會昌中，【10】遣僧入唐，禮五臺。次文德天皇，【J】當大中年間。次清和天皇，次陽成天皇。次光孝天皇，【11】遣僧宗睿入唐傳教，【K】當光啓元年也。

次仁和天皇，當【d】此土【L】梁龍德中，遣僧寬建等入朝。次醍醐天皇，次天慶天皇。次封上天皇，當【e】此土【M】周廣順年也。次冷泉天皇，今爲太上天皇。次守天皇，即今王也。凡六十四世。

【VIII】畿內有山城、大和、河內、和泉、攝津凡五州，共統五十三郡。東海道有伊賀、伊勢、志摩、尾張、參河、遠江、駿河、伊豆、甲斐、相模、武藏、安房、上總、常陸凡十四州，共統一百一十六郡。東山道有通江、美濃、飛驒、信濃、上野、下野、陸奧、出羽凡八州，共統一百二十二郡。北陸道有若狹、越前、加賀、能登、越中、越後、佐渡凡七州，共統三十郡。山陰道有丹波、丹後、徂馬、因幡、伯耆、出雲、石見、隱伎凡八州，共統五十二郡。小陽道有播磨、美作、備前、備中、備後、安藝、周防、長門凡八州，共統六十九郡。南海道有伊紀、淡路、河波、讚耆、伊豫、土佐凡六州，共統四十八郡。西海道有築前、築後、豐前、豐後、肥前、肥後、日向、大隅、薩摩凡九州，共統九十三郡。又有壹伎、對馬、多執凡三島，各統二郡。是謂五畿、七道、三島，凡三千七百七十二都，四百一十四驛，【IX】八十八萬三千三百二十九課丁。課丁之外，不可詳見。皆《奮然》所記云。

APPENDIX TWO

A Reconstructed Portion of the Nihon ō nendai ki

初主號天御中主。次曰天村雲尊。次天八重雲尊，次天彌聞尊，次天忍勝尊，次瞻波尊，次萬魂尊，次利利魂尊，次國狹槌尊，次角龔魂尊，次汲津丹尊，次面垂見尊，次國常立尊，次天鑑尊，次天萬尊，次沫名杵尊，次伊奘諾尊，次素戔烏尊，次天照大神尊，次正哉吾勝速日天押穗耳尊，次天彥尊，次炎尊，次彥瀲尊，凡二十三世，並都於築紫日向宮。彥瀲第四子號神武天皇，自築紫宮入居大和州橿原宮，即位元年甲寅，當周僖王時也。次綏靖天皇，次安寧天皇，次懿德天皇，次孝昭天皇，次孝天皇，次孝靈天皇，次孝元天皇，次開化天皇，次崇神天皇，次垂仁天皇，次景行天皇，次成務天皇。次仲哀天皇，國人言今爲鎮國香椎大神。次神功天皇，開化天皇之曾孫女，又謂之息長足姬天皇，國人言今爲太奈良姬神。次應神天皇，今號八蕃菩薩，有大臣號紀武內，年三百七歲。次仁德天皇，次履中天皇，次反正天皇，次允恭天皇，次安康天皇，次雄略天皇，次清寧天皇，次顯宗天皇，次仁賢天皇，次武烈天皇，次繼體天皇，次安開天皇，次宣化天皇，次天國排開廣庭天皇，亦名欽明天皇。次敏達天皇，次明用天皇，有子曰聖德太子，次崇峻天皇，次推古天皇，欽明天皇之女也。次舒明天皇，次皇極天皇，次孝德天皇，次天豐財重日足姬天皇，次天智天皇，次天武天皇，次持總天皇，次文武天皇，次阿閉天皇，次飯依天皇，次聖武天皇，次孝明天皇，聖武天皇之女也。次天炊天皇，次高野姬天皇，聖武天皇之女也。次白璧天皇，次桓武天皇，次諾樂天皇，次嵯峨天皇，次淳和天皇。次仁明天皇，次文德天皇。次清和天皇，次陽成天皇，次光孝天皇。次仁和天皇，次醍醐天皇，次天慶天皇。次封上天皇，次冷泉天皇，今爲太上天皇。次守平天皇，即今王也。凡六十四世。

The *Gazetteer of the Nanjing
Ministry of Revenue*
The Record of an Auxiliary Capital
Department in the Ming Dynasty

JUN FANG

The *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* (*Nanjing hubu zhi*) is one of the many departmental gazetteers compiled by bureaucrats at Nanjing, the southern capital of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Although modern scholars are well aware that two national capitals, a primary northern one, Beijing, and a secondary southern one, Nanjing, existed during the Ming dynasty, and may marvel at the identical bureaucratic apparatus and power structure at the two capitals,¹ few have noticed that almost all the major government agencies in the southern capital compiled and printed their own departmental gazetteers.² In contrast, only two offices in the northern capital ever published such works.³ Fortunately, approximately a dozen gazetteers produced by the Nanjing administration have survived. This article discusses the hitherto neglected *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* — its compilation, its two known editions, and the extant copies. It then explores the genre of the departmental gazetteer and the reasons for its widespread use by southern-capital officials in the Ming. The article further discusses the contents

of the departmental gazetteer and analyzes its significance for the study of the Ming dual-capital system.

At present it is not clear which Nanjing office first compiled a departmental gazetteer. What is known is that at least two institutions published gazetteers earlier than the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue.⁴ According to the preface to the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* written by Han Shiyong, in the late 1540s when he became minister of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue, he felt the need to prepare a ministry monograph that would contain regulations, administrative responsibilities, and precedents for his subordinates to follow. His intention to compose such a guidebook was further propelled when he came across the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Court of Judicial Review* (*Nanjing dalisi zhi*). Xie Bin, then director of the Guizhou Bureau of the Ministry,⁵ offered to do the job. He started compilation in the sixth month of 1549, completing the work in the first month of 1550. Seven months later, Zhao Hesui, manager of the General Service Office under the ministry, was entrusted with the task of editing the new gazetteer. When the editing was under way, however, Han Shiyong was transferred to the Nanjing Ministry of War. Therefore it was Wang Chongqing (1484–1565), Han's successor, who read the edited version of the gazetteer and ordered it to be printed (see illustration 1). It took another eight months for the book to appear in print.⁶

The *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* has at least two editions, dated 1550 and 1595. The 1550 edition consists of four *juan* of "general records" (*zongzhi*), twenty *juan* of "classified records" (*fenzhi*), and two appended *juan* (*fujian*).⁷ It also includes two prefaces by ministers Han Shiyong and Wang Chongqing, both dated 1550.

The Fu Ssu-nien Library at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, holds an exemplar of the original 1550 edition of the twenty-four-*juan* gazetteer, and the East Asian Library at the University of Chicago has a microfilm copy made from the Taiwan original. The 1550 edition in Taiwan is, however, incomplete, lacking *juan* sixteen (except for the first page) and twenty-four, as well as the two appended *juan*. And *juan* five and twenty both lack the last few pages. The first page of Han Shiyong's preface (which is also the first page of the gazetteer), page fifteen of *juan* one, and page one of *juan* seventeen are

序南京戶部志

兩京六曹未有志創南京戶部志
 者今大司馬石溪韓公始也先
 是石溪公既覃精思於厥務而又
 慮夫

祖宗成法備載會典諸書思欲往有所
 稽來有所程也遂命郎中謝君彬
 旁蒐而博采之取其事關職司爲

1. First page of the preface to the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* dated 1550 by Wang Chongqing (1484-1565). Eight cols. of 15 chars.; border 14 x 20.8 cm. Photographic copy of exemplar in the Fu Ssu-nien Library of the Academia Sinica, Taipei, held by the East Asian Library, the University of Chicago. All the illustrations appearing in this article are taken from this photographic copy.

also missing. I have not yet determined whether another exemplar of the 1550 edition exists.

The Sonkeikaku Bunko in Tokyo holds a copy of the 1595 edition, which contains a postscript dated the same year by Yin Rong, director of the Guizhou Bureau at the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. Yin writes that he was browsing through the gazetteer in his spare time and found that the copies housed at the ministry were already incomplete, so he decided to collate and reprint the gazetteer. Some minor differences exist between the two editions. The 1595 edition contains a preface by Xie Bin, author of the gazetteer, which is missing from the 1550 edition. Nor does the 1595 edition include the two prefaces written by Han Shiyong and Wang Chongqing, the "principles of compilation" (*fanli*), and the list of reference works used for compiling the gazetteer, all of which are present in the 1550 edition. But the table of contents and the texts of the two editions are exactly the same, without a single page missing from the 1595 edition. The Fu Ssu-nien Library at the Academia Sinica has a photographic copy of this edition produced in the 1970s.

Some biographical records exist for two of the five officials involved in compiling and publishing the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue*, Han Shiyong and Wang Chongqing. Han was a native of Nanchong, Sichuan Province, who received the "metropolitan graduate" (*jinshi*) degree in 1514.⁸ Before becoming the Nanjing minister of revenue, he served in the same ministry as vice director of the Fujian Bureau, director of the Shandong Bureau, and vice minister. He was then transferred to the Nanjing Ministry of War.⁹ Wang, on the other hand, was a native of Kaizhou (modern Puyang, Henan Province). He became a metropolitan graduate in 1508. Author of four books on Chinese classics, Wang succeeded Han as the Nanjing minister of revenue. Later he also served as the Nanjing minister of rites.¹⁰

There is a short biographical entry in the local gazetteer of Xie Bin's native county of Longxi in Fujian Province. It tells us that on receiving the metropolitan-graduate degree in 1544, Xie was appointed secretary at the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. He then served for a time as director of one of the ministry bureaus before becoming prefect of Guangzhou Prefecture.¹¹ Little is known about the other two lower-

ranking ministry officials who contributed directly to the publication of the gazetteer, Yin Rong and Zhao Hesui. Yin came from Neijiang, Sichuan, and like Xie Bin, assumed the directorship of the Guizhou Bureau in the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue.¹² Zhao was a native of Nanhai, Guangdong Province, and held a “provincial graduate” (*juren*) degree.¹³

The so-called gazetteer is a unique genre in Chinese historiography, recording important information about a particular place or administrative unit. A gazetteer usually runs to several volumes and preserves a wide range of information about the history, geography, administration, biography, and cultural features of the place or the unit it chronicles. Depending on the subject matter, Chinese gazetteers can be classified into three main groups: administrative, topographical, and institutional. Best known to historians are gazetteers dealing with the history and geography of an administrative unit, such as a county, subprefecture, prefecture, province, or even the entire country. Topographical gazetteers treat natural features such as mountains, and institutional ones deal with man-made structures like monasteries and academies.¹⁴ Less well known are the “departmental gazetteers” (*bumen zhi*), which record the history, administrative responsibilities and precedents, and major officials of a government department.

It is unclear when Chinese officials started to compile these departmental gazetteers. Examining the extant documents, it seems safe to suggest that such gazetteers appeared at least as early as the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368). One example is the *Gazetteer of the Directorate of the Palace Library of the Yuan Dynasty* (*Yuan mishujian zhi*) written by Wang Shidian (fl. 1342).¹⁵ During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), departmental gazetteers were also printed. One of them is the *Imperially Sponsored Gazetteer of the National University* (*Qinding guozijian zhi*) which was compiled during the Qianlong (1736–1795) and Daoguang (1821–1850) reign eras. But the compilation of departmental gazetteers during the Yuan and the Qing dynasties was never conducted on as large a scale as it was during the Ming when virtually every major governmental office in the southern capital published its own.¹⁶ These works are shown in table 1.

One commonality of these departmental gazetteers is that each was compiled and edited by officials working for the same department, and

Table 1
DEPARTMENTAL GAZETTEERS COMPILED BY NANJING
ADMINISTRATION OFFICES

TITLE	PUBLISHING AGENCY	DATE OF PUBLICATION OR COMPILATION
<i>Jingxue zhi</i> ^b	Nanjing Prefectural School	1603
<i>Jingxue zhi</i>	Nanjing Prefectural School	?
<i>Jiuqing cilin zhi</i> ^b	Nanjing Hanlin Academy	1597
<i>Liudu wuxue zhi</i>	Nanjing Military School	?
<i>Nanjing bingbu zhi</i>	Ministry of War	?
<i>Nanjing dalisi zhi</i>	Court of Judicial Review	pre-1550
<i>Nanjing duchayuan zhi</i>	Censorate	?
<i>Nanjing duchayuan zhi</i> ^b	Censorate	1623
<i>Nanjing gongbu zhi</i>	Ministry of Works	?
<i>Nanjing guanglusi zhi</i>	Court of Imperial Entertainments	?
<i>Nanjing guanglusi zhi</i> ^b	Court of Imperial Entertainments	1596
<i>Nanjing hanlin zhi</i>	Hanlin Academy	?
<i>Nanjing honglusi zhi</i>	Court of State Ceremonial	?
<i>Nanjing hubu zhi</i> ^b	Ministry of Revenue	1550; 1595
<i>Nanjing jinyiwei zhi</i>	Embroidered Uniform Guard	?
<i>Nanjing libu zhi</i>	Ministry of Rites	?
<i>Nanjing libu zhi</i>	Ministry of Personnel	1571
<i>Nanjing libu zhi</i> ^b	Ministry of Personnel	1622 (revision of 1571 edn. above)
<i>Nanjing qintianjian zhi</i>	Directorate of Astronomy	?
<i>Nanjing shangbaosi zhi</i>	Seals Office	?
<i>Nanjing shanglinyuan zhi</i>	Directorate of Imperial Parks	?

AUTHOR OR SPONSOR	NUMBER OF JUAN	MODERN EDITIONS OR REPRINTS	LOCATION OF EXTANT EDITIONS ^a
Jiao Hong	8	Taipei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1965	
He Qizhi et al.?	?		
Zhou Yingbin	6	Collected in <i>Xuanlantang congshu</i> (Shanghai, 1941), fascicles 65-68	
Xu Bozheng	5		
unknown	?		
unknown	17		
Shi Pei	40		
Xu Bida	40		Fu (microfilm copy), Naikaku
Zhu Changfang	18		
unknown	4		
Xu Daren	4		Fu, Naikaku
Dong Qichang	12		
Sang Xuekui	4		
Xie Bin	24		1550 edn.: Chicago (microfilm copy), Fu; 1595 edn.: Fu, Sonkeikaku
Zhang Keda	20		
unknown	?		
Wang Zongyi	15		
Wang Fengnian	20		Taipei
Shi Ruiyun	8		
Pan Huansu	20		
unknown	?		

(Table 1, continued)

TITLE	PUBLISHING AGENCY	DATE OF PUBLICATION OR COMPILATION
<i>Nanjing taichangsi zhi</i>	Court of Imperial Sacrifices	?
<i>Nanjing taichangsi zhi</i>	Court of Imperial Sacrifices	?
<i>Nanjing taipusi zhi</i> ^b	Court of Imperial Stud	1522-1566
<i>Nanjing tongzhengsi zhi</i>	Office of Transmission	?
<i>Nanjing xingrensi zhi</i>	Messenger Office	?
<i>Nanjing xingbu zhi</i>	Ministry of Justice	?
<i>Nanjing xingbu zhi</i> ^b	Ministry of Justice	1556
<i>Nanjing zhanshifu zhi</i> ^b	Office of the Heir Apparent	?
<i>Nanyong jiu zhi</i>	Nanjing National University	1458
<i>Nanyong xin zhi</i>	Nanjing National University	?
<i>Nanyong zhi</i> ^b	Nanjing National University	1544
<i>Xu Nanyong zhi</i> ^b	Nanjing National University	1623

^a Libraries are identified as follows:

Beijing	National Beijing Library
Chicago	East Asian Library, University of Chicago
Fu	Fu Ssu-nien Library of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei
LC	Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Naikaku	Naikaku Bunko, Tokyo
Sonkeikaku	Sonkeikaku Bunko, Tokyo
Taipei	National Central Library, Taipei

^b Extant gazetteers. Others may or may not have survived. Some Ming works that also deal with administrative responsibilities (*zhizhang*) and regulations (*tiaoli*) of certain departments of the Nanjing administration appear in Wang Huanbiao's *Shoudu zhi*. I have, however, included in the table only those I consider to be departmental gazetteers. *Shoudu zhi* attributes *Nanjing zhanshifu zhi* to Liu Chang, whereas *Beijing tushuguan guji shumu* lists Shao Dian as the author. There are

AUTHOR OR SPONSOR	NUMBER OF JUAN	MODERN EDITIONS OR REPRINTS	LOCATION OF EXTANT EDITIONS
Wang Zongyuan	13		
Shen Ruolin	40		
Lei Li	12	Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji keshushe, 1987	
unknown	?		
Weng Fengchun	16		
Jiang Shanli	26		
Pang Song	4		Fu (microfilm copy), LC
Shao Dian	20		Beijing
Wu Jie	18		
unknown	18		
Huang Zuo	24	Taipei: Weiwen tushu chuban youxian gongsi, 1976	
Huang Rubing	18	Taipei: Weiwen tushu chuban youxian gongsi, 1976	

two possibilities for this discrepancy. The first is that the two might be authors of different editions, the other that Liu Chang was the sponsor and Shao Dian the actual compiler. I suspect the latter is the case for *Shoudu zhi* states that Wang Chongqing was the author of one of the editions of *Nanjing hubu zhi*, when in fact he was its patron in his capacity as the Nanjing minister of revenue.

SOURCES: Beijing tushuguan, *Beijing tushuguan guji shumu* (Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1987); Wolfgang Franke, *An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968); Gu Qiyuan, *Kezuo zhuiyu* (Nanjing 1618; new edn. in *Jinling congke*, 1904) 7, p. 12; Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, *Taiwan gongcang shanben shumu shuming suoyin* (Taipei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1971); Library of Congress, *Far Eastern Languages Catalog* (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1972); Naikaku Bunko, *Naikaku Bunko kokushō bunrui mokuroku* (Tokyo: Naikaku Bunko, 1961); *Sonkeikaku Bunko kokushō būnrui mokuroku* (Tokyo: Seikōsha, 1939); University of Chicago, *Catalogs of the Far Eastern Library* (Boston: G.K. Hall and Co., 1973); Wang Huanbiao, *Shoudu zhi* (1935; rpt. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1966), pp. 1377-1381; Zhang Weiren, *Zhongguo fazhishi shumu* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1976).

the compilation was usually done under the auspices of the department head.¹⁷ Three major reasons may explain why almost all of the Nanjing civil offices produced their own departmental gazetteers. First of all, a departmental gazetteer, like other types of gazetteers, could be used by Nanjing officials to bolster the status of their office, to justify the very existence of the auxiliary southern capital, and, more important, to help them keep their jobs. During the Ming dynasty, although Nanjing had the same number of bureaucratic agencies as Beijing did,¹⁸ and its officials received the same emolument as their counterparts in Beijing, the area under the jurisdiction of the Nanjing administration was considerably smaller than that of the Beijing administration. It was territorially restricted to the Southern Metropolitan Area (Nan zhili) and a few provinces in south China. The Nanjing administration also had fewer officials and functionaries than the Beijing administration.¹⁹ In the eyes of some Ming contemporaries, the Nanjing government was definitely not indispensable, and some even regarded the secondary southern capital as a redundant and wasteful institution. Their opinion is vividly reflected in a saying that "the Nanjing Ministry of Personnel does not bear responsibilities for evaluating and selecting officials; the [Nanjing] Ministry of Rites does not know how to organize and administer the civil service recruitment examination; the [Nanjing] Ministry of Revenue has no duty to collect taxes; and the [Nanjing] Ministry of War possesses no power to deploy troops."²⁰ The publication of departmental gazetteers was obviously aimed at providing people with some information about what the agencies in the southern capital were doing so as to improve their own image.

Second, the compilation of departmental gazetteers was based on practical considerations. These gazetteers could be used, among other things, as guidebooks for junior officials wishing to familiarize themselves with their departmental duties. Third, the comparatively undemanding duties of the Nanjing administration allowed its officials the time to compile these gazetteers. Its relatively small jurisdiction and the usual absence of the court and the emperor from the southern capital simplified the Nanjing administration's official duties. And this was common knowledge among Ming officials. For example, when a metropolitan graduate was

appointed secretary of the Bureau of Reception in the Nanjing Ministry of Rites, his father, a senior official in Beijing, admonished him that “the official duties in the southern capital are simple, but you should not take a laissez-faire attitude; to achieve greater accomplishments, you should pursue your studies diligently.”²¹ Yin Rong’s postscript to the 1595 edition of the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* also confirms this impression. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons he collated the gazetteer was that he had plenty of free time while in office, and did not want to squander it.²²

The *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* consists of twenty-four *juan* in two parts: general records and classified records; there are also two *juan* of appendixes. Each *juan* of the gazetteer generally begins with quotations of official policies and regulations from such government publications as the *Jurisdictions of Government Agencies* (*Zhusi zhizhang*), *The Great Proclamation* (*Dagao*), *Guiding Principles* (*Xiangang*), and *Code of the Ming Dynasty* (*Da Ming lü*). It then explicates the administrative responsibilities of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue on specific matters, and lists relevant statistics. It also describes the history of the ministry prior to 1420 when the primary capital of the Ming was relocated to Beijing. The titles for each *juan*, section, and subsection are listed in table 2.

Juan one traces the evolution of the ministry and its subordinate offices (see illustration 2); *juan* two lists officials and functionaries under the ministry, their respective ranks, and the staffing at various ministry offices; *juan* three describes the locations of the ministry offices and the residences of the ministry’s high-ranking officials; *juan* four defines the official responsibilities of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. Records in *juan* four indicate that besides supervising the financial affairs of various local offices in Nanjing, the ministry also had some national financial responsibilities: the management of national household registers, known as the “yellow registers” (*huangce*) during the Ming dynasty (see illustration 3), issuance and inspection of the use of salt certificates (*yanyin*; see illustration 4), and collection of grain taxes from Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang provinces and the Southern Metropolitan Area (see illustration 5).

Juan five reports the registration and management of households, punishment for violation of registration policies and regulations, and the

Table 2

CONTENTS OF THE GAZETTEER OF THE NANJING MINISTRY OF REVENUE

<i>JUAN</i> TITLE	NUMBER OF <i>JUAN</i>	<i>JUAN</i> NUMBER AND SECTION TITLE	<i>JUAN</i> NUMBER AND SUBSECTION TITLE
General Records	4	1. Evolution of the Ministry (<i>jianzhi zhi</i>) 2. Offices under the Ministry (<i>zhiguan zhi</i>) 3. Ministry Offices (<i>gongshu zhi</i>) 4. Administrative Jurisdiction (<i>zhishou zhi</i>)	
Classified Records	20	5-7. Statistics (<i>minke</i>) 8-11. General Accounts (<i>duzhike</i>) 12-17. Specific Accounts (<i>jinke</i>) 18-24. Granaries (<i>cangke</i>)	5. Registered Population (<i>hukou zhi</i>) 6. Accounting (<i>kuaiji zhi</i>) 7. Miscellaneous (<i>zaxing</i>) 8. Expenditure (i) (<i>jingfei zhi</i>) 9. Expenditure (ii) 10. Expenditure (iii) 11. Official Salaries (<i>linlu zhi</i>) 12. Reserves (i) (<i>kucang zhi</i>) 13. Reserves (ii) 14. Reserves (iii) 15. Reserves (iv) 16. Material Supplies (<i>gongying wuliao</i>) 17. Weights and Measures (<i>quanliang zhi</i>) 18. Taxation (i) (<i>zhengshou zhi</i>) 19. Taxation (ii) 20. Taxation (iii) 21. Granaries (i) (<i>cangyu zhi</i>) 22. Granaries (ii) 23. Ministry Officials (i) (<i>huanji zhi</i>) 24. Ministry Officials (ii)
Appendixes (<i>fujian</i>)	2		

compilation and audit of the yellow registers. This *juan* also includes the total number of yellow registers produced by all the thirteen provinces of the country and the two metropolitan areas, the total amount of summer and autumn grain taxes collected from the whole country, and in particular the amount of such taxes submitted in 1542 by individual provinces and metropolitan areas. The sixth *juan* records the amount of grain and wheat allocated to members of the nobility residing in Nanjing, eunuch chiefs, civil officials, and military officers. The seventh *juan* relates, as its title suggests, the miscellaneous duties of the ministry. *Juan* eight concerns the Ming regulations on rewards, and the amount of rewards administered by the ministry. *Juan* nine stipulates the grain rations allocated monthly to the soldiers of the guard units and the fodder for army horses. *Juan* ten records the amount of grain consumed by soldiers in charge of the transportation of tribute grain from southern China to the north. *Juan* eleven reveals the salary grading for imperial nobility, civil and military officials, and functionaries. It also contains related government regulations and emendations.

Juan twelve records all the taxes administered by the ministry. According to the gazetteer, they include taxes on commodities, fishing, and transit. During the Ming, customs houses were established along the Grand Canal to collect transit duties on all shipping, and the ministry took charge of the customs houses at Yangzhou, Huaian, and Hangzhou. It is worth noting that the ministry also issued tea certificates (*chayin*) used nationwide. *Juan* thirteen focuses on monetary policies in general and is not specifically related to the duties of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. It discusses the issuance, production, and circulation of currency, and provides relevant government regulations. *Juan* fourteen describes the salt administration (*yanfa*). During the Ming, the production and distribution of salt were regulated by the Ministry of Revenue in Beijing, but the issuance of salt certificates fell under the jurisdiction of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. *Juan* fifteen describes the "palace treasuries" (*neifuku*) and the nine storehouses run by eunuchs in Nanjing and records the volume of grain and silver stored in those storehouses in 1549. *Juan* sixteen lists tributary articles sent to Nanjing by prefectures and counties within the Southern Metropolitan Area. *Juan* seventeen

南京戶部通志卷之一

志卷一

賜進士南京戶部貴州司郎中龍溪
鄉進士南京戶部司務廳司務南海趙

建置志

嘗觀周禮六卿分職各率其屬以倡九牧阜成兆民則成周之制我朝不設丞相而以天下庶務責之六部而又兩都並建六卿以分理之則我

國家之制夫帝者因時創制何必相襲要於為成民之意一也南京之有戶部舊矣無所聞於載籍而論著者自國初迄于今大畧為建置志後有君子得以考焉 按

2. Opening page of the first juan of the Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. Ten cols. of 22 chars.

正德七年令於後湖荒洲蓋造廚房搭橋水次以便造飯人等往來仍立牌禁約有將火過橋者治以重罪

嘉靖元年令於後湖東北二面築立牆垣千餘丈仍於湖外沿牆蓋立鋪舍責令地方人等晝夜巡邏以防不虞

已上後湖禁例

黃冊數目

國初直隸府州縣并十三布政司黃冊共五萬三千三百九十三本

弘治十五年黃冊共六萬七千四百六十八本

嘉靖二十一年南北直隸府州縣并十三布政司黃冊共

3. Page 15b of *juan* five of the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue*. Under the heading "Number of Yellow Registers" are the numbers of the yellow registers of the Ming empire during three different reign eras.

南京戶部分志卷之十

志卷十四

庫藏志三

鹽法

按今鹽法屬戶部掌行鹽引勘合則出本部然鹽引為鹽法而設不詳其法孰知引之為用也故備載之

按大明會典序云國朝鹽課專以供給邊方糧餉或水旱凶荒亦藉賑濟其利甚博然必私鹽禁嚴而後官鹽流通法久弊滋故自洪武以來鹽法條件因時漸密云

諸司職掌

凡天下辦鹽去處每歲鹽課各有定額年終各該運司并



4. First page of *juan* fourteen of the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue*. Ten cols. of 22 chars. The issuance of salt certificates and the inspection of their use during the Ming were the responsibility of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue.

<p>府州縣其徵於夏者謂之夏稅其徵於秋者謂之秋糧夏</p>	<p>按今本部徵收不外浙江江西湖廣三布政司及南直隸</p>	<p>已上秋糧米豆雜糧</p>	<p>備發邊支用以後年分照舊派納</p>	<p>銀每米一石折銀六錢徑解戶部轉送太倉銀庫收貯以</p>	<p>十四年各處該解南京各衛倉米并水兌正餘米盡數折</p>	<p>二十四年為陳邊務以裨安攘事准戶部咨內開嘉靖二</p>	<p>徵銀五錢黑豆一石徵銀三錢</p>	<p>處賑濟以救饑民事議將應天等十一府州每米一石止</p>	<p>欽依去後續該巡撫應天都御史丁 題為地方極重旱災議</p>
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5. Page 31a of *juan* eighteen of the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue*. Ten cols. of 22 chars. The last two lines on the left explain that the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue was responsible for collecting the grain tax from the Southern Metropolitan Area and Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Huguang provinces.

concerns general government policies and the regulation of weights and measures. This *juan* also has no direct relevance to the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue.

Juan eighteen is an account of grain taxes collected by the ministry. *Juan* nineteen deals with the collection and distribution of fodder in the Southern Metropolitan Area. *Juan* twenty discusses the genesis and development of military farms during the Ming, and the related government regulations and practices. It also contains the quotas for grain to be produced by the thirty-four Nanjing guard units in 1548. *Juan* twenty-one and twenty-two describe the Ming policies on granary maintenance and famine relief, particularly the granaries managed by the Nanjing guards, their geographical locations, and the level of grain reserves. *Juan* twenty-three lists the names and terms of office for ministers, vice ministers, directors, and vice directors of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue. Occasionally, names of lower-ranking officials, such as office managers, record keepers, and proofreaders, are also entered in this volume (see illustration 6). *Juan* twenty-four deals with eleven prominent ministers who served in the ministry, some of whom worked for the ministry when the Ming primary capital was still in Nanjing. One of the two appended *juan* is devoted to eulogies of ministry officials, the other to a list of books housed at the ministry.

The *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* has preserved a large amount of valuable data and information on the implementation of certain Ming national economic policies and the functioning of the ministry. Records in this work, together with other surviving departmental gazetteers of the Nanjing administration, would further advance our understanding of the Ming two-capital system. The gazetteer also includes excerpts from sixteen collections of Ming imperial decrees and government policies. Of these sixteen collections, the following eight are most frequently quoted: *Jurisdictions of Government Agencies*, *The Great Proclamation*, *Guiding Principles*, *Code of the Ming Dynasty*, *Ancestral Instructions of the Imperial Ming Dynasty* (*Huang Ming zuxun*), *Imperial Proclamation for Educating the People* (*Jiaomin bangwen*), *Legal Directives of the Ming Dynasty* (*Da Ming ling*), and *Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* (*Da Ming huidian*). But since all eight works are still available for modern

seemed wasteful and financially burdensome to the central court, and scholars then and now have wondered about the differences in the functioning of the two capitals and how the Ming court justified maintaining a separate capital. Records in the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* reveal that in addition to performing various indispensable local political, economic, and military functions,²⁴ the Nanjing administration had a national role to play. An important branch of the Nanjing administration, the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue was responsible for collecting grain taxes from Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Huguang provinces, and the Southern Metropolitan Area, which amounted to almost half of the empire's total grain income.²⁵ In 1542, for example, grain collected from the three provinces and one metropolitan area amounted to 35 percent of the empire's summer grain tax and 55 percent of the autumn grain tax.²⁶ These figures indicate that the duties of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue may have been much more complex than many scholars had imagined.

The large amount of grain tax gathered in Nanjing also required the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue to play another important role in the national economy: transporting grain to north China. During the Ming dynasty, the Nanjing vice minister of revenue was from time to time concurrently appointed director-general of tax-grain supplies (*zongli liangchu*),²⁷ a position with overall supervisory responsibilities for the reception and storage of tax grain at Nanjing and its transportation to the north.²⁸

Issuing and supervising the use of salt certificates is another example of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue's involvement in the management of national financial affairs. The ministry printed the certificates and distributed them to the Salt Distribution Commissions (*yanyun si*) across the country. The individual commissions issued the certificates to salt merchants in their jurisdiction and at the end of every quarter handed back to the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue for audit and cancellation the certificates that had been used by the merchants.²⁹ Another less important national function that the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue performed was the storage and examination of the yellow registers of the empire.³⁰

Records in the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue* all point

to the fact that Nanjing was not only the locus of the former imperial palace and tombs, but also the storehouse of important government documents and a main collection point for the empire's tax revenue. It is for these reasons that Xie Bin argued forcefully that Nanjing should retain its status as the southern capital of the Ming dynasty.³¹

NOTES

The author is grateful to Timothy Brook, Ken MacDonald, and F. W. Mote for their help and comments.

1. For more information about the two-capital system of the Ming, see F. W. Mote, "The Transformation of Nanking, 1350-1400," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 101-153; Edward Farmer, *Early Ming Government: The Evolution of the Dual-Capital System* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Council, Harvard University, 1976); Huang Kaihua, "Ming zhengzhi shang bingshe Nanjing buyuan zhi tese," *Mingshi lunji* (Hong Kong: Chengming chubanshe, 1972), pp. 1-52.
2. In this article "department" (*bumen*) is defined broadly to include not just ministries but government departments and national institutions.
3. The two northern capital departmental gazetteers are: *Huang Ming libu zhi* in forty *juan* printed in 1620, and *Libu zhigao* in one hundred *juan* printed in the same year. It is worth noting that the two gazetteers were not published until the end of the dynasty.
4. They are the Nanjing National University and the Nanjing Court of Judicial Review. Editions of the *Gazetteer of the Nanjing National University* (*Nanyong zhi*) were compiled in 1458 and 1544; the *Gazetteer of the Court of Judicial Review* (*Nanjing dalisi zhi*) was published before 1550.
5. The Guizhou Bureau was one of the thirteen functional bureaus under the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue, which corresponded to the thirteen provinces in the Ming empire.
6. See Han Shiyong's preface to *Nanjing hubu zhi*.
7. The author uses two methods for numbering his work. In the table of contents, the four-*juan* general records and the twenty-*juan* classified records are numbered separately. In the text, however, the numbering of the two sections in the left-hand fold is consecutive, whereas on the right-hand side it is both separate and combined. For example, the first *juan* of the classified records is identified as "juan one of the classified records (*fenzhi juan zhi yi*); juan five of the gazetteer (*zhi juan wu*)." To avoid confusion, *juan* mentioned in this article are numbered consecutively.
8. Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, ed., *Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin* (Taipei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1966), p. 892; Zhu Baojiong and Xie Peilin, *Ming Qing jinshi timing beilu suoyin* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980), vol. 3, p. 2501.

9. *Nanjing hubu zhi* 23, pp. 35a, 37b. See also Han's preface to the gazetteer.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 53. Zhu Baojiong and Xie Peilin, *Ming Qing jinshi timing beilu suoyin*, vol. 3, p. 2496.
11. Yang Jingsu et al., *Longxi xianzhi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967; rpt. of the 1879 edn.) 16, p. 12a. See also Zhu Baojiong and Xie Peilin, *Ming Qing jinshi timing beilu suoyin*, vol. 3, p. 2528.
12. Yin Rong's postscript to the 1595 edition of *Nanjing hubu zhi*.
13. *Nanjing hubu zhi* 23, p. 56b.
14. For a detailed discussion of the administrative, topographical, and institutional gazetteers, see Timothy Brook, *Geographical Sources of Ming-Qing History* (Ann Arbor: The Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988), pp. 49-66.
15. The eleven-juan gazetteer, which was first printed in 1272, records the evolution, jurisdiction, and officials of the Directorate of the Palace Library during the Yuan dynasty. A collated edition of the gazetteer was published by Zhejiang guji chubanshe in 1991.
16. It is not certain whether the Academy of Imperial Medicine (*taiyiyuan*), the Central Buddhist Registry (*senglusi*), and the Central Taoist Registry (*daolusi*), three minor agencies in the southern capital administration, compiled departmental gazetteers.
17. For example, Tao Shangde and Pang Song were the minister and the Shandong Bureau director of the Nanjing Ministry of Justice respectively when they compiled the *Nanjing xingbu zhi*; Xu Bida, author of the *Nanjing duchayuan zhi*, was the assistant censor-in-chief of the Nanjing Censorate; Xu Daren was the chief minister of the Nanjing Court of Imperial Entertainments when he composed the *Nanjing guanglushi zhi* in the 1590s.
18. For details on the organization of the southern capital, see *Da Ming huidian* (Taipei: Zhongwen shuju, 1963; rpt. of the 1587 edn.) 1, 1-19; *Ming shi* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974) 75, pp. 1831-1836; 76, pp. 1864-1865.
19. The ratio of the number of ranked officials in the Beijing and Nanjing governments was roughly two to one, and the ratio between Beijing and Nanjing functionaries approximately three to one. See *Da Ming huidian* 2, pp. 1-40; 3, pp. 1-19; 7, pp. 1-46.
20. *Nanjing hubu zhi* 1, p. 5b. Quoted in Huang Kaihua from Tan Qian, *Guo que* (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1959) 13, p. 893.
21. He Qiaoxin, *Jiaoqiu wenji* (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1974; rpt. of the 1781 edn.) 20, p. 4a.
22. See Yin Rong's postscript to the 1595 edition of the *Nanjing hubu zhi*.
23. The other eight works consulted by the author of the gazetteer are: *Da Ming guan zhi*, *Daxue yan yi bu*, *Huang Ming jilue*, *Huang Ming wenheng*, *Jigu dingzhi*, *Junfa dinglü*, *Shuangxi zaji*, and *Wenxing tiaoli*. Of them, only the fate of *Junfa dinglü* is uncertain. It may still be extant.
24. Militarily, the southern capital administration assisted the central government in Beijing to maintain peace and stability in the southern part of the empire. It played an active role in suppressing the rebellions of aboriginal peoples in the southwestern provinces. It also contributed considerably to the suppression of coastal piracy

during the Ming. Politically, the southern capital served to some extent as a training ground for junior officials to enrich their experience of bureaucratic service. In the words of some Ming people, Nanjing was "a place for accumulating seniority" (*yangwang di*). See *Hai Rui ji*, ed. Chen Yizhong (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962, rpt. 1981), p. 572. Since the two capitals assigned equal ranking for those who assumed the same positions, many Beijing officials were dispatched to the southern capital to assume a higher position. After a certain period of service in Nanjing, they were summoned back to Beijing to take the same position there. For a detailed study of this political function of the southern capital, see Huang Kaihua's "Ming zhengzhi shang bingshe Nanjing buyuan zhi tese," pp. 27-52.

25. *Nanjing hubu zhi* 18, p. 19b.
26. *Ibid.* 5, pp. 20a-21a.
27. This grain came to the government as taxes paid in kind.
28. The post of director-general of taxed grain supplies shuttled between the Beijing censor-in-chief and the Nanjing vice minister of revenue several times during the Ming. In the early Ming period, the post was held by the Beijing censor-in-chief, and in 1447 the Nanjing vice minister of revenue was ordered to assume the position. During the Chenghua reign era (1465-1487) the post was assigned back to the Beijing censor-in-chief. In 1547 the Nanjing vice minister of revenue was again assigned to the post. In 1560 the Ming government, for the third time, gave the post to the Beijing censor-in-chief, and ten years later, in 1570, the Nanjing vice minister of revenue was ordered once again to take charge of the transportation of the taxed grains. See Wang Tianyou, *Mingdai guojia jigou yanjiu* (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992), pp. 205-206.
29. *Nanjing hubu zhi* 14, pp. 14b-15a.
30. *Ibid.* 5, pp. 3a-14a.
31. *Ibid.* 1, p. 5b.

GLOSSARY

bumen zhi 部門志

cangke 倉科

cangyu zhi 倉庾志

chayin 茶引

Dagao 大誥

Da Ming huidian 大明會典

Da Ming ling 大明令

Da Ming lu 大明律

Daoguang 道光

Dong Qichang 董其昌

duzhike 度支科

fanli 凡例

fenzhi 分志

Fu Ssu-nien (Fu Sinian) 傅斯年

Fujian 福建

fujian 附卷

gongshu zhi 公署志

gongying wuliao 供應物料

- Guangdong 廣東
 Guangzhou 廣州
 Guizhou 貴州
 Han Shiyong 韓士英
 Hangzhou 杭州
 He Qizhi 何琪枝
 Henan 河南
 Huaian 淮安
 Huang Ming zuxun 皇明祖訓
 Huang Rubing 黃儒炳
 Huang Zuo 黃佐
 huangce 黃冊
 huanji zhi 宦跡志
 Huguang 湖廣
 hukou zhi 戶口志
 Jiang Shanli 江山麗
 Jiangxi 江西
 jianzhi zhi 建置志
 Jiao Hong 焦竑
 Jiaomin bangwen 教民榜文
 jingfei zhi 經費志
 Jingxue zhi 京學志
 jinke 金科
 jinshi 進士
 Jiujing cilin zhi 舊京詞林志
 juren 舉人
 Kaizhou 開州
 kuaiji zhi 會計志
 kucang zhi 庫藏志
 Lei Li 雷禮
 linlu zhi 廩祿志
 Liudu wuxue zhi 留都武學志
 Longxi 龍溪
 minke 民科
 Nan zhili 南直隸
 Nanchong 南充
 Nanghai 南海
 Nanjing bingbu zhi 南京兵部志
 Nanjing dalisi zhi 南京大理寺志
 Nanjing duchayuan zhi 南京都察院志
 Nanjing gongbu zhi 南京工部志
 Nanjing guanglusi zhi 南京光祿寺志
 Nanjing hanlin zhi 南京翰林志
 Nanjing honglusi zhi 南京鴻臚寺志
 Nanjing hubu zhi 南京戶部志
 Nanjing jinyiwei zhi 南京錦衣衛志
 Nanjing libu zhi 南京禮部志
 Nanjing libu zhi 南京吏部志
 Nanjing qiantianjian zhi 南京欽天監志
 Nanjing shangbaosi zhi 南京尙寶司志
 Nanjing shanglinyuan zhi 南京上林苑志
 Nanjing taichangsi zhi 南京太常寺志
 Nanjing taipusi zhi 南京太僕寺志
 Nanjing tongzhengsi zhi 南京通政司志
 Nanjing xingbu zhi 南京刑部志
 Nanjing xingrensi zhi 南京行人司志
 Nanjing zhanshifu zhi 南京詹事府志
 Nanyong jiuzhi 南雍舊志
 Nanyong xinzhizhi 南雍新志
 Nanyong zhi 南雍志
 neifuku 內府庫
 Neijiang 內江
 Pan Huansu 潘煥宿
 Pang Song 龐嵩
 Puyang 濮陽
 Qianlong 乾隆

Qinding guozijian zhi 欽定國子監志
quanliang zhi 權量志
Sang Xuekui 桑學夔
 Shandong 山東
Shao Dian 邵點
Shen Ruolin 沈若霖
Shi Pei 施沛
Shi Ruiyun 施瑞雲
 Sichuan 四川
Sonkeikaku Bunko 尊經閣文庫
Wang Chongqing 王崇慶
Wang Fengnian 王逢年
Wang Shidian 王士點
Wang Zongyi 汪宗伊
Wang Zongyuan 汪宗元
Weng Fengchun 翁逢春
Wu Jie 吳節
Xian'gang 憲綱
Xie Bin 謝彬
Xu Bida 徐必達
Xu Bozheng 徐伯徵

Xu Daren 徐大任
Xu Nanyong zhi 續南雍志
Xuanlantang congshu 玄覽堂叢書
yanfa 鹽法
Yangzhou 揚州
yanyin 鹽引
Yanyun si 鹽運司
Yin Rong 陰鎔
Yuan mishujian zhi 元秘書監志
zaxing 雜行
Zhang Keda 張可大
Zhao Hesui 趙鶴隨
 Zhejiang 浙江
zhengshou zhi 徵收志
zhiguan zhi 職官志
zhishou zhi 職守志
Zhou Yingbin 周應賓
Zhu Changfang 朱長芳
Zhusi zhizhang 諸司職掌
Zongli liangchu 總理糧儲
zongzhi 總志

NEWS AND NOTES:
FOR THE FRIENDS OF THE GEST LIBRARY

ANNUAL REPORT 1992-1993
GEST ORIENTAL LIBRARY AND EAST ASIAN COLLECTIONS

By the end of June 1993, the total holdings of Gest Library stood at 510,704 volumes, including 91,535 in Forrestal storage. A total of \$530,051 was expended for both monographs and serials in the fiscal year 1992-1993: \$279,893 for Japanese materials, \$219,183 for Chinese, \$21,634 for Western, and \$9,341 for Korean.

The leaky roof on the third-floor stack area has finally been repaired, and the protective plastic sheeting is gone from the top of the book stacks. We are fortunate in having escaped the wrath of the Great Storm of 1993.

We did, however, suffer a serious blow in the illness of our Chinese-Japanese cataloguer, Franklin Wang, who suffered a stroke in January and took long-term disability in July. We miss him.

Technical Services. The total number of volumes and reels catalogued and added showed an increase of 1 percent over last year, with a 1.7 percent increase in Chinese cataloguing, a 2.4 percent increase in Japanese, and a 40 percent increase in Korean cataloguing. Mr. Wang's illness and absence drastically reduced original- and serials-cataloguing figures for this year. Compared to last year, original cataloguing decreased by 23 percent and serials cataloguing by 80 percent. The overall number of new titles catalogued decreased by 16 percent, with a 21 percent and 11 percent decrease in Chinese and Japanese cataloguing respectively, but a heartening 63 percent increase in Korean cataloguing. This year's figures, nevertheless, still represent the fourth highest ever for new titles catalogued and the third highest ever for total volumes and reels catalogued and added.

The overall cataloguing pattern for the past year was 20 percent original

(compared to 22 percent last year), 42 percent LC copy (36 percent last year), and 38 percent RLIN-member copy (42 percent last year).

Since acquisition figures continue to outpace cataloguing figures, cataloguing arrearage showed an increase for the fifth consecutive year, with 3,700 volumes and reels adding to the arrearage, for a total of 17,610; the majority of these consist of the Chinese backlog, which now numbers 13,010.

As a Chinese NACO (National Cooperative Cataloguing Operation) participant, we contributed 639 original headings and updated 100 existing ones last year. The extra workload strains our limited resources, but we are committed to this national cooperative effort and will begin Japanese NACO training as soon as we have our new Chinese-Japanese cataloguer with us.

We filed 37,846 cards into the Gest public catalogue, but a stubborn Chinese filing backlog remains. We have urged NOTIS (Northwestern Online Total Integrated System) to put priority on developing CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) vernacular-character display capability for the online catalogue so that we may be relieved of the double catalogue maintenance burden. Toward this aim, we have formed a NOTIS CJK User's Interest Group with other East Asian librarians to work for the realization of having a CJK capacity on NOTIS.

Collection Development. So far there are still no true automated systems with CJK capabilities on the market for acquisitions. We are monitoring this situation closely, but, a truly CJK system for acquisitions is probably still two to three years in the future.

In 1992-1993, Gest Library acquired 8,638 volumes of Chinese monographs (excluding periodicals, maps, and microforms), an increase of 1,416 volumes over 1991-1992. This represents a 19.6 percent increase compared with last year's 2.6 percent increase over 1990-1991.

Two factors produced this sudden increase. First, the Chinese publishing industry has increased its output. At the Committee on East Asian Libraries (CEAL) annual meeting in Los Angeles last March, a representative of the Chinese book trade mentioned that about ninety thousand titles had been published in 1992. Second, as the economy becomes increasingly market oriented, Chinese book suppliers have become more decentralized and competitive, which has opened up many sources for hitherto unavailable materials. The number of book catalogues received from China has increased perceptibly during the past year. Some dealers, however, although skilled at sending out catalogues, have yet to master the art of supplying and maintaining good service.

The distribution of our acquisition expenditures for Chinese materials is as follows: China, 38 percent; Taiwan, 24 percent; Hong Kong, 35 percent; and the United States, 4 percent.

China's economy is overheated, with the inflation rate at 17 percent, although the local currency has dropped in value vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong have a much higher rate of inflation than the United States, which has driven up the price of books, journals, binding, and postage.

The Japanese publishing industry suffered a serious setback as the result of recession caused by the collapse of the so-called bubble economy. Bankruptcies among medium-sized publishers were rampant, and close to a thousand bookstores have gone out of business. A sharp drop in advertising revenue has weakened the financial condition of many periodicals.

Trade-book prices have shown an average annual increase of 4 percent over the past few years, but research, academic, and reprint works have increased on average by 20–30 percent.

The dollar dropped to a record low of one hundred yen to the dollar on August 13, although it has risen a little since then. Compared with a year ago, our purchasing power for Japanese acquisitions is down 20 percent. This terrible weakness caused us to purchase the lowest number of volumes for the Japanese collection since 1990. In spite of a steady increase of funding from the university administration, the number of volumes purchased in fiscal year 1992–1993 dropped 13 percent from the last fiscal year.

Subscription prices for Japanese journals have showed a steady annual increase of 12 percent since 1990, but several journals increased their subscription rate as much as 60 percent over the year before.

Support from the U.S. – Japan Friendship Commission, which lasted over a decade, ceased this year. Fortunately, the East Asian Studies Department has generously provided us with a Title VI grant.

We added 581 Korean volumes to the library, including gifts from the National Assembly Library and from other public and academic libraries in Korea.

In June 1993, librarians from six major Korean collections in the United States — Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard, Hawaii, Washington (Seattle), and UCLA — plus two observers, one each from Princeton and Yale, convened at Seattle to discuss cooperative acquisition, collection development, resource sharing, and the like.

Public Services. Circulation statistics have gone up from 24,770 a year ago to the current 27,466, a 9.8 percent increase. These figures include 8,784 for Western-language materials. They clearly show that our Western collection is in great demand, and we will have to formulate a plan to accommodate this demand and to improve the collection's housing. Interlibrary loan requests from other institutions have increased 60 percent, from 422 in 1991–1992 to 674 in 1992–1993. The increase in requests for Japanese materials has been dramatic, from 144 to 240. Our borrowing requests stayed about the same (from 176 to 178).

We are planning to automate our antiquated manual circulation system next fall. This surely will provide better service to our users.

Professional Development. Gest staff members continue to be active in the American Libraries Associations (ALA), CEAL, the Center for Research Libraries (CRL), and the Research Libraries Group (RLG).

Charmian Cheng remains head of Public Services.

Martin Heijdra is currently serving as the CEAL representative to the Bibliography of Asian Studies, a member of the CEAL Subcommittee on Library Technology, and a member of the CEAL Subcommittee on Chinese Materials. He attended the RLG Chinese Rare Books Catalog Project International Advisory Committee meeting held in Princeton in early March. He also published an article on the movable-type Tangut Tripitaka volume in the Gest Rare Book Room in the important journal *Wenwu* (Cultural relics).

Soowon Kim is serving as a member of the Subcommittee on Korean Materials, CEAL. She was also an observer at the Conference on Korean Collection Development held in Seattle in June.

Antony Marr remains a member of the Advisory Panel for East Asian Materials at the Center for Research Libraries, and is a board member of the Center for Chinese Research Materials.

Mariko Shimomura continues to serve on the CEAL Subcommittee on Technical Processing.

Iping Wei continues to serve as the Princeton liaison to the RLG Chinese Rare Books Catalog Project, and as a member of the Princeton University Library's NOTIS Data Conversion Team and the NOTIS Index Specification Team. She is also a member of the OPAC (Online Public Access Catalogue) References Committee and the Authorities Group. She also attended the RLG Chinese Rare Books Catalog Project International Advisory Committee meeting.

All six librarians attended the AAS-CEAL annual meeting in Los Angeles. Martin Heijdra took part in the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D.C.

Visitors. During the past year a total of 86 nonlocal visitors did research, used materials, or toured the library. They came from the following countries: China, 27; the United States, 27; Japan, 19; Taiwan, 10; Australia, 1; India, 1; and Russia, 1.

FRIENDS OF THE GEST LIBRARY

The Friends of the Gest Library is a group of private individuals dedicated to the idea that an East Asian library resource like the Gest Oriental Library (the East Asian Research Library at Princeton University) must be known, supported, and encouraged in order to enrich both the aesthetic knowledge of East Asia and the growth of scholarship and contemporary information concerning that part of the world. Many individuals have already been active for years in guiding the Gest Library, and contributing their time and resources ad hoc. In 1986 they formed the Friends of the Gest Library in order to broaden the Library's support and foster communication among other interested parties.

As a group, the Friends sponsor colloquia and exhibitions on East Asian books, calligraphy, art, and their historical relationships. They secure gifts and bequests for the Library in order to add to its holdings items and collections of great worth. They disseminate information about the Library (and about other East Asian libraries) so that members and nonmembers alike can benefit from its resources.

JOINING THE FRIENDS

Membership is open to those subscribing annually thirty dollars or more. With that membership fee is included a yearly subscription to the *East Asian Library Journal*. Members will be invited to attend special exhibitions, lectures, and discussions that occur under the aegis of the Friends. Checks are payable to the Trustees of Princeton University and should be mailed to:

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