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To Bury the Unhappy Past

The Problem of Textbook Revision in Japan

Y U E - H I M T A M

Few would doubt the importance of textbooks in reflecting the change of values in Japan. Marius B. Jansen, for example, in 1957, witnessed a “striking contrast” between postwar textbooks and those used before the surrender of 1945.¹ Today one may wonder, however, to what extent Japanese history textbooks are still showing such a contrast, particularly when it comes to the treatment of war. More and more Japanese textbooks seem to be increasingly eager to reconstruct Japanese history, trying to bury Japan’s unhappy past. The case of Japanese history textbooks, examined in this paper, may add to Marc Ferro’s amazing findings in his worldwide survey of the “use and abuse of history,” and may also throw some light on the important question he has raised: “And then, tomorrow, which nation, which human group will still be able to control its own history?”²

During the Allied occupation (1945–1952) all Japanese textbooks were directed to purge all references to militarism and ultranationalism, which had been the politically correct stances that had characterized wartime and prewar textbooks. Indeed, many people admitted Japan’s

responsibility for the Pacific War without reservation. The Ministry of Education in its "Guide to the New Education," issued in 1946, expressed guilt-ridden sentiments: "From the Manchurian Incident [1931] on, Japan followed an undemocratic political and economic course at home and acted contrary to international legal and moral tenets abroad. . . . These policies were a cause of the Pacific War. We must never repeat those mistakes."³ The first postwar state textbook on Japanese history, *Kuni no ayumi* (Our nation's path, certified and published in 1946), was unequivocally pacifist: "The Japanese people suffered terribly from the long war. Military leaders suppressed the people, launched a stupid war, and caused this disaster."⁴ Textbooks for other subjects such as civics and modern society also adopted the same attitude. In a 1949 reading published by the Ministry of Education, *Minshushugi* (Democracy), we find the following accusation: "Japan and Germany must accept the greatest responsibility for World War II, which caused vast suffering, distress, and dislocation to the world. . . . [The military] propelled Japan into the fateful cataclysm of the Pacific War."⁵

The new emphasis on anticommunism in U.S. foreign policy, which started in late 1947, and the return of sovereignty to Japan in 1952 saw early attempts to revise the guilt-ridden views of the Pacific War and to reverse the democratic educational reforms.⁶ As early as February 1953, only one year after independence, the minister of education, Okano Seigo, created a public sensation with his controversial statement: "I do not wish to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of the Greater East Asian War, but the fact that Japan took on so many opponents and fought them for four years . . . proves our superiority."⁷ As a textbook writer observed, "the Ministry of Education did a volte-face on the official interpretation of the war."⁸ Many textbooks began to shift responsibility for the war away from Japan, blaming instead China, the United States, England, and other countries for the tragedy. Some even supported the so-called Affirmative View of the Greater East Asian War (*Dai Tōa Sensō kōtei ron*) advocated by the nationalistic revisionists in the 1960s, which sought to reinterpret the war as a positive action to resist Western imperialism led by Japan in the interests of all Asians.⁹

The revision of textbooks in Japan has been directed from above,

stemming from the long-term objective of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to boost patriotic education and nationalism. In February 1955 “nationalization of textbooks,” a euphemism for “tightening control of textbooks,” was in the platform of the Japanese Democratic Party (the predecessor of the LDP). Following its victory in 1956, the LDP started a campaign to correct the bias and indoctrination in the textbooks written by leftist authors for all subjects, including even basic Japanese language instruction in elementary and high schools. The LDP leaders openly accused textbook writers of being Marxist, antigovernment, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic.¹⁰

In spite of its desire for immediate revision of the textbooks, for the first two decades or so after independence, the LDP could only exert moderate and gradual pressure on the Ministry of Education, which was responsible for textbook screening and certification. The opposition parties were equally firmly against such revision. Many mass rallies were organized by the militant Japan Teachers' Union (Nikkyōso) and other groups to protest the tightening of control on textbooks. Textbook writers also rebuked the government as reactionary and undemocratic, and criticized the screening system as unconstitutional.¹¹ Professor Ienaga Saburō, a renowned Japanese historian whose popular Japanese history textbook was rejected by the Ministry of Education in 1963, sued the government on grounds of censorship three times, starting in 1965. The first lawsuit was in the courts for fifteen years, the second for over twenty-five; the supreme court has yet to deliver its judgment on the third.¹² The legal battles have contributed substantially to the division in Japanese views on history education.

Beginning in 1980, when the LDP won a landslide victory in the election for both houses of the Diet, the LDP vigorously launched a new campaign to revise the textbooks. This campaign generated protest not only at home, but abroad. Elsewhere I have examined the blazing diplomatic dispute that flared in the summer months of 1982 in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries over the presentation in Japanese history textbooks of events prior to and during the Second World War.¹³ As evidenced by an official statement issued by the then secretary general of the cabinet, Miyazawa Kiichi, the Japanese government for the first

time was forced to commit itself to making the necessary corrections in textbooks for the sake of friendship with its neighbors.¹⁴ However, the Japanese government's commitment in 1982 failed to check the revisionist tendency in textbook writing. Another furor of protests exploded in the summer of 1986 when the Education Ministry approved a new textbook for Japanese history, which, as shown in a later section of this paper, was antidemocratic and ultranationalistic, and full of denials of Japanese war crimes. Not only were there protests in Japan, but China and South Korea led other Asian countries in lodging diplomatic complaints, warning that bilateral relations could be damaged unless the Japanese government rescinded its approval of this new textbook. The prime minister, Nakasone Yasuhiro, is reported to have been personally involved in the approval. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to the help of the Ministry of Education in coping with the problems caused by the new textbook. Kaifu Toshiki, prime minister from 1989 until November 1991, who approved the controversial textbook in his capacity as education minister, resigned early enough in July 1986 to avoid getting into deeper trouble. His successor, however, was fired when he tried to defend the textbook's treatment of the "Greater East Asian War."¹⁵ Indeed, few issues would have placed the Japanese leadership in such a rare display of public agonizing.

In the early 1980s a few American scholars rightly spoke out about the problematic treatment of the Pacific War and Japan's relations with the United States in Japanese textbooks. A research project jointly sponsored by respectable Japanese and American institutions reported in 1981 that although the American reviewers of Japanese textbooks gave high marks to the general performance of the Japanese textbook writers, they could also readily identify "problematic areas" in the subjects under review, including history (Japanese and world), geography, civics, Japanese politics, and economics for junior and senior high school students.¹⁶ The problematic treatment of Pearl Harbor and other events in Japanese-U.S. relations in the twentieth century was found to be most disturbing.¹⁷

The reviewers mentioned above were primarily "concerned with improvements in the quality of the textbooks of both nations,"¹⁸ and their discussion of the Pacific War was necessarily sketchy. Few concrete

examples or analyses were given to illustrate the reviewers' points regarding the Pacific War and American-Japanese relations. Moreover, the reviewers focused on the textbooks published in 1978 and 1979 only.¹⁹ As textbooks in Japan are required to go through the certification process every three to four years, changes and revisions are bound to be made. To understand fully how the Pacific War is treated in Japanese textbooks, therefore, one has to review the textbooks published over a longer period.

Before examining the treatment of the Pacific War in Japanese textbooks, it is necessary to explain the name of the war. As most Japanese textbook writers see it, the Pacific War (*Taiheiyō Sensō*) did not start with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. It started with the Japanese involvement in the Manchurian Incident in 1931, making the conflict in China the first stage of the war and Pearl Harbor the beginning of the final stage. Viewed in such a light, the Pacific War lasted for fifteen years, from 1931 to 1945, and as such, it is sometimes referred to as the "Fifteen Year War" or World War II. Ienaga Saburō explains: "The term 'Pacific War' covers the period from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to the unconditional surrender in 1945 and encompasses the whole series of Japan's military clashes with other countries. . . . These events are inseparable, full parts of the same war."²⁰ Most Japanese textbooks mark the beginning of the Pacific War in 1931, if not earlier.

The *Chūkyō* series of *Chūkyō Shuppan: Chūgakusei no shakai-ka* (Social science for high school students, published by the *Chūkyō Shuppan Company*) is used here for analysis of the treatment of the Pacific War for three reasons.²¹ First, the series remained the most popular among the textbooks for Japanese history and world history from the early 1950s to the 1970s. Until 1972 the series had more than 30 percent of the market for history textbooks.²² Second, although the textbooks in this series were required to go through certification every three to four years throughout the twenty-year period, changes proved to be minimal. Toyoda Takeshi remained the senior co-author of the series, keeping the ideas and arguments consistent.²³ Third, the texts concerning the Pacific War in this series were reprinted in a source book entitled *Taiheiyō Sensō to kyōkasho* (The Pacific War and textbooks), which is convenient to use.²⁴

In the Chūkyō series the Pacific War is treated in a chapter entitled “The Pacific War and Japan” or “The Second World War and Japan.” The chapter is divided into illustrations; an introductory section of questions and answers called “What We Are Learning from This Chapter”; a box headed “Purposes of Learning,” which highlights the contents of the chapter; the text, which makes up the bulk of the chapter; and a conclusion. The text is clearly written, being straightforwardly descriptive.

The chapter starts with two pictures, one showing an air raid in Tokyo and the other the aftermath of the atomic bomb, with provocative captions to arouse the students’ interest. One caption reads:

On August 6, 1945, we Japanese opened our fearful eyes to witness what the human race had yet to experience. In the twinkling of an eye many innocent people were sent to the bottom of hell when an atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There are many stories to be told, and the mere thought of any of them makes one tremble. . . . The war ended with the atomic bombs. . . . It was a bloody war.²⁵

It is a laudable effort to arouse the interest of the schoolchildren by using pictures and other visual materials such as maps and charts. But, since there are three or four pictures of bombings in this chapter, the reader is left with the impression that Japan was more a victim of the war than any other country. The impression becomes stronger in reading the editions certified in 1954 and later years, because a chart entitled “Victims of the Atomic Bombs” was inserted to give detailed figures of casualties in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Following the sensational introductory remarks on the pictures, three major questions are posed to students under the subheading “What We Learn from This Chapter.” As for the first question — “Was the course of our country correct until the Second World War?” — the students are told that war does not occur by accident, and therefore the course of development after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 should be reexamined. There is not the slightest trace of bitterness or of ideological overtones in the introductory remarks. Instead, one may sense a touch of scholarship. But one’s feelings change when one reads the text, which emphatically tells the students about the development of capitalism amid

Westernization in Meiji times, the failure of the political parties, and the increasingly oppressive measures taken by the United States and other Western powers that infringed on Japan's course of development. As for the second question — "What did the different countries in the world want for themselves?" — the authors explain that whatever the wishes of individual countries, they will never be attained. Thus the students are encouraged to keep a watchful eye on the aggressive moves of Japan's competitors rather than on Japan's own moves. The third question — "What is the New Japan aiming at?" — is posed as the most significant question directly related to the Pacific War. The writers contend: "During the occupation by foreign military forces there were tentative answers to the big questions. But, were these answers correct? We simply cannot tell yet. Since our country has regained independence, let us have our own answers from our own minds."²⁶ Here, in the name of independent thinking, the democratic reforms during the occupation are introduced as "tentative answers" imposed by the Americans, which need to be reexamined.

It is clear from the introductory questions and remarks that the old-fashioned Confucian notion of history as the work of moral men, who are in complete control of events and in a position to right the wrong, still has a dominant hold over the authors. The moral issue, however, has disappeared amid the overtones of social Darwinism, which predominate in the books. The Pacific War was, after all, unavoided and unavoidable. Japan was certainly not the only one to be blamed. Obviously, the authors choose not to indulge in an orgy of guilt-ridden and emotional attacks on their imperial past, which was not uncommon in textbooks in the early postwar years, but to concentrate instead on the more passive and altruistic aspects of Japanese imperialism.

Following the introductory questions and remarks, the writers go on to describe changes under the following subheadings: the depression in the 1920s, political parties and their relations with the *zaibatsu* (financial cliques), the "advance to" (rather than "invasion of") Manchuria, the conflict in China and the aid from the United States and Britain, the Second World War and Japan, and finally the Pacific War and the atomic bombs.

A strong theme running through these topics is a desire to stress the disruptive effects of Western imperialism on Japan and the rest of Asia. On the question of the depression, the writers start with a statement about overproduction in the major industrialized countries following the First World War, which is cited as the major cause for the recession and economic chaos of the 1920s. The worldwide impact of the Great Depression, which started in the United States in 1929, is particularly emphasized as a major force throwing Japan into economic disaster. To salvage the situation, the Japanese government came up with well thought out policies to facilitate the "rationalization of industries and balanced budgetary planning." Nevertheless, there was no easy solution for Japan's domestic economic problems, because Japan was small and overpopulated. As a result, "our government sought to solve the domestic economic problems abroad, and naturally, the vision of the Japanese people was also extended abroad."²⁷ Here one can easily find traces of a residual anti-Western slant, which probably owes its origins to prewar propaganda.²⁸

On the Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression, three reasons are given. First, the Chinese did not cooperate with the Japanese "economic advance" (*keizai no shinshutsu*) in China, which ultimately resulted from Japan's Westernization. Second, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party used the anti-Japanese movement (*hai-Nitchi undō o riyō*) to advance its unification movement. Third, American and British aid strengthened the anti-Japanese movement in China.²⁹ The writers leave students with the impression that the Japanese "advance" in China, although "flawed," was nevertheless imposed on Japan by Western powers. The Chinese government, particularly Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party, after all, benefited politically from the Japanese "advance." Japan is thus placed in a no-fault position.

Whereas many textbooks locate the indirect causes of the Second World War in the complex economic and political situation in the post-First World War decades, there is a perceptible difference in emphasis on the American role. The Chūkyō books are inclined to see the United States as a continuing source of worldwide troubles, which became worse in the late 1920s. Japanese students are told that the 1929

New York Stock Exchange disaster led to the Great Depression world-wide. "In particular, the price of agricultural produce plunged. To prevent a further plunge, wheat fields were burned in Canada and coffee was dumped into the sea in Brazil."³⁰ The Great Depression placed many countries in a difficult position. The United States tried in vain to help solve the problems. For instance, it agreed to extend the deadline of impoverished Germany's reparations payment, and later even agreed to accept drastically reduced reparations payments from Germany. But the United States refused to make loans to the United Kingdom and other European countries, offering no practical help for economic recovery in that part of the world. "As a result, the Western countries moved to consolidate their colonies and spheres of influence to establish a 'bloc economy' against other countries, and to facilitate 'economic control' at home."³¹ The students are also informed that President Roosevelt's New Deal was successful, but that Roosevelt's power was checked by the Congress, which favored liberalism, opposing the Nazism of Germany and the fascism of Italy. Badly hit by the Great Depression, England gave up its support for free trade, instead strengthening the policy of "bloc economy" under the National Government of Ramsay MacDonald. The rise of Mussolini and Hitler was thus related to the Great Depression, which had started in the United States.³²

Naturally, the grim socioeconomic situation in Japan on the eve of the Pacific War is attributed to the discriminatory policies of the Western powers. The text reads:

*As we could not sell our products in massive quantity at home, we had to look for markets overseas, thereby engaging ourselves in commercial competition with European countries and the United States. As a last resort, we had to lower our prices, adopting the strategy of "dumping." Other countries, however, took precautions against our dumping, such as raising tariffs.*³³

Consequently, the Japanese economy was on the brink of collapse. Industries had to lay off workers. It was difficult for the unemployed to return to their native places, as the rural areas were worse hit than the cities. The unemployed flooded the cities, helping socialist ideas to

spread. But the political parties were unable to solve these problems. The writers conclude: "Taking this opportunity, the military grabbed political power."³⁴ Hence, the students are left with the impression that the United States and other Western powers were the driving force behind Japan's move to militarism.

The writers have more immediate reasons to see the United States and the United Kingdom as malevolent upholders of world order. First, these two powers unilaterally placed an embargo on gasoline and other important materials, a move that necessitated the National Mobilization Law in Japan in 1938 and forced the Japanese government to resort to war with the United States and other powers.³⁵ Another reason was that the United States was greatly irritated by the Japanese "advance" into southern Indochina in July 1941, and took steps to reduce economic relations with Japan, including unilaterally renouncing its trade treaty with Japan.³⁶ Not satisfied with acting alone, the United States moved to ally itself with Britain, China, and the Netherlands (the Dutch), forming the "ABCD Encirclement" against Japan and making diplomatic negotiation impossible. When General Tōjō Hideki was asked to organize his cabinet in 1941, it was apparent that a war with the United States and other powers was unavoidable. Having no hope for peace, Japan decided to launch the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other American, British, and Dutch territories.³⁷

On the role of the League of Nations, the Chūkyō textbooks charge that following the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 "the prestige of the League of Nations was gone," repeating critical statements in wartime textbooks that accused the league of being "unfair" to and "biased" against Japan.³⁸

Although skillful summaries of events are the strong points of the textbooks in the Chūkyō series, questions are rarely raised. On the whole the text is straightforwardly assertive, with little reflection or analysis. Here and there some loaded accusatory phrases and lines peep through. For instance, the United States is referred to as "the center of the depression of the world" (*sekai no fukeiki no shingenchi*).³⁹ The story of the Pacific War was, in a nutshell, the story of "the flames of war that originally flared within the European world which by and by engulfed

the Orient” (*Yōroppa no tenchi-ni makiokotta dōran no hi no te wa yagate Tōyō-nimo oyonda*).⁴⁰

Another disturbing factor is the reappearance of certain colorful terms and value judgments that were common in wartime textbooks. For instance, the phrase “*hachiku no shingeki*” (irresistible advance) was used to describe the “heroic strikes” of the Japanese Imperial Army in British Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the American Philippines and Aleutian Islands in textbooks published in March 1942.⁴¹ In the Chūkyō series, a similar term, “*hachiku no ikioi*” (irresistible force), was used to describe the military victories immediately following Pearl Harbor.⁴² Indeed, the phrase “irresistible force” reminds one of wartime propaganda.

It is quite extraordinary that there is no mention whatsoever of the devastating damage in China, Southeast Asia, and other places that the Japanese caused throughout this “Fifteen Year War.” There is no reference to the Rape of Nanking, germ warfare and the 731 Unit, and other war crimes in China and elsewhere in Asia. The attack on Pearl Harbor is mentioned in one short sentence without any word of casualties.⁴³

In contrast, the effect of the war on Japanese society is covered in detail. The hardships the Japanese endured in the last months of the war are described in a provocative way:

*During the winter of 1944, at last, the American air force started to bomb Japan proper. Beginning in 1945 they raided our important facilities and cities almost every day. As a result, schoolchildren had to leave their parents and be evacuated to the countryside. Students were mobilized to manufacture weapons, or to pick up guns to fight in the front. The rural areas were troubled with lack of manpower, leaving agricultural fields a wasteland.*⁴⁴

In mentioning the suffering of the children and students in such a context, and illustrating the text with provocative pictures, the writers have succeeded in suggesting that the bombing represented savage abuse, which has in turn deeply confused the students’ understanding of the war.

The atomic bombs are condemned even more sweepingly. Before

the accusation, the bomb itself is described in some detail. One description reads: "This new bomb was made of uranium, a costly product of many first-class scientists working in secrecy."⁴⁵

The political result of the bombs is clearly spelled out:

*This device was used as a strong measure to crush the fighting spirit of the Japanese armed forces. . . . The destructive power of the bomb was beyond the capacity of any language to describe, and there was nothing to counter it. As our national strength was then already exhausted, the appearance of this surprising atomic bomb made us lose our will to resist.*⁴⁶

Despite the wealth of information on the atomic bomb, the Chūkyō's account does not really answer the kind of questions the students might have. How could all this really have happened? Why did it happen? The very wealth of information seems to make it more difficult for unsophisticated students to distinguish the woods from the trees. The writers never admit any moral wrongdoing on the part of Japan throughout the Pacific War. More than once the students are told that Japan was defeated merely because of its lack of resources and advanced technology.⁴⁷

As Japan is not found guilty, the postwar reforms during the occupation are placed in a different perspective. The writers leave the impression that the reforms were imposed on Japan by the Americans, and their effect remained doubtful. The 1954 version contains the following assessment: "Following strictly the directives from the occupying forces, we endeavored to practice democracy, gradually securing peace treaties, and finally becoming an independent country again. But most of the problems remained unresolved, and many problematic questions lie ahead."⁴⁸ At the end of the chapter, the writers remind the students that ten years after the war its impact could still be felt strongly: "In fact, we are still left in a bewildering situation. We cannot say we have completely settled the aftermath of the war. We are not completely free from the fear of another war."⁴⁹

On the one hand, the achievement of the democratic reforms is disparaged; on the other, the possible uneasiness about the performance

of the Japanese during the war is peculiarly obfuscated. At the end of the lesson, the following admonition is given to the students: "There is no need to be pessimistic. Our forefathers were preoccupied with a lot of problems. They had wrestled with these problems, and occasionally they might have taken extreme measures to try to solve them. There is nothing that we cannot do. Let us reexamine these problems once more."⁵⁰ In such a way of using and abusing history, the Chūkyō series has provided an interesting case for studying biases in school textbooks.

It is important to note that the Chūkyō textbooks cited above all went through the certification process. That is to say, they all met the standard set by the Japanese government, and as I show below, reflect the view that the Japanese Ministry of Education wanted to propagate. As early as 1949, Japan started a textbook-screening system (*kentei seido*), which has remained in effect to this day. The Ministry of Education is not only responsible for issuing the "course-of-study outlines" (*gakushū shidō yōryō*) for textbooks for all subjects at all levels in primary and secondary schools, but also for implementing the textbook-screening system. Under the influence of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the Ministry of Education has worked to check the Marxist, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic tendencies in textbooks. It is possible to form the impression that the required "revisions" were imposed from above.

It is not easy to document the imposition of revisions, however, as the instructions from the textbook inspectors at the Ministry of Education are given to the writers and publishers orally in a meeting in a private room, which is sometimes referred to as "clandestine screening" (*misshitsu kentei*).⁵¹ Nevertheless, we can see the results of the imposed revisions by comparing the final version of the textbooks with the earlier versions, including originally submitted versions and conditionally approved versions, which are all required to be printed and properly bound for internal use.

In the ten textbooks for Japanese history and eleven for world history certified in 1982, I found several examples of imposed revisions concerning the Pacific War.⁵² Although some are obvious, many are highly subtle. To show the revisions I first quote the passage in question

in translation and then quote the final version, printing in bold type the disputed terms or lines in the original version and the revised terms or lines in the final version. Finally, I briefly highlight the differences between the two.

1. *To reduce the aggressive image of the Axis.*

ORIGINAL: Afterward, in November 1937, Italy also joined the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact, **forming the Axis of the so-called three have-not countries in opposition to the three have countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. This move was based on imperialism to justify aggression and recarving of the world.** (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 318)

FINAL: Afterward, in November 1937, Italy also joined the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact. **These three countries, which were referred to as "have not countries," formed the Tripartite Axis. This Axis was formed as a united front to resist the Soviet Union; its character as a means to oppose the "have" countries of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France was also being strengthened.** (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 318)

In the final version the sentence concerning imperialism and the aggressive motivation behind the forming of the Tripartite is deleted. The revision has also given the Soviet Union as the reason the Axis was formed, placing it and the Allied powers in direct opposition to Japan, and thereby making Japan's later war with the Allied powers appear more justifiable.

2. *To reduce the aggressiveness of Japanese military actions abroad.*

CASE A, ORIGINAL: In September 1940 Japan **dispatched troops** (*shuppei*) to the northern part of French Indochina. (Sanseidō's *Kōkō Sekaishi*, p. 234)

CASE A, FINAL: In September 1940 Japan **stationed troops** (*chūhei*) in the northern part of French Indochina. (Sanseidō's *Kōkō Sekaishi*, p. 234)

CASE B, ORIGINAL: This **aggression** (*shinryaku*) in Southeast Asia (Teikoku's *Shinshō Sekaishi*, p. 304)

CASE B, FINAL: This **advance** (*shinshutsu*) in Southeast Asia (Teikoku's *Shinshō Sekaishi*, p. 304)

CASE C, ORIGINAL: [Subhead] Japan's **Invasion** (*shinryaku*) of China (Tōsho's *Sekaishi*, p. 302)

CASE C, FINAL: [Subhead] Japan's **Occupation** (*senryō*) of Manchuria (Tōsho's *Sekaishi*, p. 302)

CASE D, ORIGINAL: In 1932 the League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission, whose report **concluded that Japan's action [in Manchuria] was an act of aggression** (*shinryaku*). (Sanseidō's *Nihonshi*, p. 300)

CASE D, FINAL: In 1932 the League of Nations dispatched the Lytton Commission, whose report **did not recognize the Japanese action [in Manchuria] as an exercise of legitimate rights of self-defense** (*seitōna jieiken no hatsudō*). (Sanseidō's *Nihonshi*, p. 300)

In all four cases, the change has the effect of toning down the sense of aggression that the original version suggests. The word "aggression" is replaced by "advance" or disappears altogether.

3. To reduce the severity of Japanese war crimes.

CASE A, ORIGINAL: In the occupied areas the local people were oppressed and exploited. **On the battle front in China the Japanese were accused of reinforcing the so-called Three All policy (sankō seisaku).**² Chinese and Koreans were taken to Japan to become forced laborers in mining and other fields.³ To resist the relentless rule of the Japanese, anti-Japanese movements were spreading out in the occupied areas.

FOOTNOTES:

² **Destroy all** (*ryakukō*), **kill all** (*satsukō*), and **burn all** (*shōkō*), as the policies were called on the Chinese side.

³ **From 1939 to 1945, a minimum of more than 600,000 Koreans and approximately 50,000 Chinese were taken to Japan.** (Jikkyō's *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

CASE A, FINAL: In the occupied areas the local people were oppressed and exploited.² **To resist the relentless rule of the Japanese, anti-Japanese movements were spreading out in the occupied areas, and the Japanese army took measures to maintain security.**³

FOOTNOTES:

² There were about 40,000 Chinese who were taken to Japan proper and became forced laborers.

³ During the Pacific War, the Japanese forces were troubled by the guerrilla warfare under the command of the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese forces launched a pacification campaign in the anti-Japanese base in the middle part of the Hopei Province in China in May-June 1942, which was referred to as the “Three All” campaign (burn all, kill all, and destroy all), and criticized. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

Here Japanese war crimes such as the “Three All” policy and forced labor are removed from the text and mentioned only in footnotes. Notice, also, that the scale of the devastating “Three All” policy is substantially reduced in that it now took place in one location (mid-Hopei) and for a short period (one to two months) only. In addition, the policy is instituted to maintain security in the occupied area, making it defensive rather than offensive. The Korean forced laborers now are left out in both the text and footnote, as they are considered “citizens” of the Japanese empire.

CASE B, ORIGINAL: On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a newly completed atomic bomb on Hiroshima, **killing** (*korosu*) **200,000 people** in one blow. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

CASE B, FINAL: On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a newly completed atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and **more than 100,000 people sacrificed** (*gisei*) **their lives** in one blow. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

Here, the death toll is reduced. Notice, also, that the victims in Hiroshima are no longer “killed,” but “sacrificed” their lives for their country.

CASE C, ORIGINAL: [In Okinawa] throughout the fighting, by June 1945, **approximately 100,000 military personnel and 200,000 civilians died**. The boys and girls in such units as “Iron-Blood Loyal Force” and “Red Starlily Force” also **sacrificed their lives**. And, about 800 Okinawans were killed by the Japanese army for interfering with the prosecution of the war. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

CASE C, FINAL: [In Okinawa] throughout the fighting, by June 1945, approximately 94,000 military personnel and their dependents (including about 28,000 native Okinawans), 55,000 residents who helped out with the war (including the boys and girls in such units as “Iron-Blood Loyal Force” and “Red Starlily Force”), and 39,000 ordinary residents involved in the war had sacrificed their lives. The total death toll of Okinawans reached approximately 20 percent of the prefecture’s population. (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 318)

Notice the death toll is carefully itemized. The grand total is now 190,000, military and civilians combined, which is substantially less than previously charged (300,000). The killing of the 800 or so Okinawans for interfering with the prosecution of the war is entirely eliminated.

4. To rationalize the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

CASE A, ORIGINAL: While propagandizing the plan of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” to **justify aggression, Japan was plotting to advance to Southeast Asia.** (Jikkyō’s *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

CASE A, FINAL: While propagandizing the plan of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” **Japan was plotting to advance to Southeast Asia to secure such important resources as gasoline, tin, and crude rubber.** (Jikkyō’s *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

Here, the phrase “justifying aggression” is eliminated, and the “advance” to Southeast Asia is given a justification.

CASE B, ORIGINAL: Japan argued that this war was intended to liberate Asia from Western invasion and oppression, building “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

CASE B, FINAL: Japan argued that this war was intended to liberate Asia from Western invasion and oppression, **and to facilitate the independence of the Asian peoples,** by building “the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” (Jikkyō’s *Nihonshi*, p. 316)

Here the phrase “to facilitate the independence of the Asian peoples” is added to give more weight to the justification for “the Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

5. To shift the responsibility for the war away from the Japanese government.

ORIGINAL: **As America, Britain, China, and Holland (the Dutch)**

formed the ABCD encirclement, they facilitated an economic blockade against Japan, which was used by the Japanese government to rationalize a war. (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

FINAL: The "ABCD Encirclement," an economic blockade against Japan formed by America, Britain, China, and Holland (the Dutch), kept deepening the sense of national crisis among our people. (Jikkyō's *Sekaishi*, p. 323)

Here, the "sense of national crisis among our people" is used to replace a straightforward admission of the government's mistake in rationalizing the war. Also, the "ABCD Encirclement" is now being emphasized as the very factor forcing Japan to go to war. It is the ABCD allies, therefore, rather than Japan, that should be held responsible for starting the Pacific War.

6. *To place the Tokyo Tribunal in a negative light.*

ORIGINAL: In November 1948, Tōjō Hideki and seven others were found guilty, and their death sentence was carried out in December. By this time, the suspects who were not prosecuted were released. **Those who received sentences other than death were all released by 1958.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

FINAL: In November 1948, Tōjō Hideki and seven others were found guilty, and their death sentence was carried out in December. By this time, the suspects who were not prosecuted were released. **There were criticisms of this tribunal for being one-sided, facilitating the victors' justice.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

Here the issue of "victors' justice" is brought up in the name of presenting a "balanced" view of historical events.

7. *To rehabilitate the image of the emperor.*

ORIGINAL: There were some people among the Allied powers **who voiced their demand that the emperor be put on trial** (*tennō o saiban-ni kakeyo-no koe*). **Because of a political design centering around the United States and the United Kingdom, the emperor was exempted from consideration as a war-crimes suspect.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

FINAL: There were some people among the Allied powers **who**

voiced questions regarding the emperor's responsibility for the war (*tennō no sensō sekinin o tou*). **Out of consideration for the Japanese people's sentiments, the emperor was not listed as a war-crimes suspect.** (Yamakawa, *Shōsetsu Nihonshi*, p. 333)

Here, the accusatory tone is subtly lowered. Now instead of there being a demand that the emperor be put on trial, he is subject to inquiry about his war responsibilities. Also, the emperor is not even listed as a defendant, owing to "consideration for the Japanese people's sentiments," not because of political reasons within the United States and Britain.

It is clear that on many occasions the imposed revisions lead to a distortion of historical facts. Unfortunately, this disturbing consequence is heartily welcomed by some parts of Japanese society, particularly the conservative leadership. The former Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki is reported to have asked, "Why must we fling mud at the history of Japan with our own hands?"⁵³ Nationalism is often cited to justify the revision, and "noninterference in domestic affairs" is used to ward off protests from abroad.⁵⁴

In order not to "fling mud at the history of Japan," to use former Education Minister Fujio's words, a new textbook would be needed. Indeed, as mentioned above, the certification in 1986 of the new textbook *Shimpen Nihonshi* (New version of Japanese history), published by Hara Shobō in Tokyo in 1987 amid storms of protest at home and abroad, marked a new phase of textbook revision in Japan.

The new textbook was jointly written by nine people, including Muramatsu Takeshi, a respected professor at Tsukuba University. These writers, known for their Japanese-empire-centered view of history (*kōkoku shikan*), "would not hesitate to testify on behalf of the government against Ienaga in the textbook law suit."⁵⁵ As revealed in the press release, in addition to the nine writers, many other individuals and organizations were involved in the writing and publication. Specifically, the new textbook was "supervised" (*kanshū*) by Murao Jirō, a former deputy minister of education, and "edited" (*henshū*) by the National Association for the Protection of Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi). The "supervisor" and "editors" are politically colorful personalities in con-

temporary Japan, and the National Association for the Protection of Japan, founded in 1981, is noted as a right-wing organization. The president of the association, Kase Shinichi, former Japanese ambassador to the United Nations and an influential adviser to the Nakasone administration, is a staunch ultranationalist. The executive director, Mayuzumi Toshirō, a renowned composer by profession, has been a spokesman for ultranationalistic campaigns in recent years. The association is committed to campaign for a constitutional amendment to revive the power of the emperor and to legalize rearmament, favoring ultranationalism and militarism, which the Allied occupation sought to discourage. The leaders of this association reacted strongly to the protests from China and Korea against textbook revision in Japan in 1982, blaming the Japanese government for adopting a soft stand because it committed itself to correcting historical errors in Japanese textbooks. As they were not happy with the general performance of all existing history textbooks, they decided to produce their own.⁵⁶

This new textbook differs from its peers in several ways. First, like its prewar predecessors its text is written vertically from right to left according to the traditional style, which is in direct contrast to the horizontal writing from left to right found in all postwar history textbooks.⁵⁷ Also, it is widely rumored in education circles that the process of certification in 1986 was different from the normal course, and there are reports of favoritism from the Ministry of Education, including extensions of deadlines.⁵⁸ In spite of the fact that the textbook inspectors at the Ministry of Education demanded that eight hundred items, an unusually large number, be corrected and that many of these demands were ignored by the writers, the textbook was certified. The most striking abnormality was the personal involvement of Premier Nakasone Yasuhiro and his minister of education, Kaifu Toshiki. Moreover, despite the existence of traditional departmental lines within the bureaucracy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is said to have been called on to polish the diplomatically sensitive texts.⁵⁹ The message is plain that the premier and his ruling party were favoring the new textbook as a model history for Japanese schools. The enthusiastic response to the new textbook from leading intellectuals is also revealing. Sakamoto Tarō, a highly respected Japanese historian, gave high marks to the new orientation embodied in

this book, arguing that it distinguished itself from the left-wing approach, from the emphasis on self-criticism, and from a defeatist historical viewpoint commonly found in postwar textbooks.⁶⁰ Many more paid tribute to the publication.⁶¹ The internationally acclaimed critic Etō Jun praised this work as a “very beautiful and brilliant textbook” which provided a breakthrough in the “pitiful situation” of foreign-dominated education throughout the forty-one years (1945–1986) since Japan’s defeat. He likened the new textbook to an “air hole” (*kazaana*) in the suffocating mind-set in contemporary Japan.⁶²

In the treatment of the Pacific War, indeed, this new textbook takes a more revisionist and Japan-centric view, and draws to a greater extent on materials that present Japan in a more favorable light than did the general run of earlier postwar textbooks. This is perhaps the only textbook certified in 1986 that refuses to refer to the war as the “Pacific War.” Following the wartime practice, it consistently refers to the war as “the Greater East Asian War,” which, according to wartime propaganda, was not an aggressive war but a “sacred war” (*seisen*). The term “the so-called Pacific War” is given in parentheses when the “Pacific War” appears for the first time in the text.⁶³ In dealing with the background of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, which led to Pearl Harbor, the book introduces a series of events, including Chiang Kai-shek’s success in the northern expedition, the international support for Chiang, the Manchurian strong man Chang Hsüeh-liang’s anti-Japanese measures, and “organized anti-Japanese activities” throughout China, that give the impression that Japan’s military actions in Manchuria were necessary to resist intensified Chinese offensives against Japan.⁶⁴ Another example is a fuller account of the “Hull Note” to stress that Japan was forced to go to war by the United States. The book states that on November 25, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded that Japan withdraw all its armies from China (including Manchuria) and French Indochina, recognize the Chungking government as the only legitimate government of China, renounce the Tripartite Pact, and return to the situation before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The text ends with an emphatic conclusion: “This was in fact an ultimatum (*saigo tsūchō*), containing conditions unacceptable to Japan.”⁶⁵

Two other examples demonstrate the textbook’s desire to shift the

responsibility for the war. First, the textbook contends that the Tōjō cabinet, in spite of its efforts to prepare for war, continued its effort to avoid a war with the United States through intensive diplomatic negotiations. It was the United States that adopted the view that a war with Japan was unavoidable.⁶⁶ Second, in a box inserted in the upper column of the page, the writers quote and footnote two entries from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson's diary to stress the impression that members of the American leadership were the real warmongers. The first entry, dated November 25, 1941, quotes President Roosevelt plotting with Stimson and other members of the War Cabinet: "How do we induce (*yūdō*) Japan into a situation where it will fire the first shot?" This quotation in Japanese translation leads one to believe that the president wants a war and plans to entrap Japan into such a war by making it the first to fire. The second entry from Stimson's diary, recorded two days later, quotes Hull telling Stimson and Navy Secretary Admiral Frank Knox that as he would discontinue negotiating with Japan for peace as early as November 27, 1941, from then on the whole question of war and peace would be in the hands of the army and navy.⁶⁷ That is to say, Hull and other American leaders had secretly decided to go to war with Japan at least ten days before Pearl Harbor.

It is clear that the entries are quoted and translated in such a way as to stress the United States' responsibility for the war. Let us take the first entry as an example. The original entry in Stimson's diary reads as follows:

November 25, 1941. At 12 o'clock we (viz., General Marshall and I) went to the White House. . . . There the President, . . . brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1, 1941], for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.⁶⁸

The difference in nuance between the Japanese quotation and the original is subtle and significant. President Roosevelt's "maneuver," rather

than “induce,” was indeed extremely urgent and necessary, because he had reason to fear a surprise attack by Japan in a matter of five to six days. According to intelligence reports, Japanese forces continued their southward movements, aiming at the southern point of Indochina and landing in the Gulf of Siam, ignoring repeated warnings from the United States and England. A war with Japan was deemed inevitable. In view of the division in Congress on the issue of war, however, the president and his officials decided to refrain from militarily or diplomatically irritating the Japanese. As General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, who was present at the War Cabinet meeting in question, testified at a Congressional hearing in 1946, the presidential “maneuver” was really meant to be nonmilitary.⁶⁹ It was also not meant to be a diplomatic maneuver.⁷⁰ The “maneuver” was a political strategy to cope with a forthcoming war, not necessarily a military scheme to “plot” or to “induce” the Japanese into firing the first shot as the Japanese quotation, being out of context, tends to suggest.

This new textbook implies that a new economic and strategic consideration was a cause of the war. In its original version the book held that the Japanese government decided to fight with the United States because of a strategic assessment that with the embargo on gasoline and other important materials, the Japanese fighting ability was bound to be weakened. This assessment drove Japan to make up its mind in spite of the awareness that there was a convincing gap in favor of the United States in terms of productivity.⁷¹ As pointed out by a critic, this sort of statement is no more than repetition of wartime claims.⁷² In the final version, a chart entitled “Production of Major Materials in Japan and the United States: A Comparison” is inserted to show the huge gap between the two countries in the production of steel, coal, aluminum, and oil from 1929 to 1944. One has the impression that the embargo was genuinely effective in forcing Japan to go to war.⁷³

This new textbook is also inclined to distort historical facts in a subtle way. Concerning the start of the Pacific War, the following statement is given to confuse the time sequence and reduce the unethical behavior exhibited in the Japanese surprise attack: “On December 8 [1941], Japan declared war on the United States and England, and the air

force of the Japanese navy struck destructively the American Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and the British Far Eastern Fleet off the coast of the Malay Peninsula.”⁷⁴ Here, the Japanese attack came after the declaration of war, which is untrue. The ultimatum of war was delivered to Secretary of State Hull by Japanese ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō several hours after the raid in Hawaii and Singapore. Also, the usual terminology for the “surprise attack” (*kishū*) on Pearl Harbor and Singapore, which has appeared in almost all other textbooks, is avoided so as to give an impression the attack was merely a normal military action.

Japanese war crimes and atrocities are kept out of the text. The Nanking Massacre is mentioned ambiguously in a footnote: “The battle of Nanking was extremely fierce. Now China is demanding that Japan reflect deeply on the sacrifice of the Chinese military and civilians (the so-called Nanking Massacre) after the fall of Nanking.”⁷⁵ In the statement above it is not clear whether there was a massacre in Nanking. The students are given the impression that since fighting between China and Japan at the Chinese capital was “extremely fierce,” heavy casualties could be expected. And yet from hindsight China demanded that Japan reflect on the Chinese loss (the “so-called Nanking Massacre”). There is no mention of the rapes and senseless killings alleged in the Nanking Tribunal and other international sources.⁷⁶

Furthermore, Japan’s war responsibilities are ignored entirely. The only statement in the book about the hardships suffered by the Chinese people during the war is quite confusing. The students are told that after the fall of Nanking, the Chinese Nationalist government moved to Chungking and continued to receive military and material aid from England and the United States through Burma for its fight against the Japanese. The students are also reminded: “Consequently the front line was extended, effecting a long-term war. Meanwhile, the suffering of the people in various parts of China, which became battlefields, deepened.”⁷⁷ Rendered in this way, it is not clear whether the Chinese government, the British and American aid, or the Japanese aggression should be responsible for the deepening suffering of the Chinese people.

Although many textbooks certified in 1986 cite the belated response of the Japanese to the Potsdam declaration and the American

anxiety to save more lives by ending the war sooner as important reasons for the atomic bombs, the *New Version of Japanese History* does not give any reason at all. It gives only figures of casualties in the Japanese armed forces, particularly in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo. The caption to a picture of Tokyo on March 10, 1945, emphasizes that "the American air force not only destroyed our war plants, but also burned down our common folks' residences by dropping incendiary bombs."⁷⁸

Regarding the Tokyo Tribunal, the original version of the new textbook bluntly calls it "victors' justice."⁷⁹ This direct accusation disappears in the final version. But a long footnote is added to give details of the legal controversy over the trial. The note draws on the opinions of two justices, Radhabinod Pal of India and Bert V. A. Roling of the Netherlands, ignoring the opinions of the majority of the justices.⁸⁰

This is one of the very few textbooks to treat the problem of the repatriation of Japanese nationals after the war. But only a partial, gloomy account is given concerning the repatriation from China. The students are told that because of the civil war and the trial of war criminals in China, repatriation was delayed, which led to the loss of many Japanese lives.⁸¹ Here the positive side of the repatriation is ignored. None of the moving stories about Japanese indebtedness to the Chinese for the relatively smooth repatriation is told. In a work that has been widely adopted as a textbook for modern Japanese history in the United States, the highly respected Japanese-American historian Mikiso Hane has in effect disputed the negative claim above by substantiating that the repatriation in China revealed the "goodwill and magnanimity" of Chiang Kai-shek, who told his fellow countrymen to "cease regarding the Japanese as enemies and treat them as friends."⁸² It is only fair to say that under unusually difficult conditions in China immediately following the war the completion of such a massive repatriation of more than six million Japanese nationals in three short years can hardly be regarded as a "delay" at all.

In the final analysis, one can detect in this new textbook an echo of the "Positive View of the Greater East Asian War." Unlike other textbooks, this new book emphatically stresses the "purpose" of the "Greater East Asian War" as follows: "Japan decided to name this war the

'Greater East Asian War' (so-called Pacific War), whose purpose was to establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japan's leadership and to expel the European-American powers from Asia."⁸³ At the end of the chapter, a concluding remark reiterates this "purpose" by echoing the "Positive View of the Greater East Asian War": "This war facilitated an opportunity for the speedy collapse of the European domination that had exploited Asia for a long time. Also, it made it possible for the Asian peoples, who, in spite of their suffering from the severe battles during the Japanese occupation, stood up and realized their independence through various changes."⁸⁴

The students may well learn from this new textbook that the whole story of the Pacific War is simple: under unusually difficult conditions Japan set out to start the "Greater East Asia War" to expel the Western powers from Asia with a clear consciousness that Japan might need to sacrifice itself because of its inferior productivity and technology. And the students may learn that history has proven Japan right in that many Asian peoples, indeed, gained their independence at the end of the war, leaving Japan a lone victim. Here, the struggle for independence in Southeast Asia is entirely ignored. In this new textbook, therefore, the immediate target of the struggle, namely, the Japanese empire, which remained unmistakably the common, demonic enemy to people throughout Southeast Asia, has been uncharacteristically converted into a savior. In the minds of the writers and editors, Japan's unhappy past would thus be calmly buried, and the younger generation would no longer be burdened by the guilt-ridden history.

In conclusion it must be stressed that all the Japanese textbooks under review are genuine and for the most part sincere attempts to acquaint students with complex and controversial problems. They are well written, straightforward, and highly informative. The overwhelming adoption of the notion of the Pacific War or the "Fifteen Year War," instead of the usual, West-centered notion of "World War II," can be understood as a painful effort to search for objectivity. It has been shown that under pressure from the conservative ruling party the Japanese government has been forceful in tightening control of the textbooks through the certification system. A comparison of the original and final

versions of textbooks clearly illustrates the revisions imposed by the Ministry of Education. The textbooks tend to stress more the positive aspects of the war without condemning the Japanese leaders for their mistaken assessments and deeds. What the ruling party calls the Marxist, anti-establishment, and unpatriotic elements in older textbooks are indeed fast diminishing.

In many Japanese textbooks the United States is seen as the malevolent upholder of world order. The students are told that the United States was the original source of the depression that threw the whole world into chaos. The American support for China, the embargo against Japan, the Hull Note, and President Roosevelt's "plot" have been seen as factors directly responsible for forcing Japan to go to war. Unsurprisingly, the unwarned attack on Pearl Harbor is viewed as a strategic measure without any special historical significance.

Japanese war crimes and the brutalities of Japanese rule in China and other areas are occasionally mentioned in some textbooks, but efforts are also made to hint at or stress the reason for such drastic measures. For instance, the Nanking Massacre, if mentioned at all, is often stated to have occurred as a result of fierce fighting in which casualties could hardly have been avoided. There is a tendency to reduce casualties caused by Japanese military actions in the Japanese textbooks. Many books simply do not give statistics. None reports the American casualties at Pearl Harbor.

However, the damage in Japan, particularly the devastating power of the atomic bombs, is described in great detail with pictures, charts, maps, and other visual aids. The Tokyo Tribunal is increasingly seen as a show of "victors' justice." The repatriation of Japanese, which the human race had never previously confronted on such a massive scale, is distorted. All textbooks mention the reforms in postwar years under General Douglas A. MacArthur, but none reports the American monetary and material aid. Nor does any textbook mention the goodwill shown by the Chinese in renouncing their rights to war reparations under Chiang Kai-shek and later Mao Tse-tung. Paying reparations to China, where many people were killed and substantial damage was caused by the Japanese invasion, would have delayed Japan's "economic miracle" to a great

extent. In sum, the Pacific War is reduced to a dog-eat-dog battle among powerful nations, and Japan is placed in a comfortable no-fault position.

The certification in 1986 of the controversial *New Version of Japanese History* further reveals the Japanese leadership's desire to "right the wrong" in a wrong direction. Given the weakening of the intellectual left and the growing of the right wing in recent years, the fear of domination by the controversial new textbook in the future is not entirely imaginary.⁸⁵ The immediate impact of this new textbook cannot be overestimated. The organized efforts that have rallied around the ultranationalistic Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, the editors of the textbook, have introduced a new concern for the future of history textbooks in Japan. It used to be that following the guiding principles of the ruling LDP the Ministry of Education imposed "anti-leftist" revisions on the textbooks submitted for certification. Now it has also become necessary for the Ministry of Education to check the extreme "right-wing" bias and distortion in textbooks. But there is reason to doubt that under the conservative LDP, the Ministry of Education would really do anything to hurt its relations with the right-wing textbook writers and publishers.

The fundamental problem in Japanese history textbooks is more serious than one might expect. None of the textbooks under review asks the vital questions: Were the Japanese people guilty during the Pacific War? What actually went wrong in Japan? How can one facilitate, as urged recently by some Japanese leaders, a "deep self-reflection" over the military mission that caused "unbearable agony and sorrow?"⁸⁶ These books raise no questions about the weakness of the opposition and the lack of a strong defense of the parliamentary system. Some textbooks provide clues, stressing the fascist control of the military through the powerful special police. Many instead blame China, the United States, and other Western powers for the tragedy. One can therefore conclude that ghosts from throughout the Pacific, from Nanking to Pearl Harbor and Singapore, would find the treatment of the Pacific War in Japanese textbooks increasingly disappointing.

Given such a background, one should not have been surprised to see the passing of the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor in 1991 with the

ruling LDP rejecting the idea of making an official apology to the United States. One can also understand that the continuity of wartime ideas and values, which the LDP has been forcefully imposing on history textbooks, is genuine, persistent, and widespread. The anger and anxieties in the United States and in Japan's Asian neighbors⁸⁷ are therefore understandable. By the same token, the worries in the minds of some of the leaders in Japan are also understandable.⁸⁸ Politics has been increasingly dictating policy in a peculiar way in the domains of scholarship and education. Now it makes one wonder if it is too much to ask for objectivity in textbook writing in Japan. One cannot be optimistic, as one will be likely to exclude Japan and the Japanese textbook writers from the answer to Marc Ferro's question: "And then, tomorrow, which nation, which human group will still be able to control its own history?"⁸⁹

POSTSCRIPT: Based primarily on information available before 1989, this paper takes a rather pessimistic view of the future of history textbooks in Japan. Developments in Japan over the last few years, however, should have a positive impact on the writing of textbooks. Former Premier Kiichi Miyazawa's apology to Korea regarding the "comfort women," the apologetic remarks made by the reigning emperor during his visit to China, the Hosokawa administration's unreserved recognition of Japanese war crimes in Asia, and the Japanese supreme court's recent decision in favor of Ienaga in the 1965 lawsuit, will probably help to check the revisionist tendency in Japan in the years to come. It appears that it is possible, after all, that Japan will "be able to control its own history" in the right way.

NOTES

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1. Marius B. Jansen, "Education, Values, and Politics in Japan," *Foreign Affairs* 34.4 (July 1957), p. 666.
2. Marc Ferro, *The Use and Abuse of History: Or How the Past Is Taught* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. vii. I am grateful to Professor Paul Solon of Macalester College for his suggestion regarding this reference.
3. Saburō Ienaga, *The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 255.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Kubo Yoshizo, *Tai-Nichi senryō seisaku to sengo kyōiku kaikaku* (Tokyo: Sansaidō, 1984); Suzuki Eiichi, *Nihon senryō to kyōiku kaikaku* (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1983); Harry Wray and Takahashi Shirō, *Senryōka no kyōiku kaikaku to ken'etsu* (Tokyo: Nihon kyōiku shinbunsha, 1987); Joseph C. Trainor, *Educational Reform in Occupied Japan: Trainor's Memoir* (Tokyo: Meisei University Press, 1987).
7. Ienaga, *Pacific War*, p. 252.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
9. Hayashi Fusao, "Dai Tōa sensō kōtei ron," published in *Chūō kōron* serially in 1963, which was published in book form in two volumes in 1964 and 1965. Also, Ueyama Shumpei, *Dai Tōa Sensō no imi* (Tokyo, 1964).
10. In 1955 the Democratic Party issued three pamphlets under the general title *Ureubeki kyōkasho no mondai*. According to Jansen, "This was prepared by a party commission which drew on records of a House of Representatives committee as well as on many popular attacks on textbooks. It tried to link the Teachers' Union with the Japanese Communist Party and charged that union leaders were writing misleading and slanted texts which were poisoning the minds of the young. . . . The attack was badly overdone." Jansen, "Education, Values, and Politics in Japan," p. 670.
11. Ienaga Saburō, "The Historical Significance of the Japanese Textbook Lawsuit," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 2.4 (Fall 1970), pp. 5–8.
12. Ienaga filed lawsuits against the government in 1965, 1967, and 1984. For details see Ienaga Saburō, *Kyōkasho saiban* (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1981) and Morikawa Kinjū, *Kyōkasho to saiban* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1990). In 1982, the supreme court overturned the decision of the Tokyo high court on the 1967 lawsuit and decided in favor of the Japanese government. As for the lawsuit filed in 1965, it was not until 1993 that the supreme court reached its decision in Ienaga's favor.
13. Yue-him Tam (Tan Ruqian), ed., *Fan-Jih Kai-shi nu-hou-chi* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Company, 1991).

14. Ibid., pp. 329–331.
15. “‘Shimpen Nihonshi’ no gōin-na tōjō,” *Kyōkasho repōto* '87 (Tokyo: Shuppan Rōren, 1987), pp. 2–29.
16. The director general of the project was Masato Tokuyama, managing director of the Japan Textbook Research Center in Tokyo, and the staff director was James Becker of Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. There were six American reviewers (Ronald Di Cenzo, Robert Ferrell, Carol Gluck, Grant Goodman, David L. Grossman, and Tetsuo Najita) and fifteen Japanese reviewers (chairperson: Atsuhiko Bekki). *Japan/United States Textbook Study Project: Joint Report* by the Japan Textbook Research Center and the International Society for Educational Information in Tokyo and the National Council for the Social Studies in Washington, D.C., 1981 (hereafter referred to as *Joint Report*).
17. For comments of the American reviewers on the textbooks for Japanese history for tenth to twelfth grades, see *ibid.*, pp. 39–40; for their comments on the textbooks for world history, see *ibid.*, p. 42.
18. Ibid., p. 1.
19. Ibid., Appendix A “Japanese Textbooks.”
20. Ienaga, *Pacific War*, p. xiii.
21. The series includes six books bearing different titles such as *Nihonshi* and *Kindai no sekai to Nihon*. The dates of certification of the six books are as follows: 1953, 1954, 1956, 1961, 1965, and 1968. These six books were popularly adopted for classroom use by Japanese schools from 1954 to 1970.
22. *Kyōkasho repōto*, 1957 to 1975.
23. Toyoda Takeshi, a former teacher at Jōkōshi (Tokyo Women’s Higher Normal School, currently Ochanomizu Women’s University), was a staff writer and later head of the section responsible for Japanese history textbooks for elementary and secondary schools in the Ministry of Education in the early years of the occupation. A protege of a leading ultranationalistic historian, Kuroita Katsumi, of Tokyo Imperial University, Toyoda adopted prewar views in his textbooks and often disagreed with his American supervisors, including Joseph C. Trainor who was director of the textbook project at the Civil Information and Education Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See Trainor Papers, Box 55, Conference Report, May 8, 1946.
24. This source book, hereafter referred to as *TSTK*, was edited and published by the Ienaga Soshō Shien Shimin no Kai in Tokyo in 1970.
25. Ibid., certified 1959, p. 120.
26. Ibid., pp. 108–109.
27. Ibid., certified 1953, p. 102.
28. John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), pp. 203–290.
29. *Joint Report*, pp. 103–104.
30. Ibid., p. 104.
31. Ibid., p. 110.
32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 111.
34. Ibid., p. 112.
35. Ibid., p. 104.
36. Ibid., p. 105.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., certified 1956, p. 125.
39. Ibid., p. 110.
40. Ibid., p. 115.
41. Ibid., p. 211.
42. Ibid., certified 1954, p. 116.
43. Ibid., p. 105.
44. Ibid., p. 116.
45. Ibid., p. 117.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 118.
48. Ibid., p. 118.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. For a close look at the screening system, see Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō o Shien-suru Zenkoku Renrakukai Kyōkasho Seido Kentō Iinkai (Representative: Nagai Kenichi), ed., *Minnade kangaeyō: Nihon no kyōkasho seido* (Tokyo: Kyōkasho Kentei Soshō o Shien-suru Zenkoku Renrakukai, 1982).
52. Shuppan Rōren Kyōkasho Taisaku Iinkai, ed., "*Nihonshi*" "*Sekaishi*" *kentei shiryō-shū: Fukatsu-suru Nihon gunkoku-shugi to rekishi kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Shuppan Rōren, 1982). This source book includes problematic passages in both the original and final versions of the Japanese history and world history textbooks certified in 1982 and adopted by schools after 1983. The Japanese history textbooks are: *Shin Nihonshi*, published by Sanseidō; *Nihonshi*, Jikkyō Shuppan; *Kōtō gakkō Nihonshi*, Gakkō Tōsho; *Nihonshi*, Sanseidō; *Kōkō Nihonshi*, Sanseidō; *Shōsetsu Nihonshi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa Shuppan; *Nihon no rekishi shimpan*, Yamakawa; *Yōsetsu Nihonshi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa; *Kōtō gakkō shin Nihonshi*, Jiyū Shobō; and *Kōtō gakkō shin Nihonshi*, Daiichi Gakushōsha. The world history textbooks were: *Sekaishi* published by Tokyo Shoseki; *Shin sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Sanseidō sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Sekaishi*, Jikkyō Shuppan; *Kōkō sekaishi*, Sanseidō; *Kōtō gakkō sekaishi*, Shimizu Shoin; *Kōtō gakkō shin sekaishi saishimpan*, Teikoku Shoin; *Shinsho sekaishi saishimpan*, Teikoku Shoin; *Shōsetsu sekaishi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa; *Sekai no rekishi shimpan*, Yamakawa; and *Yōsetsu sekaishi (shimpan)*, Yamakawa.
53. Leslie Helm, "Japanese Decide Not to Apologize for Pearl Harbor Attack," originally in *Los Angeles Times*, reprinted in *Saint Paul Pioneer Press* (St. Paul, Minnesota), December 7, 1991.
54. Tam Yue-him, *Fan-Jih*, pp. 45-59.
55. *Kyōkasho repōto* '87, p. 16.
56. Satō Nobuo, *Rekishi kyōiku to sensō sekinin* (Tokyo: Azumino Shobō, 1988), pp.

- 90-91. As for Mayuzumi Toshirō's view of Japanese history, see his dialogue with Hoshino Yasusaburō, entitled "Tokubetsu taidan: hinomaru kimigayo to tennōsei," in *Kikan kyōikuhō rinji zōkangō* 58 (Tokyo, August 1985), pp. 42-60. Also see Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," *Asahi jōnanu* (Tokyo: September 5, 1986), pp. 6-12.
57. See the accompanying pamphlet, *Shimpen Nihonshi: Atarashi rekishi kyōkasho ga tanjōshimashita*, ed. Hara Shobō (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1986).
58. Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," pp. 10-11.
59. Premier Nakasone allegedly told the editors of the textbook before its certification in 1986: "I myself have read the entire book from the first page to the end. I think this is a very good textbook. One way or another I will see to it that this book will be published as a textbook. But we have various hurdles, and also have to consider diplomatic problems. Especially, we have to honor the official opinion issued by the cabinet secretary general [Miyazawa Kiichi] in 1982. Along this line of thinking, I wish to beg the writers and the editors to tolerate the intolerable and to endure the unendurable. Trust me, one way or another we will settle the matter by publishing the work as a textbook." For Premier Nakasone's and the education minister's connection with the textbook, see the remark by Mayuzumi Toshirō, in Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," p. 11. For the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, pp. 12-17.
60. See Sakamoto's recommendation in the accompanying pamphlet (see n. 57 above).
61. About five hundred people of note paid tribute to the new textbook by participating in a celebration party to commemorate its certification, jointly organized by nationalistic organizations such as Shin-Nihon Kyōgi-kai in Tokyo on July 22, 1986. For details, see Murakami Yoshio, "Fukkochō kyōkasho no naimaku," pp. 6-13.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
63. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 228.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 218.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. Quoted in Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 517. I am grateful to Professor Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago for suggesting the idea of looking at the original entries in the diary.
69. General Marshall testified, "They [the president and those present at the meeting] were trying to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that would not only protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also that in anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a military arrangement." *Ibid.*, p. 523.

70. General Marshall also testified, "I mean the expression he [Stimson] is using relates to what would be the diplomatic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight." *Ibid.*, p. 521.
71. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, p. 10.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 227.
74. *Ibid.*
75. *Ibid.*, p. 225, n. 2.
76. For an English bibliographical review of major works in all languages on the Nanking Massacre, see Daqing Yang, "A Sino-Japanese Controversy: The Nanking Atrocity as History," *Journal of Sino-Japanese Studies* 3.1 (November 1990), pp. 14-35.
77. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 224.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
79. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '87, p. 26.
80. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 234.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
82. Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 345.
83. *Shimpen Nihonshi*, p. 228.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
85. Despite the obvious support from the LDP leadership, the new textbook will have a long way to go before it dominates the market. Its share of the total market (1,372,800 copies) in 1987 when it first appeared was an insignificant 0.6 percent, representing 8,876 copies. Its sales went up to 9,357 copies in 1988, but decreased slightly, to 8,665 copies, in 1990. *Kyōkasho repōtō* '92, p. 66.
86. Helm, "Japanese Decide Not to Apologize."
87. For the anger and anxiety in China, see "Li-shi pu-neng wang," in *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), December 8, 1991.
88. For instance, in the early summer of 1986 on the eve of the certification of the *New Version of Japanese History*, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported to have expressed worries that this new textbook would eventually nullify the diplomatic efforts toward reestablishing friendly relations with China and other Asian countries during the last forty years. Quoted in the article "'Shimpen Nihonshi' o osotta gaiatsu to naiatsu," by Kabajima Yuzo, *Bungei Shunju* (Tokyo, September 1986), p. 161.
89. Ferro, *Use and Abuse of History*, p. vii.

GLOSSARY

- Chang Hsüeh-liang 張學良
 Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石
 chühei 駐兵
 Chükyō 中教
 Chükyō Shuppan: Chügakusei no shakai-ka
 中教出版: 中学生の社会科
 Dai Tōa Sensō kōtei ron
 大東亞戦争肯定論
 Etō Jun 江藤淳
 Fujio Masayuki 藤尾正行
 gakushū shidō yōryō 学習指導要領
 gisei 犠牲
 hachiku no ikioi 破竹の勢
 hachiku no shingeki 破竹の進撃
 hai-Nitchi undō o riyō 排日運動を利用
 Hara Shobō 原書房
 henshū 編集
 Hopei 河北
 Ienaga Saburō 家永三郎
 Jikkō 実教
 Kaifu Toshiki 海部俊樹
 kanshū 監修
 Kase Shinichi 加勢伸一
 kazaana 風穴
 keizai no shinshutsu 経済の進出
 kentei seido 検定制度
 kishū 奇襲
 Kōkō Sekaishi 高校世界史
 kōkoku shikan 皇国史観
 korosu 殺す
 Kuni no ayumi 国のあゆみ
 Mao Tse-tung 毛澤東
 Mayuzumi Toshirō 黛敏郎
 Minshushugi 民主主義
 misshitsu kentei 密室検定
 Miyazawa Kiichi 宮沢喜一
 Muramatsu Takeshi 村松剛
 Murao Jirō 村尾次郎
 Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曾根康弘
 Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi
 日本を守る国民会議
 Nihonshi 日本史
 Nikkyōso 日教組
 Nomura Kichisaburō 野村吉三郎
 Okano Seigo 岡野清豪
 ryakukō 掠光
 saigo tsūchō 最後通牒
 Sakamoto Tarō 坂本太郎
 sankō seisaku 三光政策
 Sanseidō 三省堂
 satsukō 殺光
 seisen 聖戦
 seitōna jieiken no hatsudō
 正当な自衛権の発動
 sekai no fukeiki no shingenchi
 世界の不景気の震源地
 Sekaishi 世界史
 senryō 佔領
 Shimpen Nihonshi 新編日本史
 shinryaku 侵略
 Shinshō Sekaishi 新詳世界史
 shinshutsu 進出

shōkō 燒光

Shōsetsu Nihonshi 詳説日本史

shuppei 出兵

Taiheiyō Sensō 太平洋戦争

Taiheiyō Sensō to kyōkasho

太平洋戦争と教科書

Teikoku 帝国

tennō o saiban-ni kakeyo-no koe

天皇を裁判にかけよの声

tennō no sensō sekinin o tou

天皇の戦争責任を問う

Tōjō Hideki 東條英機

Tōsho 東書

Toyoda Takeshi 豊田武

Yamakawa 山川

Yōroppa no tenchi-ni makiokotta dōran no

hi no te wa yagate Tōyō-nimo oyonda

ヨーロッパの天地にまきおこった動乱

の火のてはやがて東洋にもおよんだ

yūdō 誘導

zaibatsu 財閥