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Fu Ssu-nien: The Latter Days of a May Fourth Youth

WANG FAN-SHEN

Students of modern Chinese intellectual history have concentrated on the so-called teachers of the May Fourth Movement, including Hu Shih (1891–1962), Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879–1942), and Li Ta-chao (1888–1927). Less attention has been paid to the “student” generation,¹ among whom Fu Ssu-nien (courtesy title Meng-chen, 1896–1950) was a principal leader (see illustration 1).

Fu Ssu-nien, who led the demonstration of May 4, 1919, was also a major figure in the New Culture movement. Known as a distinguished historian from the late 1920s on, Fu Ssu-nien was viewed by his contemporaries as the harbinger of modern Chinese historiography. He established the Institute of History and Philology at Academia Sinica (IHP), and served as its director for twenty-three years. In the mid-1940s, Fu also became known for his heroic decision to remonstrate two premiers of the Nationalist government, H. H. Kung (K'ung Hsiang-hsi; 1880–1967) and T. V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen; 1894–1971). Later, as a university president, Fu also distinguished himself through outstanding service at both Peking University (hereafter Peita) and Taiwan University (hereafter T'aita).

Born in Liao-ch'eng, Shantung, Fu was the descendant of Fu I-chien (1609–1665), the first top-degree exam candidate (*chuang-yüan*) of the Ch'ing dynasty. Although Fu's family produced several high officials in the Ch'ing period, at the time of his birth the family had fallen onto hard times financially. Thanks to support from his father's students, Fu Ssu-nien was able to obtain an early education and to attend Peita. Among his contemporaries, Fu Ssu-nien's classical education was considered exceptional.



1. A portrait of Fu Ssu-nien. From Chi-nien Fu ku hsiao-chang ch'ou-pei wei-yüan-hui, ed., *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu* (Taipei: Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1951).

From age six, Fu was instructed by his paternal grandfather in the ancient Chinese classics, and it is believed that he committed to memory many of the canonical texts. His teachers in the Chinese department at Peita, like Liu Shih-p'ei (1884–1919) and Huang K'an (1886–1935), two major authorities on Chinese classics and also conservative stalwarts, believed Fu one of the brightest prospects for the future of Chinese traditional learning. However, to the surprise of many, under the influence of Hu Shih, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chou Tso-jen (1885–1967), and other Peita new professors, in 1917 Fu suddenly took up the banner of the New Culture group led by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih.

Fu graduated from Peita in 1919, and the following year went to Europe to study Western disciplines. He first spent three years studying experimental psychology at London University, and later concentrated on physics, mathematics, and comparative linguistics in Berlin for four years. Fu ended his Western odyssey in the winter of 1926, and returned to China to join the staff of Chung-shan University, Kwangtung.

There Fu Ssu-nien served as dean of the School of Letters. In 1928, he persuaded the president of Academia Sinica, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei (1868–1940), to establish the IHP, and set as its goal the study of history as a scientific discipline. The institute soon became a leading center for historical, archaeological, and philological research.

In his early years, Fu Ssu-nien was known for his radical beliefs, which emphasized cultural iconoclasm and positivistic historiography, and rejected introspective moral philosophy. During the May Fourth period, he was renowned for his iconoclasm, and his views led him to assert that the "family is the anchor of ten thousand evils," that "the West and China can be equated with right and wrong [respectively]," and that "it is acceptable to become totally Westernized."²

Fu Ssu-nien also believed that the various barriers to Chinese modernization had as their root the deeply inner-directed and personal nature of Confucian moral philosophy. Hence, as a student in Europe Fu was openly receptive to anti-introspective and often empiricist theories like behaviorism. Fu later traced the etymologies of several key terms of Confucian moral philosophy, and asserted that "benevolence" (*jen*) and "duty" (*i*) were not innate qualities of the human mind, but human artifices.³ He also felt that genuine Confucian doctrine maintained that "our nature is not only good or only bad," but that "the natures of some are good and others are bad."

Consequently, he viewed the Mencian moral tradition as a betrayal of true Confucianism, and, instead, tended to side with Hsün-tzu (313–230 B.C.), especially with the latter's interest in investigating the external world and the need to discipline the inner mind.⁴

Since 1927 Fu has been recognized as one of the chief architects of modern Chinese learning. Establishing his reputation in the field of history, he pioneered Rankean historiography, and stressed objective and scientific rigor, which he hoped would help divorce history from the traditional moral and political indoctrination of the past, and would promote the importance of historical facts over theoretical concepts. In his pursuit of historical objectivity, Fu Ssu-nien even advocated "ordering materials so that [historical] facts will become self-evident."⁵

Today, Fu Ssu-nien is remembered in China for his ability to balance history and politics. However, this was not exactly what he himself had originally intended. Although Fu continually criticized contemporary politics, he had initially wished to uphold an oath made in his youth to be a lifelong teacher while foregoing any political involvement.⁶

As a result of the political corruption of the early Republican period, an apolitical attitude was much in vogue at the time of the May Fourth movement. John Dewey (1859–1952), who keenly sensed the discontinuity between the scholar-official tradition and the new apolitical inclination, remarked that "it was in its deeper aspect a protest against all politicians and against all further reliance upon politics as a direct means of social reform."⁷ Chow Tse-tsung concluded that "the liberals' abhorrence of practical politics was based on the one hand upon their pessimistic views of the warlord and bureaucratic government, and on the other upon their assumption that political reform could be achieved only after a social and cultural transformation."⁸ Although many individuals abjured politics and many associations even forbade their members to become politically involved, many others did nevertheless become politically active. Hu Shih, for example, had once renounced politics for twenty years, but was soon drawn back in. In fact, upon hearing about the success of the Northern Expedition in 1927, Hu Shih, then in England, even expressed regret over his former position as a supporter of cultural and social reforms, and admitted that "we may be wrong in trying to avoid politics."⁹ Fu Ssu-nien made a similar vow during his student years at Peita. He earnestly proposed to his New Tide Society

colleagues that they refrain from societal work until their thirties, avoid politics, and never become assemblymen (*i-yüan*).

In this study I examine how later political involvement gradually overran Fu's youthful ideals, and review his ensuing career as an amateur politician, and his seven-year tenure as a People's Assembly representative after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. I examine how Fu Ssu-nien heroically brought corruption charges against the two most powerful premiers of the Nationalist government, T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung, which helped lead to their resignations. In addition, Fu's involvement in academic administration — in 1945 he was appointed acting president of Peita, and in 1949 he became president of T'aita — is briefly summarized. Finally, the pragmatic and personal motivations behind Fu Ssu-nien's shift away from his earlier radical convictions are discussed.

STUDYING OR POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

The neglect of politics was, as mentioned above, a major feature of the liberal faction of the May Fourth generation. But the cultural ideals of the May Fourth movement were soon superseded by political realities as the danger of national subjugation loomed. This occurred despite Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei's insistence that "research is the way to save our country."¹⁰ Many intellectuals agonized over whether they could make any substantial contribution to their imperiled country.¹¹ The Mukden Incident in 1931 raised serious questions in the minds of scholars, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 made these questions and doubts even more pressing.

Fu Ssu-nien and the IHP had long been labeled as neglectful of social needs, if not of political realities. Fears that their research work was meaningless frequently appeared in the private correspondence between fellow members of the IHP. In one such letter, Li Chi (1886–1979) confessed that "after the Mukden Incident, we always asked ourselves: in the present circumstances, is the kind of work we are doing a waste?"¹² But Li assured his fellow scholars that "although the nation is now facing disaster (*kuo-nan*), we should continue working on our original projects. We think this the most appropriate way to contribute to our country."¹³ But, "if needed," Li continued, "we can take up arms to fight the enemy at any time." Li's confession epitomized the common anxiety of the members of the IHP. Yin Ta

(Liu Yao, 1906–1983), a participant in the Anyang excavations, secretly fled to Yen-an to participate directly in politics.¹⁴ Another archaeologist of the Anyang excavations, Kuo Pao-chün (1893–1971), also confided that at this time, research was only a “useless decoration.”¹⁵

Fu could not relieve his pangs of guilt. He confided in a letter to a friend that he felt extremely guilty about staying home and reading ancient books during a time of national emergency. But he was soon to find that he could not do anything more helpful than reading ancient books, since he was unable to take up arms the way younger men could.¹⁶ Weng Wen-hao (1889–1971), a prominent geologist and high official, confided to Fu Ssu-nien that he was disappointed with geological studies since they could contribute almost nothing to the nation. The desperate war forced scholars to ask themselves the most fundamental questions about the practical application of their work.¹⁷

The tension in Fu’s mind during the last fifteen years of his life was a major motivation that almost drove him to give up academic work and occupy himself with various kinds of state affairs. In 1942 Fu recalled:

I am one who hates politics and has always loved to be at ease. If I were born in a peaceful time, I would definitely be able to excel in academic work. But the abhorrent political situation compels me to rush out of my study, and a sense of responsibility compels me to participate in politics.¹⁸

From this time on, Fu published no more serious academic research work.

At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War Fu Ssu-nien was immediately summoned by the government to participate in the Council of National Defense (Kuo-fang ts’an-i hui). During the war years, Fu was active in the People’s Political Council. At the beginning of the war, the IHP moved with several thousand boxes of books, experimental instruments, archaeological findings, and anthropological data from Nanking to Changsha. Later, in an attempt to avoid Japanese air raids, the IHP proceeded with extreme difficulty to Kunming in Yunnan Province via Vietnam. The IHP had only stayed in Kunming for four months before incessant Japanese bombing forced it to relocate to a remote area. Fu decided to look for a place whose name did not appear on maps so that Japanese aircraft could not drop bombs on it.¹⁹ He chose the remote village of Li-chuang in Nan-hsi District, Szechwan Province. Situated in the middle of the mountains and shel-

tered by a huge protruding rock, the village is invisible from the air. Following Fu, two other institutions relocated to this place. Fu's knack for moving the institute's colossal assets over several thousand miles with a shabby transportation system earned him the nickname "Mr. Mover" (Pan-chia-hsien-sheng).²⁰ Fu was able to accomplish these difficult logistical tasks because of his own stamina and his personal connections (*kuan-hsi*), which enabled him to procure the needed number of vehicles.²¹ During the war years the IHP's collection constituted the only large-scale library in the entire southwestern region, and this was of great help to the many humanities scholars there.²² The story repeated itself ten years later when the same collection was successfully moved to Taiwan and became a major resource for historical study there.

It was also Fu's proposal to combine Peita, Ch'inghua, and Nan-k'ai, the three most prestigious universities in China, into the Southwest Associated University (Hsi-nan lien-ta),²³ the most important educational organ during the war years. Thousands of students and professors walked or took vehicles from North China to Kunming to resume their studies.

FEARLESS CRITIC OF GOVERNMENTAL MALPRACTICE

During the eight war years, Fu was the director of the IHP and also a representative in the People's Assembly. In the assembly he was active in fighting governmental corruption and malpractice, and he also obstructed any motion that he thought went against the modern scientific spirit.²⁴ His demeanor during his tenure in the assembly won him the nickname "Cannon Fu" (Fu Ta-p'ao). Cannon Fu was especially famous for his attack on H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong and his contribution to their ultimate resignations. Kung and Chiang Kai-shek had both married daughters of Charlie Soong, T. V. Soong's father, and were thus related, and Kung had come under Chiang Kai-shek's protection. Quite successful at expanding his power base by cultivating traditional personal relations, Kung appointed his henchmen in disregard of formal procedure. In October 1933, he succeeded his brother-in-law T. V. Soong to the top financial post of the Nationalist government, a post that Soong had occupied almost continuously since 1926. During his tenure, Kung undertook several major financial reforms. He was appointed premier in 1938, succeeding Chiang Kai-shek. Several months after Kung's appointment, Fu began to communicate privately

with Chiang Kai-shek about Kung's complete lack of qualification for his current position. Two long memos accused Kung of various sorts of corruption, malpractice, illegal appointments, abuse of power, and self-aggrandizement.²⁵ Kung soon became aware of Fu's accusations, and the resultant tension between Kung and Fu was so high that at one point Kung even tried to avenge himself by curtailing the budget of the Academia Sinica and lowering its status from an organ of the Presidential Office to an organ of the Executive Yüan, headed by Kung.²⁶ Only when Chu Chia-hua (1893–1963), another powerful figure in the Nationalist government, took the post of secretary general of the Academia Sinica did the academy escape from this danger.

Kung's cultural policies also greatly irritated Fu. Upon assuming the premiership, Kung attempted to extend his reach into the cultural sphere. He once delivered a lecture to a gathering of professors in which he argued that various ideas held by intellectuals contradicted government policy and were thus inappropriate. Fu was dismayed by this.²⁷

Kung's corruption, although widely known and discussed throughout the nation, was not opposed; nobody dared do anything about it.²⁸ Fu was the exception; he continuously sent memos to Chiang reminding him that Kung's practices were damaging Chiang's reputation and the nation's strength. He told Hu Shih, "To protect Chiang's reputation, I dare to purify anything detrimental to it."²⁹

Eventually, Fu Ssu-nien may have felt that the Nationalist government was like a giant who could not lift himself up and that Chiang and his party had no potential for reform and rejuvenation. Apparently, no private memorial from Fu could persuade Chiang and his party to cut off the tumor that was H. H. Kung. Extremely dismayed, Fu decided to attack Kung publicly.

In 1943 the Ministry of Finance decided to sell one hundred million U.S. dollars, part of a five-hundred-million-dollar U.S. loan, to the public. This was a colossal amount of money for an impoverished nation like China, and the American dollar constituted a stable guarantee that would enable people to retain their wealth during a period of hyperinflation. But before long, Kung and his group announced to the public that the funds had already been sold. In actuality, he and his group had secretly bought up half of the money and sold it at more than five times the original asking price.

Many people knew that this had happened, but they could prove little or nothing. Finally, certain lower officials of the Bureau of the National Treasury, which was then in charge of selling the funds, mailed Fu several leaves from the account book of the bureau, which showed that Lü Hsien, a henchman of H. H. Kung and the director of the bureau, was seriously corrupt and had been involved in “swallowing up” the U.S. dollars.³⁰ Fu Ssu-nien jumped at this rare chance. He proposed a motion in a session of the People’s Assembly in July 1945. On hearing this, Ch’en Pu-lei (1890–1948), general secretary of the KMT (see illustration 2), and Wang Shih-chieh (1891–1981), general secretary of the People’s Political Consultative Council (both were good friends of Fu), tried to block the motion. They advised Fu that instead of going public with the scandal and incurring criticism from the United States and the Chinese Communist party (CCP), he should send a personal memo to Chiang Kai-shek.³¹ Ch’en Pu-lei and Wang Shih-chieh may also have tried to enlist Hu Shih, who was in the United States at this time, to persuade Fu to withdraw his motion, for Fu soon got a telegram from the United States advising him to stop his attack; it was to no avail.³² Fu was keenly aware of Chiang’s congenial relationship with Kung and, judging from his unsuccessful experience in denouncing Kung privately to Chiang in the past years, had decided to criticize Kung publicly in an open session of the People’s Assembly, and also to challenge Lü Hsien to meet with him in court. Fearing that the evidence would be stolen by Kung’s clique, Fu put it in a small suitcase, carrying it with him during the day and using it as a pillow at night.³³ The whole nation was stunned, and Attorney General Cheng Lieh (1888–1958) even asked Fu to let him see the evidence so that he could investigate it further (see illustration 3).³⁴ Much hard evidence concerning the corruption of Kung’s group continued to flood Fu’s mailbox,³⁵ and this allowed Fu to make several further motions.

Upon learning that H. H. Kung’s corruption had incurred the anger of the U.S. government, Chiang Kai-shek finally decided to fire Kung. He even informed Fu Ssu-nien that he was pleased with his courageous actions.³⁶ “I am happy that, at long last, I have caused Kung enough troubles to force him to resign,” Fu wrote to his wife. “I have endeavored to achieve this for about eight years. He is finally gone, but the nation has already been spoiled by him to a great extent. I am extremely grieved about the destiny of my people.”³⁷

傅先生之態度，一舉一動總是一可受，
任何人對他言苦言好感。他有一分最
佳佳宜的地方，拿一句下江話來說，他
有一副「討人歡喜的」面孔，而此
的感熱，則是他共有「清酒的精神」
因付不表其認真的態度。

2. During a session of the People's Political Consultative Conference in 1945, Ch'en Pulei, general secretary of the KMT, and Fu Ssu-nien sat together. Ch'en conferred in writing with Fu, and in this note praised Fu's personality highly. Preserved in the Fu Ssu-nien Papers, the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei.

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檢察官 偵辦 而弟親自主持 惟葉
君現員 法部 參事 亦重 查更

最高法院檢察署用箋

3. Attorney General Cheng Lieh asked Fu Ssu-nien to provide him evidence for further investigation of the corruption of Lü Hsien, who was H. H. Kung's henchman. Preserved in the Fu Ssu-nien Papers, the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei.

VISITING YENAN

Not long after H. H. Kung's resignation from three of his jobs — president of the Central Bank (twelve years), secretary of finance (eleven years), and premier or vice premier (eleven years) — atomic bombs were dropped on Japan. People soon became aware that peace was imminent.

The Nationalist government's announcement of its unilateral decision to summon the National Assembly (Kuo-min ta-hui) produced great tension between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP. Foreseeing the immediate end of the war, Fu Ssu-nien, Huang Yen-p'ei (1877–1965), and four other representatives of the People's Assembly suggested that Chiang Kai-shek summon the Political Consultative Conference (Cheng-chih-hsieh-shang-hui-i), a suggestion Chiang accepted.

Early in July 1945, Fu and several other representatives spent five days in Yen-an, then the base of the CCP, discussing the makeup of the council. They reached two agreements with Mao Tse-tung (1893–1976): the first was to cancel the unilateral National Assembly, the second to convene a political consultative conference. The mission successfully brought the two governments to the Chungking Conciliation Meeting. After the surrender of Japan, the leaders of the KMT and the CCP held a thirteen-day conference.³⁸

Fu was personally acquainted with Mao Tse-tung from his student days at Peita. Fu had been a prominent leader of the student movement, but Mao, who was only a library assistant, had never been able to join discussion groups with Fu and Lo Chia-lun (1897–1969). But when they met again, perhaps for the first time in thirty years, Mao was the leader of the major power opposing the Nationalist government. At Mao's invitation, they stayed up talking the whole night. Fu found that Mao was very familiar with various low-brow novels and that this had helped him to understand the mentality of people in the lower social strata and manipulate mass sentiment. He felt that Mao was a rebel leader like Sung Chiang, the major figure in the novel *Water Margin* (*Shui-hu chuan*).³⁹ In a way, Fu and Mao had similar rebellious natures. During the May Fourth era, Fu had been the leader in rebelling against warlords; Mao was to be the leader in rebelling against the KMT. Fu conceded to Mao that "I am only a small rebel like Ch'en Sheng (?–208 B.C.) and Wu Kuang (?–208 B.C.), whereas you are a major rebel like Liu Pang (r. 206–196 B.C.) and Hsiang Yü (232–202 B.C.)." Inspired by this, Mao copied a T'ang poem for Fu on Fu's departure from

Yenan. The last sentence of the poem was a description of Mao himself: "Liu Pang and Hsiang Yü never read books."⁴⁰

Two May Fourth youths had chosen different paths. One became a scholar, the other chose "not to read books" but to become a political opponent of the Nationalist government. The divergence between them was complete three years later when Mao Tse-tung denounced Fu, along with Hu Shih and Ch'ien Mu (1895–1990), as "reactionary scholars."⁴¹

AMBIVALENCE TOWARD THE NATION'S PAST

It is necessary to discuss Fu's inner world during the eight war years. Fu was, as we will see, most reluctant to give up his iconoclastic ideals. During the Sino-Japanese War, some of the May Fourth youths were praising their nation's past, and one even entitled his book *I Believe in China*.⁴² Fu was still torn between the poles of patriotism and iconoclastic ideals. He probably alternated constantly between these two poles, unable to free himself from the resultant anguish. He sometimes conceded in public lectures that China had a glorious past, yet he never allowed these lecture notes to be published.⁴³ Although Fu ssu-nien could convince himself that universalism and iconoclasm ultimately served nationalism, his inner tension still ran high. The need for a national identity was heightened when the nation was involved in a devastating and bloody war. The issue of "Chineseness," which had been a rather academic one prior to the war, was transformed into a weapon for mobilizing people to fight for the survival of their nation.

Fu Ssu-nien was periodically asked to deliver lectures to arouse the spirits of his compatriots by describing the nation's dignity. On several occasions, Fu spoke positively of China's past, whereas he scarcely mentioned modern Chinese history because of its perceived lack of glory. He always concluded his lectures with discussions of several memorable events or heroic figures to encourage his audience to wage a "holy war" (*sheng-chan*) against Japan. He was once commissioned by the Nationalist government's propaganda organ to draft a "History of the Chinese Revolution" ("Chung-kuo min-tsu ko-ming shih-kao," ca. 1938–1939). In this work he wrote that "the Han Chinese are not a weak race; they are sometimes weakened by dark politics, but they are not really feeble. . . . They become stronger whenever they are challenged."⁴⁴ Fu did, however, discipline himself against hyperbole. Despite repeated requests, he never finished this treatise.⁴⁵ When

these remarks are contrasted with those he jotted down in a notebook in 1927 — “China is not a civilized country”⁴⁶ — it is evident that Fu had changed considerably. And in the mid-1940s when T’ang Yung-t’ung (1893–1964), who sympathized with *Hsüeh-heng*, an anti-New Culture journal, wrote to Fu that he was terribly worried about the deaths of learned old men and the discontinuity of Chinese traditional learning that would probably result, Fu sorrowfully endorsed T’ang’s sentiments.⁴⁷ Less than twenty years before, it had still been Fu’s intention to discontinue traditional learning, but now its very continuance had become his greatest concern.

But although Fu Ssu-nien no longer held some of his former beliefs as zealously as he once had, he did not abandon them entirely, and he was acutely aware of the rising tide of a sense of “national essence” that accompanied the Sino-Japanese War. In various essays Fu reminded people not to exaggerate the glories of the nation’s past. He conceded that given this war, national confidence was a must. “But,” he added, “we would rather believe in our future endeavors than in the nation’s past.” He warned people not to “forge some historical miracles to deceive our own descendants.” A sense of national essence could make some positive contributions to the national feeling, but it should not be abused, he added.⁴⁸

AMBIVALENCE TOWARD HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY

Fu Ssu-nien was also torn between historical objectivity and immediate political needs. I offer two examples. The first concerns his unfinished project of tracing the ethnic origins of the Manchus, the purpose of which was to prove that the Manchus were ethnically identical to the Han Chinese. In a draft of this project Fu strove mightily to illustrate that most Manchu and Han surnames were originally the same, and that the Manchus had obscured this fact after their destruction of the Ming court in order to protect their own special political privileges and prerogatives.⁴⁹ In this project Fu tried to reconstruct the phonetic similarities between many Manchu and Chinese surnames. But he was ultimately overcome by the immense difficulties involved in defending his hypothesis. Several Manchu noble names could be traced back to Chinese origins, but many others could not.⁵⁰

Why was Fu so obsessed by this hypothesis? The essential tension between nationalist enthusiasm and objective historical study might be a pos-

sible explanation. When Fu was searching for the similarity between Manchu and Chinese surnames, he had Manchukuo in mind. The establishment of Manchukuo was, he argued, a Japanese scheme to serve imperial Japanese needs by exaggerating the ethnic differences between the Han Chinese and the Manchus.⁵¹ It was, then, Fu's concern to rebut that argument.

The second example is also associated with ethnic history. During the Japanese occupation of Indochina, the Japanese had sought to convince the ethnic minorities of Southwest China that they were actually Thai people and had little to do ethnically with the Han Chinese. This was done to encourage them to separate themselves from the Chinese government. In the 1940s many intellectuals who followed the government on its retreat into Southwest China found themselves in an excellent environment for ethnic studies. For many it was the first opportunity to observe these minorities firsthand, and they decided to explore the field of ethnology. The Southwest Ethnic Research Association (Hsi-nan min-tsu hsüeh-hui) was organized by Fei Hsiao-t'ung (1910–). Ku Chieh-kang (1893–1980) did several studies on the history of these minorities; Fei Hsiao-t'ung and Wu Ching-ch'ao (1901–1968) conducted some anthropological surveys. They published a number of articles revealing the ethnic diversities among these minorities and their differences from the Han Chinese. Fu Ssu-nien soon instigated a debate with Ku Chieh-kang, Fei Hsiao-t'ung, and Wu Ching-ch'ao on their studies. With this, the tension between history and politics surfaced again. During the debates, Fu criticized the three men as “purposeless scholars” (*wu-liao hsüeh-che*) who, “under the pretext of academic work” (*chia hsüeh-shu chih-ming*), were attempting to dismantle the nation's identity. Fu argued that when the entire nation was severely threatened by its enemy and Southwest China was being egged on to sever itself from China, academic work should be subservient to political needs. All the people of China proper should band together to fight the Japanese, he argued, and scholars should not supply the enemy with even a single shred of evidence to persuade the southwest minorities to rebel under the banner of “Great Thaism” (*Ta Thai chu-i*), no matter how objective their studies were.⁵² Fu therefore wrote to Ku Chieh-kang that what he should do at this moment was prove that the Hu (non-Chinese “barbarians”) and Han Chinese were from the same ethnic stock.⁵³ He demanded to know why, while the Japanese were proclaiming that Kwangsi and Yunnan were originally the habitations of Thai peoples and the British were egging on the chiefs of

local tribes in Yunnan, some Chinese scholars were still exiling themselves to these places and tracing the ethnic origins of these peoples. He said that it would not be a problem were they to publish their articles in virtually noncirculating academic journals (*hsüeh-shu k'an-wu*), but that it would be most improper to publish them in popular journals.⁵⁴

This brings us to an interesting issue: whether historians should, during times of national crisis, obscure unfavorable facts. T'ao Hsi-sheng (1899–1988) believed that in view of the political situation, scholars should carefully hide some historical realities. For example, even though scholars might believe that China was a most backward country, it was still their mission to inform the people of their nation's glorious past in order to arouse nationalistic feelings among them.⁵⁵ During times of national crisis, the objectivity Fu cherished so much was relegated to noncirculating journals.

After the Japanese surrender, Chiang Kai-shek considered appointing Fu as the new president of Peita. Fu, however, believed Hu Shih was the best choice, and at Fu's request, Chiang changed his mind and appointed Hu Shih instead. For various reasons Hu, who by then had been relieved of his ambassadorship and had remained in the United States, was not sworn in immediately.⁵⁶ Fu Ssu-nien, who enthusiastically persuaded Hu Shih to accept the presidency of Peita, was appointed acting president during the interregnum. Peita was at that time still a constituent of the Southwest Associated University in Kunming and was awaiting repatriation to its Peking campus. Before long, Fu was traumatized by a large-scale student movement in Kunming.

SETTLING STUDENT UNREST IN KUNMING

The Kunming Student Movement was considered a major factor contributing to the success of the CCP. The government's high-handed cultural policies produced a continuing conflict with liberal leftists, which erupted in violence in December 1945.⁵⁷

KMT policy toward intellectuals changed drastically after the United States joined the Pacific War. Before then, intellectuals wholeheartedly cooperated with the government in resisting foreign invasion. During the nation's life-and-death crisis, the government also endeavored to mobilize and

organize people of every stratum to fight the enemy. For several years a somewhat more democratic political atmosphere prevailed. The participation of the United States in the Pacific War was viewed by the Chinese people as assurance that the Allies would ultimately win the war and that therefore the Chinese nation would survive. With this assurance, the government set out to implement cultural control, and the intellectuals resumed their criticism of the government. The government's cultural policies were inefficiently implemented and never successfully carried out, but they still incurred enormous hostility from intellectuals and young students.⁵⁸

Kunming, with its American air base, remoteness from Chungking, and liberal American style, retained a democratic atmosphere. Intellectuals there were relatively free to express their discontent. Nevertheless, at the end of the war, students felt relieved that they could finally return to Peking. But the civil war erupted soon after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, and students of the Southwest Associated University were forced to remain in Kunming another eighteen months. They were extremely disappointed with the political situation when the local garrison extended its control to the campus, and a clash immediately ensued.

On December 1, 1945, a tragic event occurred. While leftist students were holding a public meeting denouncing the KMT for its corruption and misgovernment, as well as for the responsibility they felt it should shoulder for the outbreak of the civil war, the local garrison commander, Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'üan (1902–1949), dispatched a squad to the lecture hall. The agents stormed the hall with pistols and grenades, killing four students and injuring twenty-five others.⁵⁹ Students and professors reacted immediately: they decided to boycott all classes, call for the punishment of the ringleaders in this slaughter, and publicize the true story of the tragedy. Because the government only made slight concessions, a stalemate developed. As the acting president of Peita, Fu was one of the three executive members of the Southwest Associated University. Consequently he was invited by Chiang to settle this dispute (see illustration 4), a difficult job requiring the most sophisticated abilities.⁶⁰ While negotiating with students to go back to their classrooms, Fu confessed to his wife that this mission was like jumping into a fire.⁶¹ After thirty years, Fu, the former marshal of the May Fourth demonstrations, was trying to calm a student movement. His friends ribbed

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

孟真先生回昆以後
併力以仍賢勞為念
關於處理學潮事
已另致各校教職員一
書想可同時奉閱尚望垂

4. A letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Fu Ssu-nien inviting him to settle the Kunming student unrest. Preserved in the Fu Ssu-nien Papers, the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei.

him by quoting the saying "He who cuts others' hair will someday have his own hair cut by others."⁶² In the eyes of the leftists, at least, Fu had become a tool of the KMT, and slander from leftist elements abounded.⁶³

Fu finally persuaded the students to stop boycotting their classes by promising further concessions from the government. Fu's heroism in denouncing H. H. Kung had given him a reputation for being an impartial and upright negotiator, among the students as well as the general public, and he was quite fair in handling this tragedy. He blamed local party and military leaders and successfully appealed to Chiang Kai-shek to punish several of the ringleaders. As a result, students promised to resume their class work. But differences among the students delayed the negotiations, and the decisions of the student committee kept changing. Fu confided to a friend that he suspected that CCP students were behind the scenes impeding the negotiations, and indeed it turned out that from the beginning of the incident to its settlement the CCP had a hand in the affair.⁶⁴ At one point during the repeated stalemates, Chiang Kai-shek planned to resort to mass arrests or violence.⁶⁵ Aware of this, Fu Ssu-nien and Mei I-ch'i (1889-1962), president of Ch'inghua University, announced that they would resign immediately if students did not accept the settlement terms. Fu also managed to persuade the faculty to announce that all faculty members would also resign.⁶⁶ The students agreed to end their protests, and classes resumed. A report from the American consul to the State Department stated that Fu had finally stabilized the situation. In the report, the American consul expressed relief that Fu had come on the scene, because although Fu was not a government official, he had the power to handle the situation.⁶⁷

Fu was highly distressed by this incident. He wrote with sorrow that during the May Fourth movement it was out of nationalism that students stood up to demonstrate, whereas the students in Kunming were egged on by the CCP and patronized by the Soviet Union. But Fu also expressed his distaste for some of the KMT ringleaders. He proclaimed that "Li Tsung-huang (1888-1978) and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'üan should be summarily executed. . . . My resentment toward Li Tsung-huang is no less than that toward anybody else."⁶⁸ He lamented the destiny of the nation and predicted that a blazing inferno would soon "burn rock and jade together." Although he had successfully solved a political debacle, he felt powerless and was pessimistic about the future of the nation.

PUNISHING TURNCOATS

On learning of Japan's surrender, Fu Ssu-nien was elated. It was reported that in Chungking he was drunk and kissed everyone he met on the street, happy that the Chinese had not become a subjugated people. He soon took action to ferret out traitors who had served under Japanese control. Fu's hatred of turncoats was the result of his traditional conception of "loyalty," which though hardly mentioned by Fu himself in any of his writings, was a dominant factor in his thought. In 1945, foreseeing the end of the war, he wrote in a notebook under the heading "Black List" the following comment: "Hsieh Kuo-chen (1901-1982) is a traitor." This was because Hsieh had worked on a compilation project led by the Japanese.⁶⁹ Fu seemed to have little sympathy for people who were forced to live and work under Japanese control after the legitimate Chinese government had retreated into Southwest China.

During the war years Peita was reorganized by the Japanese military with the help of some Chinese intellectuals. It became Fu's policy to exclude all formerly pro-Japanese faculty members from Peita. Chou Tso-jen, who once served as the president of Peita, immediately wrote to plead with his former student Fu Ssu-nien to do otherwise, but to no avail.⁷⁰ The government had set up continuation schools to educate the students who had once studied in schools controlled by the Japanese during the war years, and many bogus professors were retained to teach at these schools because there were not enough faculty members. But Fu insisted that they all had to leave. His stubbornness not only irritated the turncoats but also the many government officials who were in charge of reestablishing Chinese rule. This expulsion policy also extended to his friends, such as Yü P'ing-po (1900-1990) and Jung Keng (1871-1950). After being berated and shouted at by Fu, Jung Keng published a plea in a newspaper for leniency toward faculty members who had served in the Japanese-dominated Peita. Fu immediately published two announcements defending his policy, arguing that in 1937 Peita had instituted a policy encouraging its entire faculty to move to the south. And, Fu continued, almost all faculty members of the bogus Peita had not originally taught at the university, and it was therefore not right to retain them. On top of that, Fu believed it was his responsibility to guard staunchly the principle of loyalty and thereby set a good example for future generations.⁷¹ In doing this he might have been bearing in mind the

words he had once uttered: "Because of the lack of citizenship training, there have been many turncoats in Chinese history."⁷² Hundreds of faculty members who had served in the bogus Peita were finally fired. Fu believed that if Hu Shih had taken over the presidency of Peita right after the war, he would not have been resolute enough to expel these disloyal professors. He was paving the way for Hu.⁷³

Fu's purges also extended to powerful political figures. Angered by the ineffectiveness of political reform, Fu, as a university president, personally sued Pao Chien-ch'ing (1893-?), president of Peita under Japanese occupation, and Chang Yen-ch'ing (1898-?), vice president of the Hsin-min Society, an organization of Chinese turncoats. The lawsuit attracted enormous attention in North China. Fu's reputation for punishing turncoats led people to believe that he was the man to whom custody of traitors should be remanded.⁷⁴

In the summer of 1945, Hu Shih returned to China to be sworn in as president of Peita. During Fu's brief tenure at Peita, he had added the Colleges of Engineering, Agriculture, and Medicine to the existing Colleges of Arts, Science, and Law. After this, in the winter of 1945, "Mr. Mover" made preparations to move the IHP from Szechwan to Nanking. In 1946, after more than one year of waiting, the IHP became the first institute of the Academia Sinica to load its people onto two ships to go down river to Nanking.⁷⁵

The lives of members of the IHP in Li-chuang during the war years had been made miserable by hyperinflation and the humid climate. The cost of living, however, was lower in Li-chuang than in the coastal areas. In the expensive city of Nanking, the government's "demobilization aid" was not enough to allow IHP members to buy even basic kitchen utensils and bedding. Witnessing this, Fu was extremely pessimistic about the future of the IHP, and he perceived that total political and economic collapse was imminent.⁷⁶

Because of the shortage of paper during the war years, only a few items of research by IHP members had been published, and the IHP had been almost forgotten by its colleagues and the world at large. In 1947 and 1948, despite the impact of hyperinflation, Fu secured a large quantity of paper with which to publish an impressive number of works by members of the IHP.⁷⁷

FEARLESS CRITIC OF T. V. SOONG

In 1947 civil war and skyrocketing inflation reached new heights. T. V. Soong, who had succeeded H. H. Kung as premier in 1945, was believed to be contributing to the economic deterioration by virtue of his destructive policies and the immense corruption of his coterie. Soong and Kung had helped Chiang considerably in financing his cadets before and after the Northern Expedition, but malpractice and the enormous corruption of their coteries irritated their compatriots. The CCP published many books denouncing them, and these proved to be extremely effective propaganda.⁷⁸ As late as the 1960s, a supporter of the Nationalist government still believed that the Kung and Soong coteries had destroyed the entire Chinese middle class.⁷⁹

Fu's attacks on Kung and Soong unintentionally coincided with those of the leftists. The "loyalists" under the Nationalist government were paradoxically echoed by Chiang's enemies, and this proved to be detrimental to Chiang's reputation.

Soong and Kung were not just relatives but enemies, and Soong was sometimes referred to as "the emperor's brother-in-law" (*kuo-chiu*). Like Kung, Soong was a thoroughly Western-educated banker. Indeed, Fu claimed that no more than one ten-thousandth of Soong's blood was Chinese. Unlike Kung, however, Soong was never a favorite of Chiang.⁸⁰ Expecting Soong to cure the economic woes created during Kung's tenure as minister of finance and as premier, many people were euphoric when Soong returned from the United States to be sworn in as premier. When Soong announced his policy of purchasing gold from people at below-market prices and thereby elicited much criticism, Fu stood alone and wrote a famous article, "The Gold Peril" ("Huang-huo"), endorsing Soong's policy.⁸¹ Fu's belief was that during periods of national crisis, people should contribute their fair share to help the country. Yet before long the corruption and illegal practices engaged in by members of Soong's coterie irritated and provoked many people. In August 1946 Soong decided to sell 380 million U.S. dollars from the Central Bank to the public to stabilize the inflation-ridden economy. It was contended that Soong's coterie bought up about 151 million of the dollars and that Kung's group purchased about 180 million. People believed that these two groups had gobbled up fully 89 percent of the entire sum.⁸²

In addition, Soong implemented a new policy of issuing certificates for importing crucial resources. Since the Soong and Kung coteries controlled the certificates, they monopolized the importation of resources to the extent that, as Chiang Kai-shek complained, in February 1947 one pound of tobacco cost ten thousand *yüan* (Chinese currency). These two policies caused an economic disaster (known as the “gold disaster” in Shanghai and other cities), but the government made no move. Fu could endure this no more, and right after the “gold disaster” he published “Such a T. V. Soong Should Step Down” (“Che-yang ti Sung Tzu-wen fei-tso-k’ai pu-k’o”) and two other powerful articles.⁸³ Headlines like “Fu Ssu-nien Would Launch Revolution” appeared in newspapers.⁸⁴ The three courageous articles were widely hailed by the people and also led Chiang Kai-shek to change Soong’s policies immediately. Although Chiang blamed the CCP for the inflation, Soong stepped down in fifteen days.⁸⁵

Letters of support for Fu began to pile up, and “Cannon Fu” was hailed as a modern remonstrator. Members of the KMT approvingly followed Fu’s actions, and one hundred core members called for punishing Soong’s coterie. Even the *Central Daily Press* (*Chung-yang jih-pao*), the major party newspaper of the KMT, fanned the flames of public indignation, urging the destruction of the Kung and Soong coteries.⁸⁶

In retrospect, it is worth noting that among the KMT’s numerous internecine struggles, there was at least one constant confrontation — that between those with intellectual backgrounds and those of the comprador (*mai-pan*) class.⁸⁷ It is difficult to map out the members of these two groups, but it is agreed that Soong and Kung were the heads of the comprador class, and Chu Chia-hua, Hu Shih, Fu Ssu-nien, Chiang T’ing-fu (1895–1965), Wang Shih-chieh, Weng Wen-hao, Ch’ien Tuan-sheng (1900–1990), Wu Ching-ch’ao (1901–1968), and others were in the intellectual group. Although members of the intellectual group occupied a number of high posts, they were constantly outnumbered and outmaneuvered by various cliques inside the KMT, and Kung and Soong exerted much pressure on many of them. For example, Chiang T’ing-fu was badly treated by Soong, and his letters of complaint to Fu were numerous.⁸⁸ Weng Wen-hao, as Hu Shih told Fu, was occupying the office of general secretary of the Executive Yüan without receiving any assignment from the president of the Yüan, T. V. Soong.⁸⁹ The impression Fu got from their complaints was that T. V. Soong had gathered all the power for his own clique and had neglected all

other cabinet members.⁹⁰ During Hu Shih's tenure as China's ambassador to the United States, T. V. Soong was actually the real representative of the Nationalist government in Washington. Soong treated Hu Shih shabbily and always bypassed him in negotiations between Chungking and Washington. H. H. Kung, T. V. Soong, and Wang Cheng-t'ing (1882-1961) were three major saboteurs who complained about Hu's "non-diplomatic" activities in America,⁹¹ and these complaints ultimately led to Hu's dismissal.⁹² Chu Chia-hua, the minister of education and later head of KMT organization and the major patron of Fu and the Academia Sinica, was also overwhelmed by Soong and Kung.⁹³ Closely associated with all of these people who were victims of Soong's high-handed habits, Fu had the audacity to stand up and resist such behavior. Perhaps the fact that Fu did not actually serve in the government and so was not constrained by any official regulation, was one of the reasons he was able to level charges against the Soong coterie. After these attacks, Fu became in the Chinese mind a representative of the "pure stream" (*ch'ing-liu*), that is, the incorruptible element in public life.⁹⁴

To be a member of the "pure stream" was thought to preclude being a professional politician. Fu said that he jumped into politics simply because he could not "bear to see all under heaven not at peace" and therefore "rushed in and out [of politics]"; he "could never stay inside or outside [of politics] for long."⁹⁵ Fu's political career was that of a traditional remonstrator. It is ironical that at a time when the government was losing its legitimacy, the liberal intellectuals who were regarded as members of the pure stream lost their credibility with the youth as soon as they joined the KMT government. They were better trusted when they were not in office, which was why many of them accepted government appointments only reluctantly. As already mentioned, Hu Shih, after he was relieved of his ambassadorship, refused appointment as president of the Academia Sinica, because it was an organ of the Nationalist government.⁹⁶ Fu Ssu-nien also declined offers of positions as a cabinet member (*Kuo-fu wei-yüan*), minister of education, and president of the Examination Yüan.⁹⁷ Whenever the liberals assumed office, they lost their credibility. The best way for them to help the government was to remain outside it. In the 1940s, liberals were destined to occupy no power base.

IN THE UNITED STATES

Exhausted by his wartime and postwar activities, Fu's chronic high blood pressure worsened. He rejected Chiang Kai-shek's repeated offers to become a minister in the cabinet. Given his personality, Fu knew that the only job he could do for his country was to be a fearless remonstrator and not a high bureaucrat. He was also aware that when public opinion no longer supported his government, the best course of action was to stay outside the government and support its policy at appropriate times.⁹⁸

In June 1947, after his flamboyant criticism of T. V. Soong, Fu went with his family to the United States for medical treatment. An operation was planned that would surgically interrupt the sympathetic nerve pathways.⁹⁹ He stayed in New Haven most of the time, but also received treatment at Brigham Hospital at Harvard University. This was his first year of leisure since his return to China in 1926. He drew up a plan to read whatever he should have read, and he always stayed up until two or three in the morning reading. Most of his attention was on Marxism and the revolutionary strategy of Lenin, a topic he had neglected and which had become most relevant during the 1940s. He may have felt that his negligence in repudiating Marxism had contributed to the young generation's attraction to the CCP. He decided that after returning to China, most of his efforts would be directed toward connecting academic study with the practical world. On May 7, 1947, Fu wrote that he would like to edit a sociological review, write a general history of China, and establish the "Fu Ssu-nien Tribune."¹⁰⁰ It is noteworthy that in the spring of 1948, Fu was elected to the Legislative Yüan in absentia. Without being notified, Fu was supported by over two hundred legislators in a motion to run for vice president of that organ. The motion, however, failed.¹⁰¹

Fu did not undergo the operation; in fact he was given a rather optimistic evaluation of his health.¹⁰² Despite his relatives' repeated advice, Fu chose to return to China instead of staying in the United States as a refugee. In August 1948, when the Nationalist government was in serious danger, returning to China was a rare act.¹⁰³ He was, however, persuaded by his wife to leave their only son in the States.¹⁰⁴

While Fu was in the United States, the CCP achieved tremendous momentum in the civil war. In mid-1948 the CCP forces were already almost

equal in number to those of the KMT. At the end of that year, Manchuria and northern China were taken over by the CCP, and the Northwest also fell under its control.

On his return to Nanking, Fu was horrified by the deteriorating political situation. Knowing that Nanking would soon fall to the CCP, he had brought with him large numbers of sleeping pills, and on hearing of the suicide of Ch'en Pu-lei and Tuan Hsi-p'eng (1897–1948), two old friends of his, Fu decided to die for the “old regime.” Apparently, it was only his wife's intervention that saved him from suicide.¹⁰⁵ Locking himself in a small room for three days, he recited over and over a poem by T'ao Yüan-ming (365–427):

I planted mulberry trees by the river bank
 And hoped to have a harvest three years hence,
 But just when leaves began to deck the boughs
 A sudden landslide changed the river's course.
 The leaves were stripped, the branches all broken,
 Roots and trunk floated off to the blue sea.
 The silkworms will have nothing to eat this spring
 And who will furnish clothes against the cold?
 I failed to plant them on the high plateau
 And now today what have I to regret?¹⁰⁶

In agony over the change of regime, Hu Shih reportedly also recited this poem, reprimanding himself for having neglected the work of guiding the youth. This reprimand was expressed in the two sentences: “I failed to plant them on the high plateau/And now today what have I to regret?” Hu believed that if in years past he had not been so obsessed with evidential research and had paid more attention to general issues, the youth would not have been taken in by Communist propaganda.¹⁰⁷

During the three long days Fu was reciting this poem, his sense of despair over the collapse of the old regime was evident. He also felt as though all he had tried to achieve in the past was being dismantled, and this led him to rethink many of the values he had once espoused. He may have considered the matter teleologically, and found that the iconoclasm and apolitical style of study did contribute to the disaster. But since he had “failed to plant them on the high plateau,” what did he now have to regret?¹⁰⁸

In late 1948, when Nanking was in great danger, Fu announced the disbanding of the IHP. He had hoped to remove the institute to a safer place to continue the nation's academic tradition, and he lamented the fact that his deteriorating health had prevented him from undertaking such a burdensome task. But when the members of the IHP decided to carry on their work, Fu chose to move the IHP to Taiwan. The institute was safely relocated to Taiwan in late 1948. Fu was appointed president of T'aita in January 1949, almost at the same time that a large force of the Nationalist government was surrounded on the Hsü-chou Plain. Later, when the capital of the Nationalist government was "moving on foot" from place to place, Fu was already in Taiwan devoting his energies to T'aita.

During the last years of the Nationalist regime, Fu was singled out by CCP propaganda organs as a target of attack. Fu's bitter criticism of the CCP and his role in settling the Kunming student demonstration infuriated the CCP, and it labeled him "anti-CCP and anti-Soviet Union." Fu could not have agreed more. "I like this title," he announced.¹⁰⁹ Fu also became a major target of the *Wen-hui pao*, a CCP organ, and other arms of the CCP press.¹¹⁰ In August 1949 he was even denounced by Mao Tse-tung as a war criminal.¹¹¹

AT T'AITA

Fu is known in Taiwan more for his presidency of T'aita than as a historian, and he remains today the most memorable T'aita figure in any poll.¹¹² The Fu Gardens, Fu Hall, and the Fu Bell, which rings hourly in commemoration of his death, all remind T'aita students that there was once a Fu Ssu-nien. But Fu served at T'aita for less than two years. How then did the legend of Fu Ssu-nien develop?

Fu made a considerable contribution to reviving and reinforcing the faculty of T'aita after the departure of the Japanese. Thereafter, in terms of teaching quality T'aita became one of the best universities in all of China. When the Nationalist government withdrew to Taiwan, millions of mainlanders followed, and university enrollment suddenly increased severalfold. T'aita was immediately overburdened by the unexpected expansion, and its facilities were strained to the breaking point. If all students went to their classes, there were not enough chairs for them to sit on. Some students even

lived in the patient rooms of the T'aita Hospital. Fu used his extensive personal connections to "plunder" money from the cash-strapped Nationalist government for the benefit of the university.

Fu is also remembered for his staunch stance in favor of human rights. Political terror prevailed in Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s. Seeing it coming, Fu strove to maintain academic dignity and courageously resisted police intrusion on the T'aita campus. His heroic efforts to protect the independence of the academic world were much hailed whenever students were arrested. Fu is well remembered for his statement: "I am running a university, not a police station." He resisted arrests of students carried out without hard evidence and successfully secured the release of many innocent students.¹¹³ But because he was staunchly opposed to the CCP, Fu helped the Nationalist government expel Communist students and send them back to the mainland.¹¹⁴

Fu Ssu-nien is remembered not only for obtaining many prestigious teachers from the mainland, but also for not allowing high government officials to get professorships. This was uncommon action for an era in which political power was quite influential in academic affairs. After 1950, whenever high officials used their political influence to secure their own professorial appointments, Fu was mentioned repeatedly as an icon of resistance.

During the last stage of his life Fu came to be very much concerned with educational issues, and his last articles were on this topic. While studying in Europe, he had paid considerable attention to college education, and his ideal had been to establish a research-oriented university. He despised the educational system adopted from the United States, especially the parts influenced by Columbia University's Teachers College, an institution that was, according to Fu, offering much too shallow a curriculum. He even believed that the Kiangsu Education Association, which followed the Teachers College educational philosophy, should bear the responsibility for the collapse of Chinese education and the resultant dislocation of the youth and the collapse of society.¹¹⁵

Fu retained the old research orientation of T'aita but paid particular attention to introductory courses. He required the most prominent and senior professors to teach freshman classes. Last but not least, Fu is remembered by T'aita students for his charismatic affection, his outgoing

personality, and his jocular, plebeian bearing. All of these were great qualities enabling him to win students over. Students were also proud that their president was a veteran May Fourth leader.¹¹⁶ But the veteran admitted that he was no longer the May Fourth leader he had been in his youth.

LIBERALISM OR SOCIALISM

Fu Ssu-nien lived in Taiwan for less than two years. During the last stage of his life Fu reflected on some of his convictions and the loss of the “old dynasty,” and some drastic changes are discernible in this period of his life.

Fu had always been labeled a liberal, but he never completely espoused liberalism. His political essays focused not on democratic ideals but on the construction of a modern political culture. Until the mid-1940s he was fond of frequently making the following points: throughout Chinese history there was only central government and no local government; China had only government and no “society”; China had masses but no society; politics should be the business of the people and it was absurd to count on the government to do everything; and the Chinese upheld no political cause — if they upheld even one, it would be better than none at all.¹¹⁷

The world of politics was constantly on his mind. On the one side was economic equality and on the other side was freedom. Fu had always believed that these two poles could be joined. Being keenly aware of the plight of the proletariat, Fu placed great emphasis on economic equality, which remained his primary political concern throughout his life.¹¹⁸ He constantly repeated that the ideal state would be one in which freedom as well as economic equality existed. If a state had only one of these qualities without the other, Fu could never be satisfied with it. A state with mild socialism and liberalism was his utopia, and Roosevelt and the platform of the Labor party in England his political models. Fu believed that Roosevelt’s social policies imbued a new spirit into liberalism. He believed that capitalism had been abusing liberalism to exploit the people and had produced extreme economic inequality. Imperialism was its natural product. It was a must for a liberal to be mindful of economic equality; without it, liberalism was not real liberalism.¹¹⁹

Although socialism is one of the most ill-defined terms in modern China, Fu and various other liberal intellectuals entertained similar ideas of social-

ism and longed for a world of liberalism without capitalism. They believed that through government power, economic inequalities could be corrected and that state-owned enterprises could bring material progress.

It is, however, interesting to note that with the victory of the CCP in mainland China, many of these liberal intellectuals fled to Taiwan, and the resultant political crisis dashed their dreams. The success of the CCP signaled the victory of economic egalitarianism by means of class struggle. Consequently, the intellectuals became aware that they could not ask for both freedom and economic equality. Many men, including Hu Shih, Fu Ssu-nien, Lei Chen (1897–1979), and Yin Hai-kuang (1914–1969), gradually gave up socialist ideals to uphold liberalism.¹²⁰ The change in Fu Ssu-nien's attitudes was very evident. In 1949, for example, he wrote that to acquire freedom, it would be legitimate to give up economic equality temporarily.¹²¹

Of those who fled the mainland and lived in Taiwan during the political terror, Fu and a group of like-minded intellectuals were unique in defending liberalism. Many of them became staunch advocates of liberalism and later suffered for it during the KMT's crackdowns in the 1960s.¹²²

SEARCHING FOR SOURCES OF MORALITY

In Fu's late life, his abandonment of crude materialism and positivism was observable, as was his return to the Mencian tradition. During his year-long stay in the United States, Fu had time to reflect on many things. First of all, he noticed that during the previous twenty years, "Western learning" had changed considerably. Positivism was no longer as popular as he had once imagined. Fu found that his hostility toward Kantian philosophy and his appreciation of positivism and behaviorism had all changed. He wrote in 1947:

I was originally a crude materialist of the physiological type (in philosophy, not in other spheres). I therefore appreciated Pavlov, J. B. Watson, James and his language theory of the emotions, R. Carnap, and Freud and his works. But now I want to have surgery to cut off my sympathetic nerve connections with them. During my year of illness [1941], I constantly reflected on the meaning of human life. Sometimes these reflections resembled

mysticism, but in reality they were not. I finally became aware that the cosmos is a great deduction and that we have to make some assumptions, and take these assumptions as bases to deduce others.¹²³

Fu became disenchanted with J. B. Watson. He believed that in dealing with human problems, “Watson’s behaviorism is too crude. . . . More spiritual elements can help people avoid neglecting important facts.”

Fu also realized that human beings should be distinguished from other creatures and that they were not governed by the same rules of behavior. He said that in comparing animal behavior to human behavior, people had to bear in mind the idea that “man is one species of animal” but that “an animal is not a man.” Fu believed that behaviorists and many Darwinists often unconsciously committed this error. He believed that the political influence of Darwinism was evident in bolshevism.¹²⁴ “When I was in Europe [during the first half of his stay there] I was a crude materialist of the physiological type; I therefore was very interested in Freud and also in Watson’s behaviorism,” Fu once said. But in 1947 he said,

Believing in crude materialism and pragmatism is equivalent to saying “I am always lying.” . . . I think I was naive before. To use the Kantian terminology, I was in my pre-critical period. This time, during my stay in America, I found that there has been little progress in behaviorism. I feel that Pavlov’s experiments were very crude, and of Watson’s contributions only the implicit language theory is valuable.¹²⁵

Fu was no longer as optimistic as he had once been about the possibility of applying scientific methods to human affairs. He believed in Poincaré’s sensationalism theory that human feelings can be dealt with by models of natural science, but he felt that we should know the limitations of such an approach. He admitted becoming sympathetic with the mentalistic point of view and regretting his former materialistic point of view.¹²⁶

During Fu’s later years, his hostility toward Mencian philosophy changed. The most obvious signal of this came in 1949 when he required T’aita freshmen to read the works of Mencius. A competition to show what one could gain from reading Mencius was instituted to reward those who achieved a good understanding of the text.¹²⁷ Traditional moral cultivation

again came to his attention. Ho Ting-sheng, a former colleague of Fu's at Chung-shan University, noted that Fu visited him at T'aita for the sole purpose of discussing the concept of moral cultivation in Mencius.¹²⁸ Hsü Fu-kuan (1903–1982), a critic of Fu, also noticed this drastic change and observed that Fu was a courageous person who could change his mind.¹²⁹ This change was comparable to his switch to the New Culture group in 1917 and is another milestone along the lifelong journey of a May Fourth mind.

Was this change attributable to the loss of China to the CCP or was there another reason? In a way, what happened to Fu might have been like what happened to Tai Chen (1723–1777), the foremost scholar of evidential research during the Ch'ing dynasty. It was recorded that when Tai was about to die, he confessed that he could not remember any of his classical and philological studies, but that passages of moral philosophy were coursing through his consciousness.¹³⁰ If this story is true, it is because moral philosophy can nourish people's minds the way food and water nourish people's bodies, whereas philological and textual knowledge are absolutely irrelevant to the ultimate human condition. The episode, true or false, showed that some people did believe that Confucian moral philosophy was what people really felt intimately in their inner lives. When the May Fourth youths reached their mellow ages, did they inevitably revert to what their predecessors felt the most intimately in their innermost selves?

Fu was among the earliest of the May Fourth youths to face the ultimate situation. His inherited hypertension almost cost him his life in 1940, an extremely busy year during which Fu was jointly appointed secretary general of the Academia Sinica, director of the IHP, and a representative in the People's Assembly. He collapsed and was treated in an emergency room in Chungking by a prominent physician.¹³¹ Lying on his hospital bed, Fu reflected on his life over the past forty-five years and reevaluated Mencian philosophy, familiar to him thanks to his grandfather's instruction.¹³² We are unable to know if this constituted a return to a long-suppressed self. But we do know that after his recovery Hu Shih, then China's ambassador to the United States, advised Fu in a letter that in the midst of the ultimate situation, positivism, Lao-tzu, and Chuang-tzu were all useless to bring him peace of mind. Hu suggested, "Why don't you read the works of your fellow Shantung provincials — Confucius and Mencius? They are so com-

mon, so plain in reflecting common feelings that they can ease your hypertension by ten degrees” (see illustration 5).¹³³ Hu emphasized that

this is what I have felt intimately during my personal experiences in recent years. . . . The greatness of Confucius is his simplicity, with nothing extraordinary or remarkable. He is really reasonable and sensible . . . recently I read Mencius and have felt that he is capable of being loved. . . . Among the intellectuals of the past two thousand years, those who have had outstanding achievements and positive outlooks on life mostly benefited from the *Analects* and the teachings of Mencius.

Compared with the early Hu Shih, who championed the scientific outlook on life, this was a tremendous change. Fu Ssu-nien’s response to this advice is still unknown.

But both Hu and Fu sensed that during life crises, the positivistic mindset they had espoused in their youths was so dry and unconcerned with private, innermost feelings that it was no longer a source of sustenance to them. Fu confessed that after his life-and-death experience in 1940, he was converted somewhat to the premodern Chinese moral tradition.¹³⁴

Fu’s health hit a nadir after he completed his one-year term as deputy president of Peita. It was reported that one factor worsening Fu’s hypertension was his sensitive and anxious nature. Fu acknowledged that people always called him Cannon Fu; the term “cannon,” however, did not accurately characterize his entire personality because he was in fact timid except when confronting serious difficulties. He was aware that because of his timid nature, he always worked out all the possible ramifications of situations ahead of time with the result that he ended up frightening himself, a habit he believed exacerbated his hypertension. The tremendous mental strains of 1941 worsened his malady. It was only then that he began to regard Mencian moral philosophy as useful for stress management.

It is worth noting that after the collapse of the traditional culture, many people lost their traditional sources of morality. The belief in positivism and pragmatism was not useful for solving the problem of “meaning.” Hu Shih’s advice to Fu to resort to Confucius and Mencius exemplified the problem of “meaning” that the May Fourth youths confronted.

Fu noted in his 1946 notebook that “Mencius is the patriarch of liberalism

May 17, 1942.

孟夏文：一
二月廿日長函，三月底才收到。
所需第一種，以詠靈靈公印已寄，
現已收到。此次第一種，均已寄，現已
收到。

我竟不知 老伯母去年十月去世，不
勝哀念。她老人家待我和九弟都很
好，我們都沒有能敬養她。

她老人家辛苦一輩子，對老父期望最
大，所以介公 言之更宜十分保重身體，
以慰死者。一切紛擾，都不是置
體。由以一個有用之身，可學術致學，
這是第一大事。

老父病中讀老莊，未必是對症
良藥。我恐老父還是讀山東，孟
詠 靈 靈 公，想：那“忘懷忘食，柴
忘履，不知老之將至”，“不知天，不
知人”的通達人語，近乎人情的風
采，比 那 似 道 觀 而 實 偏 激 的 莊 生

或更可以減低幾十度血壓。
這不是笑話，是我近年親身以來
的一個感想。

孔子的偉大處正在平 以 克 奇，却
又在近 情 近 理。

近來讀孟子，也覺以此公可愛。
中國兩個多世纪的士大夫風度，其中
比較積極，比較有作爲的，都是受過
孟子的好影響。

我在此 實 在 堪 羨 狀 可 與 朋 友。
“不眠履朝 伐，
其力正乾 坤。”

這兩句杜詩，暗在 自 序 着。
今之黨派，不如用我們徽州的
一句俗話奉告：
“徽州 朝 奉，
自家任 重。”
並問大 經 大 義 大 道 的 好。
這

5. A letter from Hu Shih to Fu Ssu-nien, encouraging him to read Mencius. Preserved in the Fu Ssu-nien Papers, the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei.

and idealism.”¹³⁵ The meaning of this is ambiguous, but in part it denotes Fu’s recognition of the indispensability of a moral foundation to liberalism.

The victory of the CCP brought Fu remorse because the CCP took advantage of iconoclasm to achieve its resounding victory.¹³⁶ Not only had he become hostile toward cultural iconoclasm, he was also moved by his re-discovery of the subjectivity of being human.

THE VALUE OF CHINESE TRADITION

In 1949 when Fu assigned Mencius as required reading for all first-year T’aita students, it was unusual for a staunch supporter of the New Culture movement to assign a Confucian classic to students outside the department of Chinese.¹³⁷ This requirement marked a drastic transition in Fu’s evalua-

tion of the Confucian philosophy of mind. In the IHP, studying Neo-Confucianism was not only allowed but even encouraged.¹³⁸ Fu himself was also reported to have devoted considerable time to expounding Chu Hsi's (1130–1200) philosophy.¹³⁹ In Taipei Fu even argued that the term “New Culture movement” did not make sense (*pu-t'ung*).¹⁴⁰ In fact, early in the 1943 commemoration of the May Fourth movement, he had already called for cultural accumulation (*wen-hua chi-lei*). As for student movements, Fu opposed them vehemently: “[They are] the libido of youth bursting out from the weakest parts of their minds. Student movements helped the Chinese Communists take over the country in a big way.”¹⁴¹ Fu seemed to want to extirpate the seeds he had planted in his youth.

During his later years Fu also came to recognize that objectivity, the prime ideal of his early life, is not always possible, especially in the field of social science and historical study.¹⁴² His naive optimism about the attainability of objective knowledge changed greatly. In an article written after the Mukden Incident entitled “Informal Discussion of Historical Textbooks” (“Hsien-t'an li-shih chiao-k'o-shu”), Fu abandoned his belief that the nature of historiography was the nature of natural science.¹⁴³ When Fu was at T'aita, his confidence in historical objectivity decreased further, and he held that “absolute objectivity is only an ideal.”¹⁴⁴

The ideal of combining history and philology in one institute was also abandoned. By the 1940s Fu was claiming that these two disciplines remained together only because it would be difficult to divide up the library collection.¹⁴⁵ George Bernard Shaw, whose works Fu Ssu-nien had appreciated early in his life, was denounced by Fu as nothing but a comic writer, a plagiarizer of ideas, and one who admired Mussolini and Stalin.¹⁴⁶ The critical power in Shaw's work had formerly meshed with Fu's concerns, but when those concerns shifted to anti-communism, his perceptions of Shaw also changed.

Fu was influenced by positivism in his early years and asserted that philosophy is harmful. He thanked heaven that China had not been endowed with a rich tradition of philosophical thought.¹⁴⁷ But on January 13, 1948, he noted that “to end philosophy by philosophy is like ending war by war. It will not end the war, but on the contrary breed more terrible wars.”¹⁴⁸

During the May Fourth era Fu Ssu-nien was confident that tradition could be washed away overnight. But in 1949 he rebuked the so-called New Culture movement and the May Fourth slogan of “total Westernization” as

absurd and contended that a nation's culture could not be changed unless its language was also totally changed.¹⁴⁹

The five thousand years of Chinese culture, Fu maintained, "shall never vanish. . . . There is no nation like China with an uninterrupted cultural tradition. . . . Now is the time to think of our ancestors and treasure our cultural tradition. . . . We are now becoming the agents of a non-white-race culture." "Tradition will never die. It is impossible to erase tradition," Fu concluded.¹⁵⁰

At T'aita Shen Kang-po (1896–1977) complained to Fu that "the students do not know what the Confucian Classics are."¹⁵¹ Fu also held that students with poor knowledge of "national learning" (*kuo-hsiieh*) should not go abroad for study.¹⁵² Not a single word like this had ever been uttered by him before 1949.

But Fu never became a conservative. "China's non-industrial education should be rectified," he said. "Chinese traditions which have always neglected the masses should be corrected. Rectification, however, is not to erase but to broaden."¹⁵³

Whereas most May Fourth youths became worn out (*yung-chiu-le*), observed Yin Hai-kuang, Fu did not.¹⁵⁴ Fu's appreciation of tradition should not be exaggerated. The older Fu was both scientifically minded and sympathetic with traditional values. Hegel's dialectical theory is not a far-fetched model for describing the synthesis of Fu's final development.

THE JUMP FROM YOUTH TO OLD AGE

Deep involvement in administrative matters was always detrimental to Fu's health, and during the eight years of war with Japan, his worries about the potential subjugation of his native land and about the poor environment he lived in also seriously damaged his health.¹⁵⁵ He even said that during those years he "suddenly jumped from a youth to an old man."¹⁵⁶ The old man did not live much longer. Fu dropped dead of hypertension on December 20, 1950, after being queried by Kuo Kuo-chi (1900–1970), a representative of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly nicknamed "Cannon Kuo," about the administration of T'aita. "Cannon Fu," who had gained his reputation for remonstrating against officials, died of another cannon's fire.

The speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly announced to the public that "President Fu has passed away (*ch'i-shih*)." Since *ch'i-shih* is phonetically


similar to *ch'i-ssu* (died of anger), T'aita students immediately perceived the insulting phonetic pun on Fu's death. The next morning, thousands of students stormed the assembly and shouted "Out! Out! Out with Kuo Kuo-chi!" Students began throwing rocks at the assembly, and a riot appeared imminent. Kuo fled through the back door. The students began to disband only after being persuaded that President Fu would have encouraged them to go back to their studies if he were still alive.¹⁵⁷

Approximately five thousand people attended Fu's funeral services, a number exceeded only by the funeral service for Hu Shih some dozen years later. Fu once wrote in a scroll in 1949 that he was "determined to die on this island" (see illustration 6),¹⁵⁸ and this turned out to be prophetic.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Soon after the death of Fu Ssu-nien, the National Taiwan University initiated the compilation of a five-volume set of Fu's writings, the *Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng chi* (Selected works of Fu Meng-chen, 1952). The compilers may well have been aware that they had left out many of Fu Ssu-nien's articles, for they entitled their work "selected writings" (*chi*), rather than "complete works" (*ch'üan-chi*). In 1967, the Wen-hsing Publishing Company in Taiwan published a ten-volume set of selected writings, the *Fu Ssu-nien hsüan-chi* (Selected works of Fu Ssu-nien), which added forty-three essays to the 1952 edition. In 1980, Yü Ta-ts'ai (1907–1990), Fu's wife, initiated a project to compile the complete works of Fu, the *Fu Ssu-nien ch'üan-chi* (Complete works of Fu Ssu-nien) in seven volumes, to which the compilers added nine articles that had not been incorporated in the 1967 edition. Although intended to be "complete," this work does not include ten of Fu's articles and some of his unpublished manuscripts. Readers and researchers can find all three editions of Fu Ssu-nien's writings in the Gest Library.

Besides collected or complete works, the Fu Ssu-nien Papers and the Archives of the Institute of History and Philology, both of which are stored in the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, are perhaps the most important primary sources concerning Fu Ssu-nien's life. These two archives, however, remain closed to the public. Materials that provide further information on Fu's life should also be found in the private papers of Fu's close friends, such as Chu Chia-hua and Wang Shih-chieh, both of whom served as president of Academia Sinica. However, the two



6. A calligraphy of Fu Ssu-nien written in 1948, in which he expressed his devotion to Taiwan and its people. From Chi-nien Fu ku hsiao-chang ch'ou-pei wei-yüan-hui, ed., *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu* (Taipei: Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1951).

left mainland China for Taipei when the Nationalist government was nearing defeat by the Communist forces, and were unable to bring with them all of their personal documents and records. In Wang Shih-chieh's papers, for example, I found only some insignificant letters from Fu to Wang.

Fu Ssu-nien had a wide circle of connections in the Chinese academic world. Many of his friends remained in mainland China after 1949, and their personal diaries and records would be helpful in studying Fu's life. However, since Fu Ssu-nien has long been labeled a "reactionary scholar" by the Communists, it seems unlikely that any substantial number of such private records survived the political turmoil in China. But a recent book published in China, *Fu Ssu-nien*,¹⁵⁹ does contain some new information about Fu. The publication of the personal diaries of Fu's friends, if they have been successfully preserved, should contribute to the study of Fu. However, most such diaries published in the last few years have provided only scant information on Fu, and with the exception of Hu Shih's diary, they are not worth listing here. But because Fu Ssu-nien served as the acting president of Peita and the president of T'aita, it is possible that if in the future the administrative archives of these two institutions are opened to researchers, they will shed new light on Fu's life.

NOTES

1. See Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
2. Fu Ssu-nien, *Fu Ssu-nien ch'üan-chi* (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan kung-ssu, 1980), pp. 2412, 1553; hereafter referred to as *FSNC*.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 1314.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 666-667, 6801-6810, 694-699.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 1301, 1310.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 1208.
7. John Dewey, "New Culture in China," *Asia* (1921), pp. 581-582. Quoted in Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 224.
8. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*, p. 223.
9. See Hu Shih, "Address," given at the Royal Institute of International Affairs; in *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 6.6 (1926), p. 279.
10. *Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei hsien-sheng chi-nien chi* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1984), p. 2.
11. On the tension between study and politics, see Yü Ying-shih, "Wu-ssu, i-ko wei-wan-ch'eng te wen-hua yün-tung," in *Wen-hua-p'ing-lun yü*

- Chung-kuo ch'ing-huai* (Taipei: Yün-ch'ên wen-hua shih-yeh ku-fen yu-hsien kung-ssu, 1988), pp. 65–72. Ch'ien Chi-po, a traditional scholar, even started to study Chinese traditional military strategy. See Wu Chung-kuang, “Wu shih Ch'ien Chi-po hsien-sheng chuan-lüeh,” in *Chung-kuo wen-hua* 4 (1991), pp. 190–198.
12. Li Chi, “Anyang tsui-chin fa-chüeh pao-kao chi liu-tz'u kung-tso chih tsung-ku-chi,” *Li Chi k'ao-ku hsüeh lun-wen chi* (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1977), p. 139.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
 14. Yang Hsiang-k'uei, “Tao-nien Yin Ta t'ung-chih,” *Li-shih yen-chiu*, no. 5 (1983), pp. 73–77. Yin later became an early leader of the Cultural Revolution.
 15. Fu Ssu-nien Papers, III-693, a letter from Kuo Pao-chün to Fu. The papers are stored in the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, and are hereafter referred to as *FP*.
 16. *Ibid.*, I-57.
 17. A group of IHP members even planned to join guerrilla bands. But there were also other responses to the national crisis. For example, Li Fang-kuei, a distinguished fellow of the IHP, stated in a letter that “our country is about to be conquered; we should quickly do our research with all our energy.” See *FP*, I-1656, a letter from Fu to Hu Shih.
 18. Fu Le-ch'eng, “Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u,” in *FSNC*, pp. 2647–2648.
 19. Teng Kuang-ming, “Hui-i wo te lao-shih Fu Ssu-nien hsien-sheng,” in *Fu Ssu-nien*, ed. Liao-ch'eng shih-fan hsüeh-yüan li-shih-hsi et al. (Tsinan: Shantung Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1991; hereafter referred to as *FSN*), p. 5.
 20. See Su T'ung-ping, “Shih-yü-so fa-chan-shih,” pp. 355–379, 406–423.
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 434.
 23. *FP*, I-1130, a letter from Yang Cheng-sheng to Fu.
 24. One well-known such obstruction was his opposition to K'ung Keng's motion that traditional Chinese medicine should be esteemed. K'ung was infuriated by Fu's opposition and berated him with filthy language. The incident almost ended in fisticuffs. See Fu Le-ch'eng, “Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u,” *FSNC*, p. 2652.
 25. The manuscripts of the two letters are in *FP*, I-45, I-48. These two letters, both written in 1944, were sent by Fu to Hu Shih and are printed in *Hu Shih lai-wang shu-hsin hsüan*, ed. Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsüeh-yüan chung-hua min-kuo shih yen-chiu-shih (Hong Kong: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 604–612.
 26. Other letters concerning this episode are in *FP*, I-92, IV-219 (two letters from Wang Shih-chieh to Fu), and IV-169 (one letter from Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei to Fu).
 27. Feng Yu-lan, “San-sung-t'ang tzu-hsü,” in his *San-sung-t'ang ch'üan-chi* (Chengchow: Honan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 102–103.
 28. It is worth noting that Ma Yin-ch'u,

- the first to spell out his disappointment with Kung, was later arrested. See Yeh Yüan-lung, "Ch'ung-ta hsiao-chang Yeh Yüan-lung ch'ing-li Ma Yin-ch'u shih-chien," in *Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh*, no. 3 (1992), pp. 67-70.
29. See *FP*, I-48, a letter from Fu to Chiang Kai-shek.
 30. Several leaves of the account book which showed Lü Hsien's corruption were kept in *FP*, no serial number.
 31. Ma Liang-k'uan, "Ch'ing k'an t'i-t'ou-che jen i t'i ch'i t'ou," in *FSN*, pp. 164-165.
 32. *FP*, I-1665. Hu Shih also noted this event in his diary. See *Hu Shih te jih-chi* (Taipei: Yüan-liu ch'u-pan-she, 1990), 18 vols., November 26, 1939, n.p.
 33. See Fu Le-ch'eng, "Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u," in *FSNC*, p. 2653.
 34. *FP*, I-688, a letter from Cheng Lieh to Fu.
 35. For example, *ibid.*, I-628, a letter from the employees of the Bureau of the National Treasury; *ibid.*, I-617, a letter from someone with the anonymous name Wang Yin-ming; *ibid.*, I-616, a letter from another anonymous person; *ibid.*, I-614, a letter from one who called himself Jung Fang; *ibid.*, I-626, a letter from Chu Chih-ch'in.
 36. In a letter to his wife, Yü Ta-ts'ai, Fu said that when he later met with Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang expressed his agreement with what Fu had done. *Ibid.*, I-1298.
 37. *Ibid.* The heroic action was applauded by many. For example, a letter from Wu Ming-ta praised Fu: "You speak for the 450 million people." *Ibid.*, I-387. A letter from someone who called himself Ming Hsin compared Fu with Hai Jui, a famous remonstrator of the Ming dynasty. See *ibid.*, I-723.
 38. For a short sketch of this conference, see Kuo T'ing-i, *Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-kang* (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 720-726. See also Yü Chan-pang, "Mao chu-hsi tsai Ch'ung-ch'ing t'an-p'an ch'i-chien," in *Ch'ung-ch'ing wen-shih tzu-liao* 24 (1985), pp. 152-174. Before the visit, on June 27, 1945, Fu Ssu-nien along with six other political leaders urged Hurley, then American ambassador to China, to assist China in unifying the country. See "The ambassador in China [Hurley] to the Secretary of State: June 28, 1945," in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), vol. 7, pp. 424-425. It is reported by Hurley that after Fu's visit to Yen-an, Fu informed the American personnel that the situation was "hopeful," but that "he was neither pessimistic nor optimistic." See "The ambassador in China [Hurley] to the Secretary of State: July 7, 1945," in *ibid.*, pp. 428-429.
 39. Fu kept some rather fragmentary documentation of this visit. See *FP*, I-156, I-158, I-164, I-165, I-175, I-627, I-633, IV-379. For a description of the trip, see Huang Yen-p'ei,

- “Yenan kuei-lai,” in *Kuo-min-ts’an-cheng-hui tzu-liao* (Chengtu: Szechwan jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1984), pp. 463–506. Other documents concerning this visit are in *ibid.*, pp. 451–462.
40. *FP*, I-38. This poem, together with a short letter, was written on July 5, 1945.
41. In “Tiu-tiao huan-hsiang, chun-peitou-cheng,” Mao announced that Fu, among others, was a war criminal. See *Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi*, ed. Chung-kung chung-yang Mao Tse-tung hsüan-chi ch’u-pan wei-yüan-hui (Peking: Jen-min ch’u-pan-she, 1967), vol. 4, p. 1374.
42. See Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*, p. 233.
43. *FP*, I-708, a set of lecture notes entitled “Chung-kuo chin san-pai-nien lai tui wai-lai wen-hua chih fan-ying.”
44. *Ibid.*, I-701.
45. Fu only finished two chapters of this book, which contained about twenty thousand words. He was drafting the book during the darkest days of the Sino-Japanese War.
46. *FP*, I-433.
47. *Ibid.*, III-917. T’ang Yung-t’ung’s letter to Fu.
48. *FSNC*, pp. 1829–1830.
49. *FP*, I-701. See also several pages of the draft of this project, *ibid.*, II-949.
50. *Ibid.*, I-701, II-949.
51. *Ibid.*, I-701.
52. *FSNC*, pp. 2451–2452, a letter from Fu to Ku Chieh-kang. The original manuscript of this letter is in *FP*, II-143. *FSNC*, pp. 2449–2450, a letter from Fu to Chu Chia-hua and Hang Li-wu. The original manuscript of this letter is in *FP*, III-1197.
53. Concurrently, Hsiung Shih-li was undertaking a project to prove that the Han Chinese and the Uighurs were originally the same ethnic group. See his *Hsüan-p’u lun-hsüeh-chi* (Peking: San-lien shu-tien, 1990), p. 39.
54. *FP*, II-147.
55. A letter from T’ao Hsi-sheng to Hu Shih and Hu Shih’s reply were kept in Hu’s diary. See *Hu Shih te jih-chi*, August 12, 1935, n.p.
56. After being dismissed from his ambassadorship, Hu Shih became angry at top government officials. He therefore refused to take up the position of president of the Academia Sinica and remained in the United States. See Keng Yün-chih, *Hu Shih nien-p’u* (Hong Kong: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1986), pp. 181–184.
57. See Feng Yu-lan, “San-sung-t’ang tzu-hsü,” pp. 102–107.
58. Hsü Fu-kuan, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang-shih lun-chi* (Taichung: Chung-yang shu-chü, 1968), pp. 230–231, 247–249.
59. On the event and its causes and casualties, see Hsiao Ch’ao-jan, ed., *Pei-ching-ta-hsüeh hsiao-shih* (Shanghai: Shanghai chiao-yü ch’u-pan-she, 1981), pp. 364–378.
60. A letter from Chiang Kai-shek to Fu and the manuscript of Fu’s reply, *FP*, no serial number. Chiang’s letter was written on December 7, 1945.
61. *Ibid.*, I-1297, a letter from Fu to his wife.
62. Feng’s words were quoted by Fu. See *FSNC*, p. 2061. See also Feng’s

- “San-sung-t’ang tzu-hsü,” p. 328.
63. See Ching Yüan, “Wei kuan yü Fu Ssu-nien pu-i,” *Wen-hui-pao*, November 10, 1946.
64. *FP*, I-1332. A confidential letter from Fu to Chu Chia-hua expressed this suspicion. On the direction from the CCP in this event, see Hsiao Ch’ao-jan, ed., *Pei-ching-ta-hsüeh hsiao-shih*, pp. 373, 376.
65. Ma Liang-k’uan, “Ch’ing k’an t’i-t’ou-che jen i t’i ch’i t’ou,” p. 172.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 175–176. Fu’s anger toward Li Tsung-huang and Ch’iu Ch’ing-ch’üan was also expressed in two confidential letters to Chu Chia-hua. See *FP*, I-1326, I-1329. In *ibid.*, I-1326, Fu contended that the Garrison Commander Kuan Lin-cheng, Ch’iu Ching-ch’üan’s superior, was innocent.
69. *FP*, V-8, a notebook of 1945.
70. Ch’ien Li-ch’ün, *Chou Tso-jen chuan* (Taipei: Yeh-ch’iang ch’u-pan-she, 1991), pp. 210–211.
71. Fu Le-ch’eng, “Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng te min-tsu ssu-hsiang,” in *Shih-tai te chui-i lun-wen-chi* (Taipei: Shih-pao ch’u-pan kung-ssu, 1984), p. 158.
72. *FSNC*, p. 2056.
73. Wang Yün, “Fu Ssu-nien yü Pei-ching-ta-hsüeh,” in *FSN*, p. 99.
74. For example, there is a letter from Nieh Yün-t’ai, an industrialist, to Fu reporting that his relative Ch’ü Hsüan-ying, a famous historian who had served in the Chinese puppet government, was hiding in Nieh’s home. See *FP*, III-1123. Later Fu managed to get a copy of the record of Ch’ü’s service under Japanese control. See *ibid.*, I-1265. Fu kept in his papers a draft of a written appeal to sue Pao Chien-ch’ing. See *ibid.*, IV-525.
75. Su T’ung-ping, “Shih-yü-so fa-chan-shih,” chap. 8, pp. 1–24.
76. *Ibid.*
77. This included thirteen issues of the *Bulletin*, thirteen monographs, four phonetic investigation reports, and two archaeological reports. See *ibid.*, pp. 39–46.
78. See, for example, Ch’en Po-ta, *Chung-kuo Ssu-ta-chia-tsu* (Hong Kong: Ch’ang-chiang ch’u-pan-she, 1949); K’ang Chung-p’ing, “Lun Chung-kuo kuan-liao tzu-pen chui-i,” *Ch’ün-chung* 38 (1948), pp. 14–16; 39 (1948), pp. 14–15; and T. V. Soong hao-men tzu-pen nei-mu (Hong Kong: Ching-chi tzu-liao-she, 1968).
79. Hsü Fu-kuan, “Shih shei chi-k’uei le Chung-kuo she-hui fan-kung te li-liang,” in *Hsüeh-shu yü cheng-chih chih-chien* (Taichung: Chung-yang shu-chü, 1963), vol. 2, pp. 1–14. This is the most widely read criticism of T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung in Taiwan.
80. The tension between Soong and Chiang was widely discussed. See, for example, Parks M. Coble, *The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927–1937* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 109–115.
81. *FSNC*, pp. 1848–1855. See Ch’eng Ai-chün et al., “Tao-Sung-yün-tung

- te chu-chiang," in *FSN*, pp. 188-189.
82. The precise numbers are impossible to ascertain. Here I adopt the numbers people tended to believe at the time. See *Chung-yang jih-pao* (Nanking), July 1, 1947.
83. The two other articles are "Sung Tzu-wen ti shih-pai," *Shih-chi p'ing-lun* 1.8 (1947), n.p., and "Lun hao-men tzu-pen chih pi-hsü ch'an-ch'u," *Kuan-ch'a* 2.1 (1947), pp. 6-9. I have been unable to find a copy of the issue of the journal in which the first article appears in the United States, and I have therefore used Fu Ssu-nien's own facsimile copy. However, the page numbers were not shown. See *FP*, IV-472.
84. This headline led the *Shih-chieh jih-pao*, February 15, 1947. See also *Hu Shih te jih-chi*, February 15, 1947, n.p.
85. See *Hu Shih te jih-chi*, February 17, 1947, n.p.
86. Cf. Ch'eng Ai-chün, "Tao-Sung yün-tung te chu-chiang," in *FSN*, p. 192.
87. This is an observation made by a high official, Ch'eng Ch'ang-p'o. See Ch'eng's "Tsai chi Fu Meng-chen," in *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, ed. Chi-nien Fu ku hisao-chang ch'ou-pei wei-yüan-hui (Taipei: Kuo-li T'ai-wan ta-hsüeh, 1951), p. 50.
88. See *FP*, I-457, I-461, I-464.
89. *Ibid.*, I-1669, a letter from Hu Shih to Fu. In this letter Hu Shih severely criticized T. V. Soong.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Fu was well aware that T. V. Soong played the crucial role in Hu Shih's dismissal from his ambassadorship. Fu was also well aware that Soong, then in the United States, was the real ambassador and that Hu Shih was overwhelmed by him. For example, a letter from Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, then Hu Shih's assistant, to Fu complained that Hu received no direct information from the central government. See *FP*, IV-63. In his diary, Hu Shih complained repeatedly that T. V. Soong poached on his territory and humiliated him. See *Hu Shih te jih-chi*, February 11, 1942, and May 19, 1942, n.p.
92. See *Hu Shih te jih-chi*, November 5, 1945.
93. For the struggle between Soong and Chu, see Fu's letter to his wife, *FP*, I-1300.
94. It is worth noting that Fu used the term "pure stream" in a manner quite different from the traditional one. To him, being a member of the pure stream did not mean retreating from political life, but rather siding with the righteous in politics. He also realized that to be a member of the pure stream without becoming a martyr required a powerful patron. A personal favorite of Chiang Kai-shek's, Fu was skilled at praising and criticizing Chiang simultaneously.
95. In a letter to Hu Shih, 1942. *FP*, I-1676.
96. Hu Shih to Fu Ssu-nien, *ibid.*, I-1668. Cf. *ibid.*, II-89, a letter from Wang Shih-chieh to Fu Ssu-nien and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng.
97. When Hu Shih wavered a bit at the time Chiang Kai-shek hoped to ap-

- point him *kuo-fu wei-yüan*, Fu's outspoken opposition caused some tension in their long-time friendship. But they did not consider Peita an organ of the government, partly because it was in the North and almost beyond the reach of the KMT. See *FP*, I-1681, letter from Hu to Fu.
98. In a letter to his wife, Fu explained why he firmly rejected this appointment: "Only when I can have a great contribution to make shall I take up any position. But it seems difficult to do anything now. . . . Working with those nasty officials is not what I am willing to do." *Ibid.*, I-1302.
 99. The surgery he expected to receive is described in a clipping entitled "Medical Forum" which was kept by Fu. See *FP*, I-351.
 100. *Ibid.*, I-1682.
 101. *Ibid.*, I-352, a newspaper clipping collected by Fu Ssu-nien. According to American Ambassador Leighton Stuart's observation, legislators opposed the KMT domination of the Legislative Yüan. They therefore aimed at defeating another candidate for the vice presidency, Ch'en Li-fu, leader of the most powerful clique of the KMT. However, "Ch'en was elected on the first ballot by 343 votes to 236 for non-party candidate Fu Ssu-nien. Fu's authorship of articles offensive to Mongols reported an important factor in his defeat, causing border people to vote solidly against him." See "The ambassador in China [Stuart] to the Secretary of State, May 18, 1948," United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), vol. 7, pp. 239-240.
 102. *FP*, I-988, a summary of medical record signed by Wang Hengwen. However, Fu was advised not to take any administrative job.
 103. His only brother, Fu Meng-po, wrote Fu and advised him not to return to China. *Ibid.*, IV-234.
 104. Yü Ta-ts'ai, "I Meng-chen," *FSNC*, p. 2583.
 105. Fu Le-ch'eng, *Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u*, in *ibid.*, p. 2667.
 106. This poem is one of T'ao Yüan-ming's "Imitations" ("Ni-ku"). The English translation is from James Hightower, *The Poetry of T'ao Ch'ien* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), p. 184.
 107. Hu Sung-p'ing, *Hu Shih nien-p'u ch'ang-pien ch'u-kao* (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1984), vol. 6, pp. 2065-2066. About this time, Hu Shih admitted to the U.S. ambassador in China and former president of Yenching University, Leighton Stuart, that he had been negligent in combatting communism and had overindulged in research.
 108. Fu's disappointment was apparent in an article complaining that the works of leftist scholars intentionally appealed to common people and thus reached an unusually wide audience outside academia, whereas more objective academic works had no wide audience. See *FSNC*, p. 2089.
 109. *Ibid.*, p. 2016.
 110. *Ibid.*, p. 2072.

111. Ma Liang-k'uan, "P'ang-huang p'ai-huai nien ku-t'u," in *FSN*, p. 197.
112. Li Ch'üan, "Fu-hai shuo san-ch'ien ti-tzu," in *ibid.*, p. 206. After Fu's death, commemorative articles multiplied. See *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, pp. 81-97. During my undergraduate years at T'aita in the late 1970s, Fu remained a symbol of the university in the minds of most students and was the most memorable figure in the university's history.
113. During abnormal times only those with powerful personalities could be heroic without risking their own lives. Fu happened to have a heroic personality, a democratic attitude, and personal relationships that enabled him to curb political terror at T'aita, and he acquired a good reputation for this. As for protecting students, see, for example, *FP*, IV-264, a letter from a secret agent, Chao Kung-hsia, refusing Fu's request to release a T'aita student. See *FSNC*, pp. 2072, 2159. He was repeatedly denounced by KMT party members for "not being anti-Communist" and for housing "Communist" professors. See *ibid.*, pp. 2162-2163.
114. On sending Communist students back to the mainland, see Wang Shih-chieh's speech in a conference for the special commemorative issue of *Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh* in honor of Fu, 28.1 (1976), p. 13.
115. Fu's criticisms of the educational system introduced by the alumni of Columbia University's Teachers College were frequent. See, for example, *FSNC*, p. 2004.
116. See Li Ch'üan, "Fu-hai shuo san-ch'ien ti-tzu," p. 206.
117. *FSNC*, pp. 1720, 2493-2494, 1579, 1655, 1572-1575.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 1562.
119. *Ibid.*, pp. 1940-1953.
120. Chang Chung-tung, "Hu Shih yü Yin Hai-kuang," in *Kuo-li Tai-wan-ta-hsüeh wen shih che hsüeh-pao* 37 (1989), pp. 130-138.
121. *FSNC*, p. 1970.
122. Typical of these crackdowns was the suppression of Lei Chen and the journal *Tzu-yu Chung-kuo*.
123. *FP*, III-195. Fu to Chao Yüan-jen, ca. 1948.
124. *Ibid.*, III-196.
125. *Ibid.*
126. "Mentalistic" was Fu's own term.
127. *FSNC*, p. 2290.
128. Ho Ting-sheng, "Sun-shih tai ta le," in *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, p. 76.
129. Hsü Fu-kuan, *Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang-shih lun-chi*, p. 232.
130. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Tai Tung-yüan* (Taipei: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1970), p. 12. There is controversy concerning what the term "moral philosophy" refers to here.
131. Fu Le-ch'eng, "Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u," in *FSNC*, p. 2644.
132. *FP*, III-195. Fu to Chao Yüan-jen.
133. Hu Shih to Fu Ssu-nien, *FP*, I-1649.
134. *Ibid.*, III-195.
135. *Ibid.*, V-82.
136. He also hated the ccp's desire to transform people into machines. *FSNC*, p. 2118.
137. See Fu Le-ch'eng, "Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng nien-p'u," in *ibid.*, pp. 2643-2644. Hsü Fu-kuan noticed

- that Fu himself was undergoing immense change in 1947 and 1948, and he lamented that Fu did not get enough time to appreciate fully Chinese traditional moral value.
138. This according to an interview with Huang Chang-chien, a senior member of the IHP, November 20, 1990.
139. Lao Kan, "Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng yü chin erh-shih-nien lai Chung-kuo li-shih hsüeh te fa-chan," in *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, p. 71.
140. *FSNC*, p. 2003.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 2006.
142. Hsü Kuan-san, *Hsin-shih-hsüeh chiu-shih nien* (Hong Kong: Chung-wen ta-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1986), vol. 1, p. 218.
143. *FSNC*, p. 1359.
144. *Ibid.*, pp. 1410–1413.
145. *FP*, IV-69, a letter from Fu to T'ao Meng-ho.
146. See Li Shih-hsüeh, "Hsiao-po-na tien ch'i Chung-kuo wen-t'an chan-huo," *Tang-tai* 37 (1989), pp. 36–55. Li Han-t'ing, "Tsai tung-hsi-fang te chia-feng chung ssu-k'ao — Fu Ssu-nien hsi-hsüeh-wei-yung te Wu-ssu wen-hsüeh kuan," *Tang-tai* 25 (1988), pp. 114–129.
147. *FSNC*, pp. 1250–1257.
148. *FP*, I-1682.
149. *FSNC*, pp. 2003, 2121.
150. *Ibid.*, pp. 2226, 2121. This idea appeared repeatedly. See *ibid.*, pp. 2122, 2223, 2225.
151. *FP*, IV-274, a letter from Shen Kang-po to Fu Ssu-nien.
152. This is according to my interview with Professor Kao Yu-kung of Princeton University, who was a student at T'aita when Fu was its president.
153. *FSNC*, pp. 2124–2125.
154. Hai Kuang (Yin Hai-kuang), "Wo-i Meng-chen hsien-sheng," *Tzu-yu Chung-kuo* 4.2 (1951), p. 35.
155. Fu to Hu Shih, *FP*, I-1676.
156. Fu Le-ch'eng, "Hsien-po Meng-chen hsien-sheng te jih-ch'ang sheng-huo," in *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, p. 13.
157. *Hsin-sheng-pao*, December 22, 1950.
158. *Fu ku hsiao-chang ai-wan-lu*, illustration, n.p.
159. See note 19 above.

GLOSSARY

Anyang 安陽

Chang Yen-ch'ing 張燕卿

Changsha 長沙

Ch'en Pu-lei 陳布雷

Ch'en Sheng 陳勝

Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀

Cheng-chih-hsieh-shang-hui-i

政治協商會議

Cheng Lieh 鄭烈

"Che-yang ti Sung Tzu-wen fei tso-k'ai

pu-k'o" 這樣的宋子文非走開不可

chi 集

- chia hsüeh-shu chih-ming 假學術之名
 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石
 Chiang T'ing-fu 蔣廷黻
 Ch'ien Mu 錢穆
 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng 錢端升
 Ch'ing 清
 Ch'inghua 清華
 ch'ing-liu 清流
 ch'i-shih 棄世
 ch'i-ssu 氣死
 Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'üan 邱清泉
 Chou Tso-jen 周作人
 Chow Tse-tsung 周策縱
 Chu Chia-hua 朱家驊
 Chu Hsi 朱熹
 Ch'üan-chi 全集
 Chuang-tzu 莊子
 chuang-yüan 狀元
 Chungking 重慶
 "Chung-kuo min-tsu ko-ming shih-kaio"
 中國民族革命史稿
 Chung-shan (university) 中山大學
 Chung-yang jih-pao 中央日報
 Fei Hsiao-t'ung 費孝通
 Fu I-chien 傅以漸
 Fu Meng-chen hsien-sheng chi
 傅孟真先生集
 Fu Ssu-nien 傅斯年
 Fu Ssu-nien ch'üan-chi 傅斯年全集
 Fu Ssu-nien hsiüan-chi 傅斯年選集
 Fu Ta-p'ao 傅大砲
 Han 漢
 Ho Ting-sheng 何定生
 Hsiang Yü 項羽
 Hsieh Kuo-chen 謝國楨
 "Hsien-t'an li-shih chiao-k'o-shu"
 閒談歷史教科書
 Hsi-nan lien-ta 西南聯大
 Hsi-nan min-tsu hsüeh-hui
 西南民族學會
 Hsin-min 新民
 Hsü Fu-kuan 徐復觀
 Hsü-chou 徐州
 Hsüeh-heng 學衡
 hsüeh-shu k'an-wu 學術刊物
 Hsün-tzu 荀子
 Hu 胡
 Hu Shih 胡適
 Huang K'an 黃侃
 Huang Yen-p'ei 黃炎培
 "Huang-huo" 黃禍
 i 義
 i-yüan 議員
 jen 仁
 Jung Keng 容庚
 Kiangsu 江蘇
 Ku Chieh-kang (Ku Ch'eng-wu)
 顧頡剛 (顧誠吾)
 kuan-hsi 關係
 K'ung Hsiang-hsi (H. H. Kung) 孔祥熙
 Kunming 昆明
 Kuo Kuo-chi 郭國基
 Kuo Pao-chün 郭寶鈞
 kuo-chiu 國舅
 Kuo-fang ts'an-i hui 國防參議會
 kuo-fu wei-yüan 國府委員
 kuo-hsüeh 國學
 Kuo-min ta-hui 國民大會

- kuo-nan 國難
 Kwangsi 廣西
 Kwangtung 廣東
 Lao-tzu 老子
 Lei Chen 雷震
 Li Chi 李濟
 Li Ta-chao 李大釗
 Li Tsung-huang 李宗黃
 Liao-ch'eng 聊城
 Li-chuang 李莊
 Liu Pang 劉邦
 Liu Shih-p'ei 劉師培
 Liu Yao (Yin Ta) 劉曜
 Lo Chia-lun 羅家倫
 Lü Hsien 呂咸
 mai-pan 買辦
 Manchukuo 滿州國
 Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
 Mei I-ch'i 梅貽琦
 Meng-chen 孟眞
 Ming 明
 Nan-hsi 南溪
 Nan-k'ai 南開
 Nanking 南京
 Pan-chia-hsien-sheng 搬家先生
 Pao Chien-ch'ing 鮑鑑清
 Peita 北大
 pu-t'ung 不通
 Shantung 山東
 Shen Kang-po 沈剛伯
 sheng-chan 聖戰
 Shui-hu chuan 水滸傳
 Sung Chiang 宋江
 Sung Tzu-wen (T. V. Soong) 宋子文
 Ta Thai chu-i 大倭主義
 Tai Chen 戴震
 T'aita 台大
 T'ang Yung-t'ung 湯用彤
 T'ao Hsi-sheng 陶希聖
 T'ao Yüan-ming 陶淵明
 Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei 蔡元培
 Tuan Hsi-p'eng 段錫朋
 Wang Cheng-t'ing 王正廷
 Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛
 Wang Shih-chieh 王世杰
 Weng Wen-hao 翁文灝
 Wen-hsing 文星
 wen-hua chi-lei 文化積累
 Wen-hui pao 文匯報
 Wu Ching-ch'ao 吳景超
 Wu Kuang 吳廣
 wu-liao hsüeh-che 無聊學者
 Yen-an 延安
 Yin Hai-kuang 殷海光
 Yin Ta (Liu Yao) 尹達
 Yü P'ing-po 俞平伯
 Yü Ta-ts'ai 俞大綵
 yüan 圓
 yung-chiu-le 用舊了
 Yunnan 雲南